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“We must create a civilization where we can realize the best of human potential. 
This book helps us to understand how this vision is being realized in Asia today.”
—Muhammad Yunus, Nobel Laureate and Founder, the Grameen Bank
“In today’s world, leaders must rely on partnerships that connect across business, gov-
ernment and civil society. In Asia, partnerships are in evident display. Ruth A. Shapiro tells 
us how they help address our shared problems in ways that create win-win solutions.”
—Dominic Barton, Managing Director, McKinsey & Company
“Charity has had a long and noble history in Asia. It has not, however, been the study 
of much research or documentation. Pragmatic Philanthropy makes an important 
contribution to understanding the way in which social investment in Asia takes place.”
—Victor K. Fung, Group Chairman of the Fung Group
“Kiva is working in 80 countries. While some aspects of our work are consistent 
throughout the world, we have learned that it is essential to have on the ground 
knowledge in each of the localities where we make loans available. We must have 
trustworthy local partners and be familiar with local laws and practices. Dr. Ruth A. 
Shapiro’s insights come from decades of work in Asia. This book provides a very 
helpful view into the way philanthropy and other types of social investment gets 
done in the region.”
—Premal Shah, Co-Founder & President, Kiva
“As every great social entrepreneur knows, and as the Skoll Foundation has learned 
from our work with them, context matters. What works in Bangladesh may not 
translate to Indonesia, and vice versa. Successful social investment depends upon 
local knowledge and uptake, as Ruth A. Shapiro demonstrates in this valuable 
volume. Here she shares insights gained from her work in Asia together with some 
of the world’s most promising philanthropists. Pragmatic Philanthropy: Asian 
Charity Explained is essential reading for change-agents working across the Asian 
continent, and for those seeking to support them.”
—Sally Osberg, President and CEO, Skoll Foundation
“We are beginning to see dramatic increases in interest and activity in philanthropy 
in China and throughout Asia. We also need to see a commensurate degree of 
research and understanding of the sector. This book is a worthwhile effort to help 
close the gap between interest and impact.”
—Xiulan Zhang, Professor and Former Founding Dean, School of Social 
Development and Public Policy, Beijing Normal University, China
“Although non-profit corporations have been in existence in a legal sense since 1898, 
the Kobe earthquake of 1995, which was followed by other natural disasters, has been 
a wake-up call for Japan. We see the need for citizens to be active in addressing our 
shared concerns, whether they are helping vulnerable people or reconstructing a dev-
astated area. Studies like the one carried out by the Centre for Asian Philanthropy and 
Society help us to learn valuable lessons about what works in taking on these roles.”
—Tatsuo Ohta, Chairman, The Japan Association of Charitable Organizations
“This book exemplifies the reason that I agreed to go on the board of the Centre for 
Asian Philanthropy and Society—it provides world-class analysis to a field that is 
understudied and misunderstood. For too long, philanthropists have worked on the 
premise that the rigor and analysis they use in their businesses are not applicable to 
their charitable investments. The opposite is the case as these types of investments 
are more difficult to measure and can touch the lives of many. Dr. Ruth A. Shapiro’s 
book helps us to understand the dynamic nature of the Asian philanthropic sector 
and make more informed choices about how we invest our time and our resources.”
—Elizabeth Eder Zobel de Ayala, Chairman Teach for the Philippines
“More and more people are thinking about philanthropy in a more methodical, 
intelligent way. It is important to understand deeply the issues you are dealing 
with and support solutions that make the most impact. Grounded in research and 
evidence, this book helps us to see how this trend is accelerating across Asia.”
—Jamshyd Godrej, Chairman, Godrej and Boyce
“Our own Trust Barometer shows that trust is in crisis around the world. Nonprofit 
organizations tend to be more trusted than governments and companies but even 
their numbers are going down. In Asia, this lack of trust has significant ramifica-
tions for philanthropy and the charitable sector. This book helps us to understand 
why trust is in such short supply, why this matters and what we can do about it.”
—Richard Edelman, Chief Executive Officer, Edelman
“The Djarum Foundation’s work is grounded in community help, tolerance and 
mutual assistance. These are values that are integral to who we are and are shared 
by many in Indonesia and throughout out Asia. Pragmatic Philanthropy explains 
how these values underpin programs and practices of helping each other in Asia.”
—Victor Hartono, Chairman, The Djarum Foundation
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Today, we often hear of the differences between India and China. And 
while there are differences, there are also some striking similarities. Both 
countries have extraordinary histories, great and enduring philosophies 
and have arrived in the twenty-first century having rekindled their impor-
tance on the global stage. Both are moving past the damaging influences of 
colonial legacies as well as self-inflicted wounds while strengthening insti-
tutions and recognizing the benefits of being part of a globalized world.
As you read this book, you will see how much India and China have in 
common. In both countries, as in Asia more broadly, there is a tradition of 
taking care of one’s family, one’s clan, one’s village. It is a tradition of 
charity where the more fortunate are expected to step up and help take 
care of those less so. There are expectations that when you are in need, the 
affluent will lend a helping hand. The richer helping the poorer has a long 
and storied history in our countries.
We also face similar challenges. Both countries have pulled millions out 
of poverty but both still have millions continuing to endure economic hard-
ship. Both countries have created extraordinary wealth but wrestle with the 
challenge of extreme income inequality. Both countries are grappling with 
how to best organize local giving while at the same time dealing with the 
agendas of foreign donors. We are also trying to come to terms with China 
and India’s international influence increasing at a time when the world order 
that has been in place since the end of World War II is in a state of flux.
There are other fundamental questions on the table. What does it mean to 
be part of a community? What are the responsibilities of those who have 
toward those who have not? And how does ancient ways of interacting with 
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one another meld with modernity, technology and a cosmopolitan worldview? 
All of these big questions are embedded within the world of philanthropy.
This book looks at how these questions play out in the choices people 
make about how to help each other in eleven Asian economies. Culture 
and history surely play a role as does information and data. Throughout 
Asia, societies are evolving and new models of governance are being tested. 
Some of them will succeed and others will not but in the iterative process 
of moving forward, we will all continue to explore and experiment with 
the relationship between governments, companies and people.
Since the end of World War II, the United States has been the most 
dominant power in the world, with its soft power extending far beyond mili-
tary and economic might. America has helped shape the way we think, the 
way we act, the way we dream and the way we treat one another. Much of 
this influence has been very positive and the world has welcomed the values 
prescribed in a Judeo-Christian set of principles. Now, at a time when India 
and China are once again becoming dominant world powers, the question 
is: what will be the influence of our soft power? This book, by casting a 
spotlight on Asian philanthropy, is coming at a pivotal moment in time.
We are pleased to be part of this conversation. Both of us have long 
embraced our fortunate ability to make contributions to improving people’s 
lives and helping to progress societies. We see more and more of our peers 
coming to the realization that we have a role to play and we should do so with 
intention and with care. Post war modernity, globalism, education, and vari-
ous reforms have accelerated job and wealth creation as well as philanthropy.
This book fills the important need of shining a light on the patterns of 
philanthropy and volunteer organizations in Asia today. It provides mod-
els and strategies of effective engagement as well as showcasing the changes 
now taking place.
We are pleased to be part of bringing this important book to the grow-
ing number of donors and philanthropists, government policymakers, 
non-profit leaders, teachers and students who may be drawn to social ser-
vice and philanthropy and who can really use the information and insights 
contained here. For while we are living in extraordinary times, our human-
ity is what makes our world worth living in.
Chairman Ronnie C. Chan 
Hang Lung Properties Ltd.
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CAPS, Hong Kong SAR, China
Asian philanthropy is not well understood. Although charity has come 
through individual and family efforts in the region for millennia, only in 
recent years has philanthropy developed as a widespread, systematic prac-
tice. It is growing and becoming increasingly important to society. Studies 
on the topic are rare—there are more than ten times as many books on 
American philanthropy as on Asian philanthropy—despite the evidence of 
a new approach to giving in Asia. Asian philanthropic ventures are not fol-
lowing the path of their Western counterparts, but rather are advancing 
along their own lines. These uncharted waters need maps.
This book aims to show how Asian philanthropy works. The traits of 
Asian philanthropy differ from similar practices in the West. These traits 
are visible across national lines, under many kinds of government, and in a 
variety of disciplines. They are adaptations to the unique environment in 
which Asian giving takes place.
What makes Asian philanthropy different, and why has it been so little 
studied? The most obvious answer is that until relatively recently, Asia has 
been poor. Given the region’s remarkable growth in recent years, it is hard 
to remember that only in the last generation have significant numbers of 
Asians approached the common living standards of the West. Korean 
development was slow following the “temporary” conclusion of the 
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Korean War in 1953. It wasn’t until 1978 that South Korea became a 
middle-income economy.1 In India, almost a third of the population lives 
below the poverty line. Even China, which has moved more people out of 
extreme poverty in the past 30 years than any nation has done before, still 
struggles with its impoverished past; more than 200 million Chinese con-
tinue to live on less than $1.25 per day.2
When lifting itself out of poverty, Asia naturally focused on economic 
development first. Without much perceived wealth in a given nation, less 
attention went to sharing it. But that has changed dramatically in recent years. 
Singapore, which at the time of its independence in 1965 lacked adequate 
sanitation and housing, now has a per-capita income of $56,700, the third 
highest in the world. China now has more billionaires than the United States.3
It is difficult for those outside of Asia to see how rapid and transformative 
the growth in wealth has been. China went from having a per-capita income 
of $1100 in 1994 to $6300 in 2015. India went from $600 to $1800 in the 
same period. Indonesia’s leap has been even greater, reducing the percent-
age of those living in poverty from 23.4 percent of the population in 1999 
to 11.3 percent in 2014, an extraordinary achievement.4
While the average per-capita income in many Asian countries might still 
not be high, the numbers reflect much more disposable income in general. 
Many people and many nations in Asia have moved firmly into middle- 
income status, and within them, there are high earners with incomes far 
above the mean.
There are many analyses of what Asian countries did right in order to 
bring about this dramatic shift. One of the most influential of these was The 
East Asian Miracle, published by the World Bank in 1993, which explained 
the rise in income of eight Asian economies from 1965 to 1990 due to two 
fundamentally important policies and programs: (1) sound fiscal policies 
creating overall macroeconomic stability, and (2) the development of human 
capital through the provision of universal primary education.5
It makes sense that the poor are not philanthropists, nor is there a wide-
spread tendency to create nonprofit organizations to help others when one 
is worried about food, shelter, and health care. Only with the availability of 
disposable income can philanthropy rise, alongside the creation of social 
delivery organizations (SDOs). Until recently, most philanthropy in Asia 
came from Western foundations and through development assistance. This 
is changing. Asia is the most dynamic and fast-growing economic region in 
the world, and philanthropy is rising as the economies grow.
A second reason for the sparse track record of Asian philanthropy is a 
dearth of information. Until now, Asia-based universities have focused 
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their attention on other issues. Given the need to concentrate on economic 
development, this is not surprising. It is also not surprising that the situa-
tion is changing rapidly. University departments looking at philanthropy 
and civil society have come into existence in the past few years. In some of 
the region’s top universities, departments dedicated to the study of philan-
thropy and/or nonprofit management are emblematic of this trend. The 
National University of Singapore (NUS) created a program in 2011, Hong 
Kong University in 2014, and Tsinghua University in Beijing in 2015.
The “AsiAn WAy”
To get an accurate picture of the charitable sector in any region, it helps to 
understand how society views philanthropy and social delivery organiza-
tions. The cultural propensity to give and receive charitable donations var-
ies not only by place but also over time. In Chapter 2, we provide the 
historical overview by country. Here, we can note that while there is great 
variation throughout Asia, there is one clear strand throughout much of 
Asian history: the tendency to give first and foremost to family and clan.
Even in the West, philanthropists give partly out of self-interest. Certain 
wealthy donors like to have their gifts noted for the public, or even to have 
new buildings and developments named after them. Some gifts are made 
partly for tax purposes. Asian donors value these things, too, but they go 
a step further. In making philanthropic donations, Asians commonly 
donate as a function of personal contacts as well as to organizations that 
expand their business networks. Thus, donations typically enhance per-
sonal and business relationships while also providing support to some 
important work.
Support for such efforts is influenced by each nation’s legal and regula-
tory environment, which in turn stems from historical precedent. Laws 
encouraging or discouraging the giving and receiving of philanthropic 
donations change with time. In Asia, such laws are in flux to a greater 
degree than in the West. There is widespread ambiguity and confusion 
about what the sector can do. There are two major reasons for this.
One reason is that in Asia, people are still shaping their views about 
who is responsible for supporting the social sector. Isn’t government sup-
posed to be responsible for providing education, health care, jobs, and 
livelihood? Isn’t government supposed to insure the health, well-being, 
safety, and security of its citizens? In short, of course, the answer is yes. But 
organizations and individuals can also help provide a social good. In a 
modern world, with decentralized information and ample digital tools, 
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government might no longer be best suited to delivering all services and 
goods deemed necessary for the social contract. In the wake of the Asian 
and global financial crises, governments might also not be ideally posi-
tioned to promote all programs for the general good. Public and private 
outreach can work in tandem to keep a stronger social contract.
The second reason is that, in Asia, there is not widespread consensus on 
the value proposition of civil society and the role of private citizens. For a 
Western reader, this question may seem surprising as the establishment of 
nonprofit organizations, of think tanks, of private philanthropy does not, 
in the overwhelming majority of cases, pose any existential risk to the gov-
ernment. In a robust democratic society, multiple opinions, analyses, 
activities, and outcomes are not only tolerated but also lauded. In the 
West, a paramount role of civil society is to check the power of the govern-
ment and of the private sector. Civil society is an integral component of a 
pluralist system. Even the term civil society is often used to mean the col-
lective voices of the people as opposed to government and business. In Asia, 
many see democracy as a messy process with unclear benefits. In fact, dem-
ocratic participation isn’t as widely valued as economic growth, stability, 
and other measures of societal progress. In Asia, the term civic engagement 
might be more accurate than civil society.
If this sounds like modern China, such values are indeed in place. But 
questions about the costs of democracy come up in many places, with many 
people. Even in countries with strong democratic histories such as India and 
the Philippines, there is more than a little frustration expressed about the 
difficult nature of democratic decision-making processes and the role of 
civic actors further complicating the process. This frustration can help to 
explain why in both countries, “strong men” Narendra Modi and Rodrigo 
Duterte were recently elected as the heads of state. In countries with more 
authoritarian regimes, the question of what role private actors play in deliv-
ering a social good becomes a front-burner issue. In fact, in many Asian 
countries today, including India, China, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines, new laws and regulations for the creation and conduct of phil-
anthropic and social delivery organizations are being proposed and enacted, 
some promoting the practice and others restricting it.
When governments implement restrictions, they are frequently aimed 
at advocacy groups. When Westerners read about governments limiting 
the reach of non-governmental organizations in Asia, they are typically 
reading about groups endeavoring to change the status quo in ways 
broader than addressing the specific societal challenge. A group seeking 
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to improve eye care in rural China or Indonesia may well be accepted, 
but one aiming to strengthen citizen legal representation may not.
Though the discussion about the role that advocacy groups play in soci-
ety is a worthwhile one, it is not the point of our study and of this book. 
We are confining our analysis to social delivery organizations (SDOs), 
those aiming to provide social benefits within the given political frame-
work of each nation, and even among those, to groups working in areas 
associated with basic human needs such as education, health, poverty alle-
viation, and the environment. Advocacy organizations working in areas 
such as human rights, legal reform, and labor issues do important work, 
but it is also necessary to clarify the differences between these types of 
efforts and those that seek to address challenges lower on Maslow’s hier-
archy, which places food, shelter, and health among our basic needs.
The distinction between SDOs and advocacy organizations can be dif-
ficult to ascertain. Many SDOs also advocate for regulatory change around 
a specific set of issues. As we will see later in the book, a number of the 
organizations we studied were encouraged to provide input to the govern-
ment. Bainian Vocational Services, for example, worked with the govern-
ment to change the scope and availability of vocational training 
opportunities for children of migrant workers and the rural poor. Eden 
Social Welfare Foundation pushed government to create greater access for 
the disabled in Taiwan, and the Magic Bus was instrumental in getting the 
Indian government to change educational policies and programs around 
sports and athletic programs.
But when we talk about advocacy organizations and those that are 
encountering resistance in Asia, we are specifically referring to those orga-
nizations that combine two elements: (1) they do not have intervention 
programs and spend 100 percent of their time and financial resources on 
policy change; and (2) these changes are perceived by government as 
antagonistic rather than complementary. Throughout Asia, the largest 
donations to these types of organizations come from outside the region. 
For this reason, states such as India and China are reassessing the way that 
foreign funding comes into the country and the types of organizations it 
supports. Currently, in many countries around the world, the degrees of 
freedom for foreign-funded advocacy organizations are shrinking. This 
book does not make a judgment about these changes, but merely attempts 
to describe the phenomena and the possible ramifications on local philan-
thropy and SDOs.
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In the chapter on changing government policies we will explain in 
greater detail why this is the case, but the simple answer is that within the 
Asian context, there is far less appetite to fund efforts that publicly criticize 
government. Although there has not been perfect harmony between the 
views of government and private businesses or individuals, they have often 
worked in tandem on aligned agendas related to economic growth. While 
that is true to an extent in other parts of the world, we will see throughout 
this book that there are important differences between Western civil soci-
ety and Asian civic engagement.
What are the roles of philanthropic and non-governmental, SDOs in Asia?
The primary role is to help others in need because it is possible to do 
so. Helping others is an integral tenet of what it means to be human and 
has been promoted through the ages in civilizations around the world. 
The premise and intent are clear. More difficult to determine are the dif-
ferences in definition and motivation between charity and philanthropy. 
Are they alike? Charity is the act of giving money, food, or other kinds of 
help to people who are poor, sick, or need other types of help. Philanthropy 
is an active effort to promote human welfare. In other words, philan-
thropy is a formalized and systematic process of being charitable. This 
book deals with organizations and organized, systematic approaches to 
helping those in need.
The context for such efforts necessarily includes government. Individual 
and corporate philanthropy is on the rise, but it is a small amount com-
pared to public spending. In the United States, with the largest and most 
active philanthropic sector in the world, American foundations together 
spent about $375  billion on all programs and sectors, compared to 
$3.8 trillion in federal spending for 2015. Of that federal money, more 
than $1  trillion went to health and human services. Private donations 
remain much smaller. This means that even in the United States, with the 
largest and most robust philanthropic organizations, private funds equal 
only a small fraction of the financial resources spent by the government.
As a result, one effective use of philanthropic investment is in areas not 
ordinarily underwritten by government. This thinking results in pilot proj-
ects, basic research, riskier ventures in a variety of sectors, and much of the 
support for arts and humanities.
Our research shows that in Asia, there is an implicit social contract at 
work. As will be described in greater detail later in the book, Asian 
 philanthropy tends not to go to advocacy organizations, but is in line with 
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and often in partnership with governmental objectives. Though societal 
forces are driving a revision of this contract in many places, our study 
shows fundamental differences in how philanthropy and nonprofit organi-
zations work alongside and with governments in the region. Much of this 
can be understood by looking back at the concept of the “Asian way.”
The concept of Asian values or the term Asian way came into popular use 
under Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore and Malaysia’s Mahathir Mohamad in 
the 1990s. The term is used to describe a cultural predisposition toward 
harmony and collectivism rather than individualism. These preferences also 
entail greater acceptance of benevolent authoritarian regimes, those offering 
greater material wealth and a rule-based, but harmonious, society.
The term Asian way has been both embraced and condemned. The 
notion that there is a difference in how societies in Asia are structured and 
evolve, compared to their Western counterparts, has been disputed for 
years. Many scholars predicted that Asia would be like the West once given 
enough time as many Western nations had more similar conditions a gen-
eration or two ago. Indeed, the term Asian way has been out of favor for 
years, and the region’s heterogeneity means the concept is probably too 
grand and sweeping to cast much light on its modern connotations. But 
as seems clear from our study, there is some truth to elements of an Asian 
way, an implicit social contract with government and the deeply rooted 
tendency to seek harmony.
With this concept, Lee and Mahathir strove to counter the view that 
Asia is remarkably diverse by saying that within their own multiethnic 
countries, there are common traits and behaviors that allow for a more 
collectivist mindset and agenda. It’s a bold aim. How can one make state-
ments about a region that covers 50 countries and more than 4.5 billion 
people? While it would be ridiculous to say that Asia is homogeneous, one 
can say that there are certain cultural tendencies and behaviors that can be 
seen across many countries, especially those in East, Southeast, and to a 
certain extent South Asia. Certain concepts that have emerged from our 
research— community, cooperation, collaboration—underpin societies 
across the region, and they provide useful hooks on which to place under-
standing about Asian philanthropy.
With the above points in mind, a number of Asian governments have 
begun to come to terms with the existence and benefits of encouraging 
private philanthropy and the organizations that receive these funds. This is 
not to say that there are not also rules as to how, when, and where the 
funds and their beneficiary organizations are to work.
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The effect of these rules can easily be seen in Singapore, one of the 
leaders in recognizing the positive role of citizen engagement in the social 
sector. Since 2009, qualifying donations have been granted a 250 percent 
tax deduction including a period of time when it went up to 300%. Not 
surprisingly, charitable contributions have gone up significantly; 30 per-
cent since the law took effect.6 According to many donors, this move by 
the government was important not only because of the tax benefit, espe-
cially as the tax rate in Singapore is low, but also because it signals to the 
public that the government endorses this kind of giving. Such signals carry 
tremendous weight in other Asian nations as well. In Singapore’s case, as 
in a number of other Asian countries, it is important to understand that 
only those organizations aligned with government policies are able to get 
the appropriate accreditations to qualify for receiving these donations.
Elsewhere in Asia, government policy has been less targetted. In India 
and China, there has been a seemingly mixed set of policies. On the one 
hand, both governments have endorsed rules to encourage increased giv-
ing, but on the other, they have enacted constraints on existing organiza-
tions and philanthropies. The policies result from wariness of advocacy 
groups alongside an increasingly positive view of less controversial philan-
thropy flowing to social delivery organizations.
India is the first country in the world to require the top companies by 
market share to provide 2 percent of their after-tax profits to corporate 
social responsibility activities. As with Singapore, the funds need to go to 
accredited organizations or government projects, which include programs 
to eradicate hunger, boost education, improve environmental practices, 
and to support the prime minister’s relief fund. A company can implement 
these activities on its own, through its own nonprofit foundation, or 
through independently registered nonprofit organizations that have a 
record of at least three years in similar activities. Not surprisingly, the law 
has spurred a boom in the establishment of NGOs in India—as well as in 
the number of consultants to advise companies on how to spend the funds.
At the same time, India has put foreign organizations, such as the Ford 
Foundation, under increased scrutiny. Since coming into office, Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi has linked foreign funding received by some 
NGOs to the ongoing unrest in the country, and he has emphasized the 
importance of more tightly regulating the sector.7 In April 2017, the 
Indian government revoked the licenses of nearly 9000 nonprofit organi-
zations that had received donations from the West. This move was seen as 
retaliation—along with restrictions placed on the activities and funds of 
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Greenpeace and the Ford Foundation—against groups that had taken 
anti-Modi stances. At first blush, the two policies of encouraging corpo-
rate giving and clamping down on foreign funding for NGOs seem schizo-
phrenic. The reality is more nuanced. The Modi government encourages 
programs in line with its own development and social agenda. Whether or 
not it is fair, it has a utilitarian logic. Most organizations went along with 
the directive. One international foundation spokesperson said, “We believe 
that our role is to provide catalytic support in areas that are aligned with 
the priorities of the government of India.”
In China, the government has also been warming to the constructive 
possibilities of philanthropy and SDOs. That may be due to recognition of 
their benefits, or because the state realizes it cannot, alone, address the 
impending needs of an aging, more demanding populace. In either case, 
support of SDOs has received official endorsement. Chapter 39 of the 
5-year plan (2011–2015) states that it seeks to “Strengthen the supervi-
sion and management of social organizations including cultivation, devel-
opment, management and supervision of social organizations, promoting 
their healthy and orderly development…reflecting appeals of the citizenry 
and standardizing behavior.”
China is working out the extent to which NGOs can have latitude in 
crafting and implementing their own solutions. The recently enacted char-
ity law followed 11 years of consultation and discussion with many in the 
sector worried it would concentrate primarily at curtailing foreign-funded 
advocacy organizations, those posing a risk to its “ideological security.”8 
That does not appear to be its sole intent: the law addresses ways of mak-
ing charitable donations and the use of funds more transparent and 
accountable, decreasing the likelihood of fraud. But the law does regulate 
the types of donations a tax-exempt organization can receive and how and 
how quickly the funds must be spent. The law also calls for local govern-
ment agencies to get more involved in overseeing nonprofits, and it is 
unclear how supportive or open-minded local officials will be. Time will 
tell if the law will make civic engagement easier and more effective, or not.
Conflicting attitudes toward NGOs are apparent in other ways. In 
February of 2016, President Xi Jinping called on wealthy Chinese to help 
the poor through philanthropy—fitting timing when many high-net- 
worth individuals are seeking purpose with their wealth. Yet around the 
same time, Beijing began to modify the law allowing foreign nonprofit 
organizations to operate in China. The adjustment seemed to be aimed 
primarily at those organizations engaged in advocacy work. As Ma Jun, 
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founder of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs (IPE) 
explains, “Nonprofit organizations in China must recognize the reality of 
our national condition.”9 Social work, in line with government policy, is 
encouraged. Advocacy work is more narrowly tolerated, if at all.
The trend is clear. Some governments in Asia will allow and even 
encourage increased activity from philanthropic and social delivery organi-
zations, as long as their work suits the government’s own agenda.
A “TrusT DeficiT”
Legal fluctuations have been an important factor contributing to a wide-
spread “trust deficit” among SDOs, donors, government, and the public 
at large. SDOs are not viewed with the same confidence they inspire in the 
West, and many individuals curtail their giving as a result. In fact, in our 
interviews with dozens of high-net-worth individuals around Asia, lack of 
trust in local organizations was the number-one reason cited for the low 
degree of giving to Asia-based organizations.
Murky and fluctuating regulations and tax policies signal to the public 
that government is unsure about philanthropy and social delivery organi-
zations. It is not surprising that with the Singaporean tax subsidy, philan-
thropic giving went up considerably. There are other reasons for the trust 
deficit, however.
The most damaging influence on public trust in SDOs has been the 
wide, varied, and highly public scandals that have affected the sector, most 
especially those that include fraud and the misuse of donated funds. Most 
Asian nations have had recent experiences with these types of public scan-
dals causing quite a stir in their home economies. The growing role of 
social media and its freer flow of information has expanded awareness of 
many such incidents. In 2011, a woman claiming to be an employee of the 
Red Cross in China posted a picture of herself with her new Maserati, 
 raising popular fury. The Red Cross denied that she was an employee, but 
an official investigation was never undertaken, and the public remained 
suspicious that funds had been misused.
In any case, official donations dropped more than 80 percent as a result. 
Even squeaky-clean Singapore had a very public scandal, when one of the 
nation’s largest charities, the National Kidney Foundation, was found to 
have misappropriated funds in 2005.
Lack of transparency and disclosure by SDOs has not eased such wari-
ness. In most Asian countries, SDOs are not required to be transparent. 
R.A. SHAPIRO
 11
In Korea, most large nonprofit organizations list some financial informa-
tion on their websites; but because they are overseen by different minis-
tries, each of which has different reporting requirements, the type and 
quality of the information they provide is varied and weak. In India, 
accountability expectations are low, and only 600 NGOs out of an esti-
mated 500,000 have so far subscribed to the high standards of the 
Credibility Alliance, a watchdog aiming to improve trust through better 
governance.
In China, work by the China Foundation Center (CFC) has helped 
foundations become increasingly transparent. Because many foundations 
in China are actually operating organizations, the work of the CFC covers 
a number of SDOs. Those organizations choosing to be transparent, by 
providing their annual reports for public viewing and through other 
means, tend to find it easier to raise necessary funds. CFC now has data on 
4000 foundations.
Social delivery organizations are often not required to be transparent, 
and many lack the expertise and skills to provide this information even if 
they want to. Any such inability adds to the perception of charities as lack-
ing in skill, talent, and effectiveness. Some presume they need not learn 
such skills beyond showing cost savings. That perception is changing as 
impact and effectiveness become more important than measures of over-
head and costs. The skill set of SDOs is also improving as more people 
choose to go into public service either out of college or as an “encore” 
career. Business engagement, especially through corporate social responsi-
bility programs, is also improving the professional skills and understanding 
of SDO staff members. In Chapter 7 we will explore various ways that 
business is playing a role in influencing the sector and expectations for the 
SDO sector.
Much of this is new. University programs in this sector have not been 
around long, and they are still not widespread. Furthermore, there are few 
supplemental training programs outside of university. SDO staff might 
have hearts of gold, but they often have not been shown how to establish 
solid accounting systems, to evaluate their impact, or to tell stories of their 
programs in a professional manner.
Lastly, a factor that increases distrust is the question about how to 
define an NGO or a nonprofit organization. Currently, there is no Asian 
nation that legally differentiates advocacy organizations from social deliv-
ery organizations. This reality, coupled with a lack of transparency, means 
that it is often unclear what a given group aims to do and how well it will 
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be tolerated. Although many SDOs do have an advocacy component to 
them, it might be useful to designate those with the sole aim of policy 
change from those that are carrying out programmatic initiatives.
An empiricAl AnAlysis
So what makes a successful SDO? What makes an effective philanthropist, 
and what constitutes good philanthropic practices?
With the increasing number of philanthropists in Asia, some funders 
and consultants have stepped up to offer guidance as they determine what 
and how they will fund, though the number of organizations in this space 
remains very small compared to the West. The Centre for Asian 
Philanthropy and Society (CAPS) is one of the few Asia-based organiza-
tions doing work in this space. We understand that just as in business, the 
most effective strategies may vary with the location. To determine which 
approaches worked best, we began our substantive, empirically based 
research on effective practices within the Asian context.
Asian economies have done very well in the past couple of decades, 
creating a growing middle- and high-income class in the region. Disposable 
income translates to the purchase of consumer goods such as phones, tele-
visions, and cars, but it also means that many more have the ability to 
think about giving back to their communities, about addressing societal 
inequalities, and about improving education, health care, and the environ-
ment, among other issues. In Asia, the result is an increase in the number 
of SDOs, and also a rise in the activity of philanthropists.
Throughout this book, we will use the term social delivery organization 
(SDO). As will be explained in a subsequent chapter, the term NGO (non- 
governmental organization) is not appropriate as many of these organiza-
tions are connected to the government. Nonprofit organization is also not 
appropriate given the rise of social enterprises and other profit-making 
income streams.
Asian philanthropists are making news. Take, for example, Ronnie 
Chan, CAPS’ Hong Kong-based chairman. Mr. Chan and his brother 
Gerald donated US$350 million to Harvard University in 2015, at that 
time the largest contribution in Harvard’s history. Or look at Azim Premji, 
who put US$2 billion into his foundation for innovative improvements to 
India’s 1.3 million government-run schools. More and more individuals 
are joining this nascent field to deploy growing funds, create more pro-
grams, and bring positive changes to the quality of people’s lives.
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To get a clear view of what is happening on the ground in Asia regard-
ing philanthropy and SDOs, CAPS has carried out 30 case studies and 
other research with 42 partners in 11 economies. Each of the case studies 
is available on our website (www.caps.org/research). This book shares our 
findings across the case studies and answers the following questions:
• Is there an “Asian” way of doing good? If there is, why so, and what 
are the implications?
• What is the Asian philanthropy and social delivery ecosystem, and 
how has it evolved?
• What are the characteristics and strategies of successful Asian SDOs?
• Why is it important to distinguish between SDOs and other types of 
nonprofit organizations?
• What are trends of Asian philanthropists and why?
• What are shared challenges for the region?
• What can donors, SDOs, policymakers, and the public at large do to 
enable the social sector to thrive and contribute to improving the 
lives of people throughout the region?
Why cAse sTuDies?
We needed to understand if there are important differences in how ideas 
are formulated, coalitions built, and work undertaken in Asia. To do so, 
we sought out successful organizations to analyze the ingredients that 
enabled their success. We also studied their funders and other philanthro-
pists in the region to see if there are shared characteristics involved with 
their giving.
Subjects of the case studies as well as our partners in this project vary in 
type. Some are nonprofit organizations. Others are quasi-governmental 
groups, and yet others are corporate foundations. Several combine busi-
ness enterprise with social good. Landwasher, a for-profit firm, has found 
a low-energy way to provide sanitation systems in China. The Eden Social 
Welfare Foundation in Taiwan provides services and generates 25 percent 
of its income from businesses involving the disabled. Our studies on other 
hybrids of profit/nonprofit and public/private partnerships help us see 
the different roles they play in their respective contexts.
Each of our chosen groups aligns with the priorities of the Sustainable 
Development Goals, a set of 17 global benchmark issues broadly seen as 
essential. We focused on four categories: education, health, poverty 
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alleviation, and the environment. Another criterion was that each be 
free from scandal, not a simple requirement when many groups are 
stronger on passion and commitment than on record keeping and 
accounting. We wanted organizations with impeccable credentials.
All are local groups, not local branches affiliated with international 
organizations. Some of our donors questioned this criterion, as they have 
close relationships with global organizations. But international nonprofits 
come with established tool kits; they have governance systems, know how 
to fundraise, and conduct measurement and evaluation. We wanted to 
know how local conditions influenced all of those we studied from the 
start. We felt so strongly about this that we had to let one donor to walk 
away when she would not support this focus to our learning—a tough 
decision for a new organization operating on a shoestring!
Finally, we wanted to find organizations that offered an opportunity to 
learn something new—those that had introduced an innovation, or scaled 
their impact, or had evolved in a meaningful way. We wanted each case 
study to offer useful lessons.
The case studies have allowed us to identify characteristics and strate-
gies of successful Asia-based SDOs. Through them, we have been able to 
interact with a range of Asian philanthropists and business leaders to gain 
deeper awareness about what motivates them in their giving. These ben-
efits together allow us to paint a picture of the state of the field today.
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CHAPTER 2
Old Money—The History of Giving in Asia
Heesu Jang
H. Jang
CAPS, Hong Kong SAR, China
In 2010, Warren Buffett and Bill Gates visited China to convince their 
Chinese millionaire and billionaire counterparts to commit to giving large 
portions of their wealth to charity. During this time, the Western media’s 
portrayal of the philanthropic landscape in China, such as that by The 
Associated Press, was that it was “relatively immature.” Journals readily 
noted that while China’s GDP has recently come to reach half of America’s, 
the United States philanthropic market was still 21 times larger.1
Like China, other Asian economies are frequently subject to similar 
news coverage whenever prominent Western businessmen pay visits to 
promote philanthropy throughout the region. While it celebrates its Gates, 
Ford, Carnegie, and Rockefeller families as generous and selfless champi-
ons of philanthropy, it calls for greater action from Asia as a whole.
Admittedly, Asia is outnumbered, outweighed, and outscored by the 
West on most fronts within the charitable sector. The West in general 
boasts more philanthropists, more individual donors, and more organiza-
tions, not to mention the sheer amount and scope of donations. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the claims of the media, the clear superiority of 
the West in these measures does not dictate Asia’s capacity for doing good.
To better make sense of this apples-to-oranges comparison between 
Asian and Western philanthropy, one must first revisit the difference and 
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the relationship between charity and philanthropy defined by the first 
chapter of this book: philanthropy is a formalized and systematic process 
of doing good, while charity is the act of doing good itself. That is, even 
though philanthropy in Asia may be “relatively immature” due to the 
 continent’s rather late economic growth and exposure to the concept, his-
tory tells us Asians, too, know how to be charitable and generous.
Four key historical experiences are shared by most, if not all, Asian econo-
mies. First, Asians emphasize caring for the well-being of fellow community 
members, from family to locality. Second, religions significantly influence 
the giving and helping behaviors and patterns of Asian countries and peo-
ples, with many religious institutions even going so far as to deliver social 
services to the people. Third, modern civil society in most Asian countries 
flourished as either a challenging force against, or as a direct result of, twen-
tieth-century colonialism. Finally, the public image and personality of mod-
ern civil society in Asia has been shaped by past interactions and experiences 
with powerful central governments. This chapter will explore in greater 
detail these themes of community, faith, colonialism, and authoritarianism 
for each of the 11 Asian economies, to demonstrate how Asia’s long history 
of generosity and charity will help pave way for a philanthropic tomorrow.
IndIa
Socioeconomic incongruities coexist in India. Considered one of the lead-
ing developing countries in terms of annual GDP growth, India still suf-
fers from nationwide poverty. One in five Indians is poor, and an estimated 
270 million citizens live below the poverty line.2 Basic sanitation, health 
care, education, and other social services are not readily available to much 
of the local population.
Accompanying some of these alarming challenges are promising trends. 
India is renowned for its advanced information technology sector, as well 
as for housing major homegrown multinational corporations across vari-
ous industries. It boasts more than 100 billionaires, consistently ranking 
India in the top five with the likes of the United States, China, and 
Germany.3 And it is the largest democracy in the world.
India’s philanthropy reflects such contrasts. With socioeconomic hard-
ships alongside a dynamic marketplace full of new wealth, the gap for 
Indian charity and philanthropy to tap into is glaringly apparent.
Preceding this present-day environment favorable for charitable indi-
viduals and institutions is a rich track record of giving—both informal and 
formal—that predated even the pioneers in American philanthropic  history. 
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From the late nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, India for 
the first time witnessed the establishment of modern foundations by 
prominent members of the private sector, including the J.  N. Tata 
Endowment Scheme (1892) and the N. M. Wadia Foundation (1909).4
India also possesses a deeply ingrained culture of informal giving.5 
Providing financial and non-financial support to one’s immediate family 
and community (caste, village, or other extended social groups) is com-
mon. This culture resonates across the country today: 24  percent of 
donors reported having given money to their friends, neighbors, and col-
leagues, while 53 percent of donors indicated that an unreturned loan to 
a family relative is a donation.6 Families also provided various social ser-
vices to their domestic helpers in addition to their paid salary. Clothing 
and food were common donations, along with financial contributions to 
their health care and their children’s education.
Finally, donating for religious purposes has historically been a major 
part of Indian giving. In fact, charitable religious endowments and trusts 
came before modern philanthropic institutions. Donations frequently 
went to Islamic endowments specifically for charitable purposes, known as 
waqfs, and to trusts like the Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams that man-
aged Hindu temples and provided social services such as schools and hos-
pitals. India’s organic institutionalization of philanthropy and long culture 
of family, community, and religious giving attest to the country’s preexist-
ing familiarity with and maturity in doing good.
This homegrown charity and philanthropy reflects India’s strong faith- 
based textual roots to its generous culture. Hinduism—the most wide-
spread religion in India today—Buddhism and Islam all contribute to 
Indians’ inclination to do good. The concepts of zakat (almsgiving) and 
sadaqaat (voluntary offerings) in Islam and of bhiksha (food given as alms) 
and avoiding bad karma in Buddhism particularly pertain to giving.7
In Hinduism, many ancient Sanskrit texts are comprised of extremely 
detailed stipulations about charity and philanthropy.8 That is, beyond simply 
encouraging benevolent actions, these sources spell out the who, what, when, 
why, and how of daana (giving) and seva (service). Kings were also required 
by the epic of Mahabharata to share their wealth with the people and not use 
it for their own pleasure. Sanskrit books even imply a hierarchy, as in the Laws 
of Manu, in which food, required by all beings for their survival, emerges as the 
best in worth over gold, silver, salt, and so on. A benefactor’s attitude had to 
be genuine and passionate; certain traits were also expected of the beneficiary. 
In other words, giving merely for the sake of giving is insufficient, necessitating 
benefactors to check multiple boxes to give, strategically and efficiently.
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Still, India has not been immune to external influence on its charitable 
and philanthropic sector. Industrialization during the British Raj era 
increased both the size and the scope of philanthropy in India.9 With a 
modernized economy, the overall wealth of businesses exceeded an 
unprecedented amount, resulting in a bigger surplus for public welfare. At 
the same time, industrialization helped expand the market coverage of 
businesses and allowed them to operate beyond the regional confines of 
their respective headquarter cities, which in turn scaled up the scope of the 
private sector’s philanthropic activities. Many domestic philanthropic 
foundations reflect India’s inherent culture and history of goodwill, but 
they grew against the backdrop of industrialization that occurred under 
British colonial rule.
India’s government played an important role. As early as 1860, India 
legally recognized the existence of nonprofit groups via the British Raj 
Societies Registration Act, granting the status of a “society” to a group of 
seven or more people in any literary, scientific, or charitable association.10 
Numerous nonprofit organizations and philanthropic foundations arose as 
a result, and this piece of legislation still applies to NGOs today.11
The legacy of the colonial era also shaped philanthropic thought. As 
many donors concluded that British dominance grew from advanced sci-
ence and technology, philanthropists changed their giving priorities, fun-
neling more money into relevant endeavors, as well as into projects of 
social reform.12 More money was funneled into secular purposes, such as 
social reform and cultural revivalism projects. In the end, with Mahatma 
Gandhi’s return to India in 1916, this particular evolution of Indian phi-
lanthropy culminated in a mobilized Indian civil society’s involvement in 
the independence movement.
Gandhi’s return in 1916 shifted the course of India’s development plan 
to economic self-sufficiency. As part of this quest for self-sufficiency, vol-
untary action at the local village level became pivotal in the drive to tackle 
widespread poverty.13 As a result, the number of village-oriented commu-
nity organizations proliferated.14 Gandhi’s theory of trusteeship inspired 
many wealthy individuals at the time to donate money and resources for 
the good of the greater community, whether it would be for the indepen-
dence movement or for the delivery of social services.15 In so doing, 
Gandhi utilized many of the Hindu concepts relevant to charity and phi-
lanthropy in a way that transcended the terms’ original definitions to bring 
about greater change in line with his goals.16 He worked to transform the 
primary motive behind doing good from acquiring merit as a religious 
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obligation to wholeheartedly wanting to contribute to the general welfare 
of all, stating, “You should regard yourself as the trustees and servants of 
the poor. Your commerce must be regulated for the benefit of the toiling 
millions and you must be satisfied with earning an honest penny.”17
Gandhi also said, “Earn your crores by all means. But understand that 
your wealth is not yours; it belongs to the people. Take what you require 
for your legitimate needs, and use the remainder for society.”18 The Birla 
and Bajaj families were notably affected by the principles and theories of 
Gandhi and donated millions of rupees for causes that he promoted.19
Post-independence India (1948–1980s) further encouraged philan-
thropy. The socialist, interventionist government focused on social welfare 
and economic development, with a heavy dose of central planning.20,21 
The private sector supported the government’s developmental agenda, 
and India experienced a dramatic increase in the number of private trusts 
and foundations.22 The government, in turn, encouraged citizens’ partici-
pation in social welfare programs, but some argue that the state’s domi-
nant role actually imposed limitations on the nonprofit sector, so that it 
was only the confrontational response to inefficient government that led 
to the burgeoning of the nonprofit sector in India.23 Be that as it may, the 
outcome of growth in both philanthropy and charity in India is 
unquestionable.
Today, the charitable and philanthropic sector of India is one of the 
most vibrant in the world. Individual giving in India is a global outlier, 
trumping the rest of the world at its level of GDP per capita.24 More than 
2 million NGOs are reported to be active in the country, while the num-
bers of philanthropists and potential philanthropists in millionaires and 
billionaires are increasing every year.25,26 The Companies Act of 2013 and 
its 2-percent corporate social responsibility spending requirement has had 
a huge impact, as will be seen in greater detail in a later chapter of this 
book. But the socioeconomic shortcomings, discussed in the beginning of 
this section, persist to plague the country, making the role of charity and 
philanthropy all the more imperative for the future trajectory of India.
PhIlIPPInes
In the Philippines, we see the impact of all four themes: community, faith, 
colonialism, and authoritarianism. The Filipino lexicon reflects its deep 
cultural roots in traditions of pakikipagkapwa, a sense of shared commu-
nity and kapwa, compassion. To this day, Catholicism plays a crucial role 
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both in spiritually encouraging charity, as well as in directly providing basic 
social services to those in need. Two colonial regimes—Spanish and 
American—helped establish the initial infrastructure needed for its now 
vibrant civil society and philanthropic community, while the Marcos dicta-
torship cracked down heavily on advocacy groups, ultimately triggering a 
fierce counteraction from an extremely well-mobilized nonprofit sector.
In pre-colonial times, informal mechanisms of mutual self-help volun-
teerism prevailed throughout the country at the village level. Volunteers 
often helped with construction of public infrastructure projects such as 
churches, schoolhouses, streets, plazas, and cemeteries.27 In fact, this 
domestically bred practice of bayanihan (assuming another’s burdens) was 
more commonplace than religious associations exported by Catholicism 
and Spanish colonialism.28 This unique history of alleviating fellow com-
munity members’ hardships demonstrates the Filipinos’ deeply ingrained 
fondness for community welfare, manifested in both the language and 
village-level volunteerism.
Under Spanish colonialism, the Philippines began to see for the first 
time the establishment of formal charitable organizations. Public goods 
institutions set up by the Roman Catholic Church left behind a significant 
legacy of introducing institutionalized social delivery organizations 
(SDOs), alongside individual philanthropic giving to the Church.29 With 
its funds, the church built hospitals and orphanages, and its cofradías 
(brotherhoods) were instrumental in the provision of welfare services to 
the poor and needy. Not only did these religious associations fulfill their 
basic duties of arranging town festivals in honor of saints and ensuring the 
observance of Christian morals, but they also behaved like charitable 
groups by providing free labor and money to their immediate communi-
ties in times of crisis.30,31 In addition to these charitable and social imports, 
Catholic missionaries appended the Western notion of kawanggawa (char-
ity) to the Filipino dictionary of doing good.32
The American colonial government further facilitated the progression 
of Philippine civil society in its resemblance to contemporary nonprofit 
organizations and foundations. Under the Americans, secularism flour-
ished, demarcating boundaries between state and church, as well as 
between state and non-governmental provision of public goods and ser-
vices.33,34 As a result, the Philippines witnessed the emergence of secular 
welfare agencies, interest groups, professional associations, and charitable 
institutions. During this period youth, labor, peasant, and women’s orga-
nizations flourished, alongside the creation of professional groups such as 
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the Philippine Medical Association and the Philippine Bar Association.35 
More sophisticated, larger organizations with written constitutions—such 
as the Society of the Poor—also came into being.36 Furthermore, 
Americans brought over to the Philippines their own non-government 
organizations like the American Red Cross and the Anti-Tuberculosis 
Society, which were known to receive philanthropic support from the local 
elite.37,38 The Philippine Corporation Law of 1906 further encouraged 
nonprofit groups by giving them legal recognition along with proactive 
government funding (2.2 percent of the government’s annual expenditure 
at the time) for local associations that focused on health services.39
In the 1960s and 1970s, the hopelessly deteriorating economy and 
increasingly rampant corruption of the Marcos regime triggered the mobi-
lization of numerous social movements across sectors, from students to 
human rights advocacy.40 Eventually, these movements gradually evolved 
into formal non-governmental organizations, supplementing the lack of 
government presence in delivering essential social services in certain areas 
of the country.41,42 With these trends, civil society in the Philippines took 
its unified shape for the first time via protest and calls for reform against 
the authoritarian Marcos government. Marcos responded in 1972 with 
martial law, until public protests finally ousted him from power in 1986.
The subsequent Corazon Aquino administration enacted legislation 
favorable to nonprofits. The 1987 constitution explicitly stipulates the 
rights of non-governmental organizations, so that the state must respect 
their participation. With this new legal framework, registered NGOs rose 
by an astonishing 96 percent in less than a year, from 27,100 in early 1986 
to 53,000 by late September.43 And as José Magadia points out, civil soci-
ety in the Philippines changed its focal orientation from resistant advocacy 
to a variety of other issues primarily in social services. With this shift in its 
fundamental identity, the overall sector was able to grow further by incor-
porating additional functions such as policy research, network building, 
and so forth.44
Income inequality, poverty, corruption, and ineffective public policy 
still plague the Philippines. In multiple socioeconomic indices and mea-
surements, the country fares poorly, generally situating at the bottom half 
and lower tier. On the Social Progress Index, which attempts to capture 
how well countries provide basic social and environmental needs of their 
citizens, the Philippines ranks 68th out of 133 countries—even below its 
neighboring Southeast Asian nations of Malaysia and Thailand.45 On the 
latest Corruption Perceptions Index, the Philippines ranks 95th out of 
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168 countries, scoring behind the likes of China, India, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Thailand.46 Nevertheless, the fact that the Philippines hosts 
the largest number of NGOs per capita in Asia, between a quarter and half 
a million groups in total, reflects centuries of cultured yearning for doing 
good—and for civic engagement as a positive opportunity for the future.
south Korea
Many observers say that modern Korean civil society began 20 years ago, 
in the aftermath of twentieth-century industrialization and democratiza-
tion. Industrialization came first (the “Han River Miracle,” after World 
War II), then, in 1987, the June Democratic Uprising against military 
governments shaped the state and society that followed.47
But the practice of doing good, and its institutionalized forms in civil 
society, long predated these events in Korea. Many such practices began 
with Confucianism, which has contributed enormously to present-day 
Korean culture, perhaps more so than in any other Asian community.48 As 
far back as the sixteenth century, Confucianism in Korea gave birth to 
private academies that taught ethics. These academies were essentially the 
equivalent of a modern-day NGO. They grew locally without any involve-
ment and support from the state, instead funded through donations from 
local elites.49 And they demonstrated a high level of management auton-
omy and independence from the state. For example, the academies faced 
no interference from the government, neither in regulating their student 
admission policies nor in their economic plans to rent their lands to tenant 
farmers for self-funding.50 Unfortunately, tight oversight of these acade-
mies arrived under King Yeongjo in the eighteenth century, in the name of 
accomplishing “grand harmony,” ultimately stalling the growth of this 
premature sector of society.51
Japanese colonialism had mixed effects on Korean civil society. Indirectly, 
it encouraged modern development, ending Korea’s feudal society and 
introducing capitalism.52 It was also during this period that Korea had its 
first private scholarship foundation, Yangyounghoe, established in 1939.53 
But Japan’s aim to solidify control over the Korean peninsula involved 
cracking down on any form of social movements that challenged its colo-
nial rule.54,55 Due to the hostile relationship between the colonial ruler and 
the Korean people, Koreans began to regard the regime more as an illegiti-
mate alien power than as a moral patriarch like their past imperial rulers.56 
This antagonistic anti-state orientation is  constantly echoed throughout 
 25
much of Korea’s history during the twentieth century and defines the fun-
damental identity of Korean civil society to this day.
Independence from Japanese colonialism in 1945 enabled the brief 
growth of previously repressed social movements. Farmers, the poor, and 
other marginalized groups of society eventually congregated under an 
umbrella organization named Chonnong whose membership reached 
3 million people in 1946.57 Service-oriented religious groups and charity 
were also for the first time introduced to the country during this period.58 
This sudden expansion of civil society in Korea can be attributed to the 
lack of an official government for three weeks after liberation, which pro-
vided room for a high degree of freedom and autonomy that these move-
ments had never experienced during the colonial era.59,60 However, this 
brief period of optimism for the charitable sector was cut short by the 
arrival of the first authoritarian ruler in modern Korean history, followed 
by a series of subsequent military dictatorships.
Three extremely powerful rulers dominated the next 40 years of the 
post-liberation Republic of Korea: Rhee Syngman (1948–1960), Park 
Chung-hee (1963–1979), and Chun Doo-hwan (1980–1988). Korean 
civil society’s anti-state disposition further intensified under their rule, 
chafing against the military support that kept the presidents in power.61 
This confrontational relationship meant advocacy groups, serving as the 
representative voice of the disgruntled citizenry, came to lead the non-
profit sector in Korea.62,63
Even so, other kinds of social service organizations managed to flourish 
amid the tensions. Under President Rhee Syngman, non-political service- 
oriented organizations backed by foreign aid were relatively free to pursue 
their welfare activities. After the coup that installed President Park Chung- 
hee, Korea saw a rise in the standard of living, as Park’s regime was both 
authoritarian and development-oriented. The resulting growth of the 
middle class enabled the development of such organizations as the Saemaul 
(New Village) Movement. Now regarded as one of the most well-known 
legacies of the Park regime, the New Village Movement played a huge role 
in the urbanization and development of Korean local agricultural com-
munities, implementing the central government’s policies and plans at a 
grassroots level.64 Completely rehabilitating rural infrastructure from top 
to bottom, the New Village Movement is now considered a “classic exam-
ple of community-driven development.”65
Park’s development-driven agenda came to fruition under his successor 
Chun Doo-hwan, another military dictator, in the 1980s. That decade 
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brought rapid industrialization, urbanization, and socioeconomic class 
diversification, which in turn led to popular support for various civil soci-
ety organizations (from women’s groups to environmental advocacy 
groups). Such organizations played active roles in anti-state efforts to 
bring down the military dictator, until Chun eventually stepped down in 
the face of ongoing public demonstrations and protests.66
Those 40 years of authoritarianism shaped the advocacy-focused, anti- 
state nature of Korean civil society. Even today, the most influential and 
prominent organizations are advocacy groups concerned with issues such 
as the environment, women’s rights, and social justice.67 Now there are 
7600 such organizations, the majority of which were founded in the 
1990s. And, in the words of Bidet, authoritarian governments’ “instru-
mentalization” of non-governmental organizations and civil society 
groups whose activities and projects were well in line with their policy 
objectives also laid the foundation for various SDOs and the overall non-
profit sector.
That legacy also presents Korea with particular challenges. Donors rec-
ognize Korean civil society’s heavy sway toward advocacy groups, and that 
makes some wary; many philanthropists (usually chaebol, the Korean term 
for family dominated conglomerates) are reluctant to donate their money 
to charity and partner with local NGOs, alternatively seeking to work by 
themselves via private foundations or to work together with the govern-
ment.68 This distrust is not one-sided. Because Korea’s wealthy elite tradi-
tionally maintained close ties with military regimes, their lack of civic 
participation against authoritarianism makes them remnants of authori-
tarianism. The recent scandal of Korean conglomerates’ shady donations 
to former President Park Geun-hye has reaffirmed this suspicion of Korean 
society against the wealthy, exacerbating distrust between the people and 
potential philanthropists.
ChIna
China’s development of charity and philanthropy is often misconstrued to 
be anemic. With its one-party political system and a widespread assump-
tion that civil society is inherently a Western value and concept, this is 
understandable. Before the current Communist Party rule, the Chinese 
moved from one imperial regime to another, casting shadow over a rich 
culture of self-help. But China has a long history of doing good.
Confucianism introduced China to basic concepts of community care, 
from taking care of the elderly to providing education to the youth. This 
 27
provision of welfare predated any formal institutionalization of social wel-
fare and civil society, but it was to be taken up primarily by the govern-
ment acting as the father figure of the people.69 But the officials of the Qin 
dynasty disagreed. They advocated for a strong state and a weak society, 
neglecting the state’s civic duty to attend to the poor, believing that those 
in need were at fault for their own poverty. Chinese citizenry stepped for-
ward to fill this gap, creating the country’s first systematic private form of 
charity: family-based kinship organizations. These family self-help groups 
were both a reaction to the legalist Qin regime that failed to provide social 
services and a reflection of existing Confucian principles that emphasized 
community care in terms of family relations.
These lineage organizations provided public goods and services, includ-
ing care for widows and orphans, distribution of grain, and construction 
of schools.70 Wealthy individuals—most notably, salt moguls—oversaw vil-
lage social welfare activities.71 These clan-based groups gradually spread 
from just southeast coastal China to the rest of the country during the 
Song (960–1279) and Qing (1644–1912) dynasties. The nature of these 
groups also changed at the same time, easing their blood-tied membership 
requirements and focusing more on the delivery of social services.72 
Family-based groups continued to flourish after the end of imperial dynas-
ties, and other types of civic organizations arose, including professional 
associations and foundations.73
The smooth uptrend in China’s growing civil society halted after the 
Communist Party came to power. The Communist Party cracked down on 
all private associations, seeing them as a sign of state failure.74 The repres-
sion of these organizations, along with late exposure to key concepts per-
taining to charity, shaped current misconceptions of Chinese civil society.
Despite this unfriendly environment for the third sector, another term 
for civil society, during the twentieth century, Deng Xiaoping’s open-door 
economic policies enabled the beginning of contemporary charity and 
philanthropy. In 1995, an NGO Forum held alongside the Fourth World 
Conference on Women in Beijing introduced the general public and the 
government to the term “NGO” for the first time.75 With this occasion, 
the Communist Party accepted that NGOs were not anti-governmental 
opposition groups.
NGOs and civil society ended up aligning well with Deng’s free-market 
ideology. The growing popularity of a liberalized Chinese economy crept 
into the field of social services, applying free-market principles to social 
welfare and allowing room for the third sector to take up a much more 
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influential role in delivering public goods and services to the people. 
Hence, during the second half of the 1990s, China experienced a huge 
surge in the number of large domestic charity organizations, such as 
Friends of Nature and Global Villages, as well as the entry of many foreign 
NGOs.76
Under the Hu Jintao government, charities faced a brief period of 
restrictions, as Beijing became wary of NGOs bringing forth ideologies 
challenging to the Communist Party.77 At this time, government- organized 
programs, such as the China Red Cross, rose to prominence and became 
dominant forces within the sector.78 The Chinese government also reverted 
to more involvement in the provision of social goods and services, ending 
various market initiatives begun in the 1990s.
Amidst this recent experience of government pushback, other chal-
lenges to the growth of Chinese philanthropy arose in the form of nation-
wide scandals and controversial legislations.
Most notable was the 2011 Guo Meimei scandal, in which a young 
Chinese woman who claimed to be the “commercial general manager” of 
the “China Red Cross Chamber of Commerce” flaunted her lavish lifestyle 
of luxury sports cars and branded bags on social media. It caused such 
public uproar that domestic charitable organizations saw a 90-percent 
drop in donations.79,80 This particular scandal exacerbated the lack of insti-
tutionalized trust in China, which heavily relies on guanxi (strong per-
sonal connections).81 The World Values Survey, for example, indicates that 
close to 80 percent of the Chinese respondents do not trust strangers.82 
The Guo Meimei scandal further reduced the low level of institutionalized 
trust resulting from the culture of guanxi and societal distrust. Such scan-
dals and their ramifications remain one of the biggest obstacles to the suc-
cess of Chinese civil society.
The 2016 Charity Law put forth by the National People’s Congress 
may shape the next set of relationships between the government and non-
profit organizations. Its impact is not yet clear. Supporters see improve-
ments made in registration, fundraising, and tax incentives, while critics 
worry about restrictions on overseas NGOs.83,84,85,86 The Charity Law, its 
implications, and potential effects will be discussed in greater detail in a 
later chapter of this book.
China’s long experience with charity and philanthropy brings context 
to the challenge given at the start of this section: yes, the United States 
boasts philanthropic giving 21 times larger than in China, with a GDP 
only twice as large, but that does not mean China is not interested in 
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 giving.87 China has a rich history of the wealthy giving back to society in 
the form of clan-based lineage organizations. Civil society proved resilient 
to a temporary downturn during the twentieth-century Communist rule 
and now is developing at a good pace. The following facts suggest an opti-
mistic future:88,89,90
 1. China has experienced a 66-percent increase in the total amount of 
charitable donations during the time span of 2009–2014.
 2. Five times as many charitable organizations were in China by 2014, 
compared with ten years earlier.
 3. Per capita charitable giving increased by 20 percent annually through 
2013.
 4. 2014 saw $15.51  billion worth of total regular donations, even 
excluding one-off donations made for natural disasters.
taIwan
Modern Taiwan, founded after the Chinese Communist Party took full 
control of the Mainland in 1949, began as the Chinese Nationalist Party—
or the Kuomintang (KMT)—fled to the island of Formosa. Prior to this 
KMT exodus, and before 50 years of Japanese colonialism, Taiwan was 
part of the Qing dynasty from 1683 to 1895.91 Under Qing influence, 
Taiwan gradually accustomed itself to Chinese cultural traditions, includ-
ing Confucianism. Taiwan’s culture of doing good long resembled that of 
Mainland China, while its recent state-civil society relations resembled 
that in South Korea due to the shared experience of having an authoritar-
ian, developmental regime.
Yet Taiwan’s culture is unique. It differs from its Mainland counterpart 
in the more significant role that Buddhism plays in charity and philan-
thropy. The Buddhist notions of karma and accumulating merit in par-
ticular galvanize the Taiwanese people to volunteer and donate. In multiple 
surveys, more than 50 percent of the respondents have directly attributed 
their motivation behind doing good to avoiding bad karma and accumu-
lating merit.92,93 In fact, one of the most well-known and largest charitable 
institutions in Taiwan is a global Buddhist organization known as the 
Buddhist Compassion Relief Tzu Chi Foundation, the largest owner of 
private land in the country.94,95 This mix of Taiwan’s Confucian roots and 
the widespread Buddhist faith and practices encouraging benevolent activ-
ities attests to Taiwan’s societal capacity for doing good. Many believe that 
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the Tzu Chi Foundation, whose assets are not publicly disclosed, is the 
wealthiest foundation in Asia.
Taiwan has also been shaped by military dictatorship for more than 
30 years after 1947. This period, marked by rapid economic growth and 
industrialization, has been dubbed the “Taiwan Miracle.” In the first half 
of this time, the KMT government solidified its control over the island, 
supervising and controlling the public arena with military might. Any 
demands or suggestions coming from society were met with suppression 
and censorship. Martial law put Taiwan under authoritarian rule for the 
next 38 years. Civil society became hard to imagine.
From 1963 to 1978, economic policies started to top the list of priori-
ties for the KMT.96 Shifting the economy to one based on export-oriented 
industrialization, the KMT inadvertently gave birth to and bolstered the 
urban middle and industrial working classes. For the first time, public life 
saw the influence of other societal interests—market forces—besides the 
military political party. However, the KMT still exercised its dominance, 
and many of the economic players displayed political loyalty to the KMT 
for business opportunities.97 Competing views of society were limited to a 
few intellectuals and social elites.98 Civil society remained in limbo.
In the 1980s, numerous social movements began to emerge, not as a uni-
fied opposition to the KMT but rather as a reflection of diverse interests and 
socioeconomic classes resulting from economic growth.99 Without this 
united front, and given the KMT’s self-organized transition from “hard” 
authoritarianism to “soft” authoritarianism, co-opting the voices of 
Taiwanese civil society, Taiwan avoided the kind of direct confrontation seen 
in Korea’s June Democratic Uprising of 1987.100,101 While Korea’s military 
regime violently cracked down on dissident groups, the KMT in Taiwan 
eased toward democratization.102 With the co-opting of the third sector, 
social movements and civil society groups did not feel the necessity of con-
fronting the government, but were instead inclined to engage with the state 
through formal mechanisms and channels set forth by the government.
This is not to say that there were no protests and public demonstrations 
against the government. In 1987, up to 1800 street demonstrations were 
recorded.103 As with Korea, authoritarianism amid a growing prosperity 
shaped civil society in Taiwan, so it began to be, and remains, advocacy- 
oriented. On the other hand, the KMT’s self-democratization led to a more 
constructive relationship between the state and the third sector, mutually 
reinforcing the democratization process and providing a much more favor-
able environment for the growth of the charitable sector in the country.
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This state-civil society cooperation reached its all-time high after the lift-
ing of martial law in 1987. The Taiwanese government started to embrace 
and collaborate with these social movements, allowing formal establish-
ment of NGOs.104 The third sector and the private sector began to be 
included as consultants in the legislation of policies, laws, and regulations. 
Furthermore, the nonprofit sector in Taiwan has taken an even more active 
role in its state-society relationship by engaging in foreign policy. In the 
context of Taiwan’s unique cross-strait relations with China, Taiwan’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and civil society have cooperated with participa-
tion in international conferences.105 Nonprofit organizations are in effect 
acting to promote Taiwan’s soft power abroad. With this friendly infra-
structure and environment acquired after overcoming many historical 
obstacles, Taiwan now boasts nearly 60,000106 registered non- governmental 
organizations as of 2015, reflecting the growth and vibrancy of the sector.
JaPan
Japan’s civil society is an anomaly in the Asian continent. Japan as a nation 
is not well known for charity and philanthropy, despite its status as the 
most developed economy in the region. Frequently cited reasons range 
from the Japanese population’s cultural disposition of deference to the 
state, and corporations to the developmental regime’s tight regulatory 
and political oversight.107,108 These analyses of Japan’s underdeveloped 
sector of doing good touch on material truths. What is missing in this 
discourse, however, is an acknowledgment of Japan’s proven record, from 
ancient times to today, of helping others in the community.
Japanese philanthropy dates back to at least the seventh and eighth 
centuries, when members of the affluent noble class and high-ranking 
monks established charitable projects and institutions under major 
Buddhist temples such as the Tōdai-ji and Shitennō-ji.109 Buddhist tem-
ples initiated fundraising campaigns, known as Kanjin, to finance reli-
gious activities and social welfare initiatives.110 Catholicism, which arrived 
in Japan during the sixteenth century, further exposed the country to the 
concept of doing good. Catholic missionaries founded mutual aid 
 organizations called Misericordia to raise funds for social service projects 
such as building nursing homes and leprosy hospitals.111,112
Homegrown Japanese philanthropy developed further in the Edo 
period (1603–1868). First, wealthy Osaka-based merchants established 
private academies backed by an endowment system, laying the grounds for 
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Japan’s modern-day foundations, zaidan hojin.113 Most notably, in 1829, 
a purveyor to the feudal lord of Akita offered Kan-on-kō—land purchased 
for agricultural production whose proceeds went to assist local peasants 
and orphans. This philanthropic gesture, later joined by an additional 191 
donors, exists to this day as a social welfare organization.
These cases of religious and institutionalized giving remained relatively 
isolated, however. Central authorities’ long history of monopolizing the 
provision of public goods and social services left little room for civil society 
to grow beyond its beginning stage.114 The highly centralized public sec-
tor continued through the Meiji Restoration in the late nineteenth cen-
tury. The Civil Code was established in 1898, legally recognizing and 
systematizing for the first time the existence of private nonprofit activities 
(the koeki hojin system).115 But the Meiji government’s successful import 
of Western technology and culture into Japanese society provided the 
foundation of a modernized state. Japan then rose as a major imperial 
power in Asia, flexing economic and military dominance throughout the 
region from the 1920s to the 1940s. During this period of military author-
itarianism, all private entities were merged into one single national organi-
zation under government pressure and supervision.116
After Japan’s defeat in World War II, the war-torn island, faced with the 
challenge to quickly recover the economy, employed heavy central plan-
ning executed by its elite bureaucracy. This interventionist developmental 
state and its influential bureaucracy are key to explaining the current per-
ception of Japanese civil society.
The developmental state imposed legal restrictions and encroaching 
managerial oversight on the nonprofit sector. The Civil Code covering 
each koeki hojin (public interest corporation) requires that an applying 
organization have its license granted by a government agency, contradict-
ing the “non-governmental” part of NGOs.117 The application process is 
difficult and complex, with many facets advancing the government’s 
agenda. For example, NGOs were made accountable to the practice of 
amakudari (translated literally as “descent from heaven”), pressuring 
NGOs to hire retired bureaucrats.118 Persistent requests for detailed 
accounts and activity reports and internal meddling of NGOs’ day-to-day 
operations became common.119
What allowed the bureaucracy’s dominance over civil society to con-
tinue? The government delivered on its promises pertaining to economic 
development, and in response, the Japanese citizenry regarded the prog-
ress made by the developmental state in a positive light. In other words, 
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public trust in the bureaucracy further empowered its role in managing 
the Japanese economy and society, leaving the state’s overbearing gover-
nance of the nonprofit sector to continue without challenge.120 Added to 
this “performance legitimacy” was Japan’s long history of deference to the 
state.121 Japanese even has a self-deprecating phrase expressing a sense of 
reverence for the bureaucracy, kansonminpi (translated literally as “respect-
ful bureaucracy, despiteful common people”).122 Keiko Hirata cites 
Confucianism’s emphasis on social stability, preference of the larger group 
over individuals, and hierarchical organization of society as the cultural 
motive behind the Japanese people’s deference to the state. This wariness 
of dissident opinions against the government reached its peak during the 
Cold War era, when many anti-government NGOs and individuals were 
alleged to be communist or radically left-wing. With Japan’s winning 
streak of economic growth, and the preexisting Japanese tendency to fol-
low the bureaucracy, the state’s constant intervention in the nonprofit 
sector remained intact for most of the twentieth century.
Recent socioeconomic circumstances have changed the nature of state- 
civil society relations in Japan, hinting at the possibility of an unforeseen 
growth trajectory for the nonprofit sector. The fruits of the developmental 
state—more middle-class citizens, more wealth, and more educational 
opportunities—have stimulated the expansion of civil society in Japan.123 
Likewise, globalization has also contributed to the inception of Japan’s 
young civil society. The developmental state naturally felt pressure to meet 
in line with the standards of the developed world and international norms 
favoring the concept of civil society.124
The government’s changing attitude toward the charitable sector grew 
after two major earthquakes in 1995 (Kobe) and 2011 (Tohoku). The 
Kobe earthquake—with 6500 dead and 75,000 buildings demolished—
was especially damaging, and the response telling.125 Despite heroic stories 
of volunteerism, the overall coordination among the state, civil society, 
and thousands of volunteers was disorganized, failing to respond to the 
disaster in an efficient manner.126 Stringent registration laws for nonprofit 
organizations prevented the government from seamlessly communicating 
with small-scale organizations that convened in Kobe.127 At the same time, 
petty internal power struggles within the bureaucracy aggravated the situ-
ation at hand.128 This administrative disaster, betraying the people’s trust 
in the bureaucracy, served as an impetus for a series of regulatory and 
policy changes conducive to the growth of civil society. The 1998 NPO 
(nonprofit organization) Law eased requirements for registration, and in 
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2002 the government began engaging academics and NGOs on discuss-
ing plans to reform the entire legal framework for civil society.129
Coupled with this renewed attitude of the government toward the non-
profit sector in the aftermath of the Kobe earthquake were changing social 
circumstances. Most significantly, the issue of Japan’s aging society amidst 
a limited welfare state is creating new opportunities for NGOs, regarded 
by the government as a cost-effective alternative to provide essential social 
services to the elderly.130
In terms of individual giving, institutionalized philanthropy, and the 
nonprofit sector, Japan lags behind its regional counterparts in Asia. 
However, like many other Asian nations, Japan has committed acts of 
great charity over many centuries. Today, Japan shows that it, too, can be 
benevolent, and now has a political and social infrastructure evolving to 
facilitate the growth of the sector.
sIngaPore
Singapore tops the charts in many socioeconomic measurements. 
Singaporeans boast a GDP per capita of $52,888.70, among the highest 
in the world.131 They also enjoy a high quality of living, with a life expec-
tancy of 83 and adult literacy rate of 96.8 percent.132,133 Quality health 
care, education, and other social welfare benefits and programs are taken 
care of by the government. Where, in such a well-managed and tightly 
controlled landscape, is there room for philanthropic input? Much of the 
donated money goes abroad, and the aggregate number of donations is 
relatively low.134,135 In fact, one of the few major players in philanthropic 
giving in Singapore is the Tote Board, a government-backed organiza-
tion.136 What input does come from the nonprofit sector is still heavily 
influenced by the state. The government’s stance is generally adverse to 
NGOs, especially politically vocal ones.137 As the primary caretaker of 
social services, Singapore’s government fundamentally defines the role of 
doing good in its modern nation-state.
It was not always so. From 1819 to 1963, Singapore was under British 
colonial rule, with occupation by the Japanese empire from 1942 to 
1945.138 During this pre-independence era, civil society in Singapore was 
quite vibrant in the form of ethnic self-help organizations.139 As authori-
tarian as it may have been, the British colonial government did not impede 
the indigenous growth of these groups and may have in fact indirectly 
created the room for civil society’s growth through subpar provision of 
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social services.140,141 In the 1950s and 1960s, these groups contributed to 
Singapore’s fight for independence.142 Other types of associations, such as 
trade unions, student groups, and the women’s movement started to 
flourish during this period as well.143 Without the presence of an authori-
tarian government overtly adversarial to civil society and monopolizing 
the provision of welfare, pre-independence Singapore was able to experi-
ence a hint of nascent civil society.
After independence, the People’s Action Party (PAP) led by Lee Kuan 
Yew reversed what could have been a continued sense of excitement 
around civil society. Two underlying beliefs framed the government’s early 
contentious attitude toward civil society. First, the PAP believed that the 
public sphere in Singapore had been excessively politicized during the final 
few years of the colonial era, with groups and riots on ethnic and ideologi-
cal lines interrupting social stability.144 Second, the utmost priority of the 
government’s policy agenda back then was economic development.145 
Successful accomplishment on this front was reflected in the government’s 
efficient provision of public benefits, leaving no space and few opportuni-
ties for civil society groups.146 From the perspective of the PAP, a powerful 
centralized government, superseding other segments of society, was abso-
lutely crucial to maintaining both the social and the economic well-being 
of the newborn city-state.
The PAP imposed legal and “extra-legal” limits on civil society.147 The 
Internal Security Act and the Societies Act were used to oppress any form 
of dissident voices and increase oversight of non-governmental enti-
ties.148,149 More significant were the PAP government’s political strategies 
and institutional barriers used to control and co-opt civil society. The 
party sought to delineate the public debate surrounding civil society by 
alternatively naming it as “civic” society, focusing more on the “responsi-
bilities” of the citizenry rather than its “rights.”150 Having begun as a one-
party state that unilaterally provided social services, the PAP shrewdly 
evolved into a “competitive authoritarian”151 regime that still adhered to 
the  principal belief of the government as the core of society, while allowing 
limited, state-controlled civil outreach.
When Goh Chok Tong became the country’s second prime minister in 
1990, he instilled a sense of hope among Singaporeans that Singapore may 
soon become a liberalized society.152 At that time, Brigadier-General George 
Yeo, minister for information and the arts, gave a speech incorporating a 
metaphor apt for the current circumstances surrounding civil society in 
Singapore. He acknowledged past government policies and attitudes as 
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resembling a “banyan tree” that gave no room for civil society to grow, calling 
for a “pruning” of the tree (yet keeping the tree as the core of society).153
But after losing four seats to the opposition in the 1991 general elec-
tion, the PAP realized a more liberalized stance toward civil society did not 
result in more votes. Going forward, PAP gave less emphasis to its renewed 
state-civil society relations.154 Nonetheless, the small step forward taken by 
the government tilted the vertical relationship toward an increased pres-
ence of civil society in Singapore. Voluntary welfare associations and SDOs 
were welcomed in a supplementary role; this was known as the “many 
helping hands” policy.155 Although the Singaporean government might 
not be open to the idea of civil society opposed to the state, it is willing to 
accept a civil society supplementing the “pruned banyan tree” state.
The “pruned banyan tree” vision of state-civil society relations in 
Singapore applies to present-day affairs in the country. Philanthropic giv-
ing and charity organizations are welcomed, if not encouraged. Through 
the National Volunteer & Philanthropy Centre, for example, various 
nationwide giving events are hosted to encourage individual giving, and 
tax schemes are renewed to incentivize larger scale philanthropic gestures 
from the private sector.156,157 With this continued acceptance by the gov-
ernment of the philanthropic and charitable community, the city-state’s 
private sector and culture of giving and helping others might be on a more 
positive track for the future.
hong Kong
Hong Kong, like Singapore, is an Asian city-state whose history is primar-
ily characterized by British colonialism and rapid economic development. 
But the story of Hong Kong’s philanthropy and charity differs due to its 
proximity and unique historical ties to China. Hong Kong also has a less 
interventionist government, allowing its social delivery sector to take a 
much more prominent role than its Singaporean counterpart. The history 
of doing good in Hong Kong has been shaped by these three primary fac-
tors: British colonialism, Chinese influence, and a laissez-faire state.
In colonizing Hong Kong, the British Empire sought to provide its 
merchants with a physical port of access to China but not necessarily to 
spread Christianity nor to “civilize” the local population, as it had done in 
its other colonies.158 With this narrower goal in mind, the British colonial 
government limited its involvement in the day-to-day affairs of Hong 
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Kong society.159 Such “positive non-interventionism” profoundly impacted 
the nonprofit community.160
The British government neglected to provide education and health 
care, leaving room for Hong Kong’s first nonprofit groups to emerge.161 
These organizations divided into two types, Christian-inspired missionary 
charities and Chinese clan-based associations.162,163 In pursuit of convert-
ing the local citizens to Christianity, missionaries ended up providing 
schools, hospitals, orphanages, and even elderly care facilities. Chinese 
clan-based associations, known as kaifong, mobilized neighborhoods for 
mutual aid to fill the void left by the “small” British colonial government. 
They built the Man Mo Temple, launched by a few wealthy members of 
the Chinese community, and the Tung Wah Hospital.164
Even under British rule, Hong Kong remained in China’s sphere of 
influence. Major events experienced by the Mainland—whether for good 
or for bad—had ramifications for Hong Kong. The aforementioned kai-
fong clan-based associations are one example of China’s influence, and the 
number of these groups proliferated as Chinese refugees poured into the 
city in the wake of China’s civil war between the Communist Party and the 
Nationalist Party.165 The colonial government could not single-handedly 
tackle all of the social challenges and demands rising from this influx, 
increasing the need for NGOs’ supplementary assistance. This period also 
saw the rise of tung heung wui (“same-village associations,” in English), 
formed by people who wanted to help those hailing from the same place 
of origin in China.166 It is still quite common for donors from Hong Kong 
to provide charitable support for projects in their home villages despite 
having left those places generations ago.167
It was also during this time that several NGOs and philanthropic orga-
nizations now well known in Hong Kong society were established. The 
Hong Kong Council of Social Service, a network of NGOs, was founded 
in 1947 to help coordinate the activities of these proliferating self-help 
organizations, and the Hong Kong Jockey Club declared its commitment 
to donate its annual surpluses for philanthropy.168 Both organizations are 
key intermediaries in the industry of doing good in Hong Kong today.
Especially since the 1997 “handover,” China’s influence continues to 
shape Hong Kong’s civil society. In recent years, the unique political rela-
tionship of “one country, two systems” has prompted the formation of 
more advocacy groups, both in opposition to and in support of the Chinese 
government.169,170
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Both the British and the Chinese influence developed against a back-
drop of a laissez-faire government. Modern-day Hong Kong is a special 
administrative region, a city-state commonly known for a vibrant private 
sector, low tax schemes, and detached government involvement in social 
services. The government’s regulatory framework for NGOs is neutral, 
not interfering with the formal establishment of such organizations and at 
the same time, not incentivizing further beyond the provisions of the 
Inland Revenue Ordinance pertaining to tax exemption.171 Private options 
for any social needs are readily made available to the Hong Kong 
population.
Officially, Hong Kong relies on free-market principles when it comes to 
delivering public welfare, and it certainly does so in comparison to 
Singapore. That is, the government is clearly not the main provider of 
social services. Nevertheless, the Hong Kong government now is the sin-
gle largest source of funding for NGOs, providing 28  percent of their 
operating budgets.172 This funding occurs in response to pressure to spend 
more on public welfare, in the wake of rapid economic development and 
persistent income inequality.173,174 Given its dedication to a non-interven-
tionist free market, yet attending to the demands of its people, the Hong 
Kong government has contracted out to SDOs the primary role of provid-
ing social services. Hong Kong’s state-civil society relationship is one of 
supplementary mutual dependence, where a rise in the state’s indirect 
spending on social welfare increases the size of the voluntary sector as 
well.175 Budget cuts have the opposite effect, and with recent financial 
crises, the Hong Kong government has decreased its funding for SDOs.176 
Competition for government funding within the sector has thus intensi-
fied, and fundraising has been identified by numerous organizations to be 
the most difficult current challenge.177
thaIland
Three historical experiences have defined the modern-day landscape of 
Thailand’s charity and philanthropy. First, religious giving—particularly in 
the context of Buddhism—has been and still is a major part of the nation-
wide philanthropic culture. Second, Thailand’s unique position as the only 
country in Southeast Asia not colonized by either Europe or Japan has 
implications for its social sector. Third, Thailand’s current domestic chal-
lenges, including multiple military coups and regime changes, have contrib-
uted to an extreme politicization of its civil society. The cumulative result of 
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these historical events is a relatively recent emergence of the nonprofit sector 
and a leaning within the sector toward advocacy-oriented social movements. 
Only recently have socioeconomic trends, including income equality, begun 
to encourage development of SDOs and social enterprises.
For centuries, Buddhism has functioned as the philanthropic epicenter 
of Thailand.178 Individual giving to both the religious order, Sangha, and 
to those in need helped acquire merit and to meet the moral standards 
expected of a Buddhist.179 Thais have long placed water jars outside their 
homes for thirsty individuals, and strangers commonly found free housing 
and food from welcoming village residents.180 Buddhist temples used 
donations for providing education, elderly care, and health care to their 
local communities, and they still play a pivotal role for doing good in 
Thailand.181
Thailand’s civil society has also been shaped by its independence, as the 
sole Asian kingdom never colonized by foreign empires in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries.182 Britain and France agreed to leave the 
nation as a buffer between their Asian spheres of influence. Two monarchs 
during this period maneuvered to preserve the balance, engaging with as 
many foreign delegations as possible via trade treaties. The two kings also 
opened the country to foreign influences by sending Thai aristocrats 
abroad to European institutions. By 1940, Thailand boasted a well- 
developed infrastructure, including roads, canals, railways, shipyards, hos-
pitals, and schools.183 This might have partially contributed to the relatively 
late inception of the nonprofit sector in Thailand during the later years of 
the twentieth century, which offered an opening for organized civil society 
organizations only after the democratic transition.184
A more telling legacy is that of a powerful bureaucratic and military 
elite in Bangkok. Discouraged by the deteriorating royal class, this new 
elite staged a coup in 1932, paving the grounds for Thailand’s cycle of 
future military coups.185 Under control-conscious military rule, there was 
little room for Thailand’s civil society to grow. During and after World 
War II, the government used the National Culture Act of 1942 and similar 
laws to control Chinese clan-based philanthropic associations, in the name 
of fighting communism from China.186 For much of the twentieth cen-
tury, the authoritarian military state continued to view with suspicion any 
organized form of private interests.
Thailand’s first major civilian resistance against military dominance 
occurred in 1973, when 500,000 students came to the streets of Bangkok 
to protest for democracy, eventually forcing the government leaders to 
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leave the country.187 Though military rule returned afterwards, the stu-
dent protests and the increasing number of NGOs forced the military to 
believe that it had to work together with civil society for its own sur-
vival.188 As a result, Thailand saw an increase in the expression of social 
demands and in the number of grassroots organizations during the 
1980s.189 However, under the unstable seesawing back and forth between 
military regimes and civilian rule, civil society in Thailand became ever 
more politicized and advocacy-oriented.190,191,192
IndonesIa
Through its sheer size, abundance of natural resources, and rapidly grow-
ing population, Indonesia is elevating its macroeconomic status to a point 
where it is now a part of the four emerging “MINT”193 economies, along-
side Mexico, Nigeria, and Turkey. Beneath this economic growth, how-
ever, are alarming indicators of poverty: more than half of the population 
still lives on less than two dollars a day, 29 out of every 1000 children die 
before the age of five, and the maternal death rate remains stubbornly 
high.194 Indonesia has long had such disparities of wealth, and its social 
sector has sought to fill the gap. Charity and philanthropy in Indonesia has 
encountered much support in the process, along with various roadblocks, 
in keeping with the country’s unique cultural background.
Religion, particularly Islam and its cultural customs, occupies a promi-
nent place in the Indonesian context of doing good. With more than 
85 percent of the country professing Islamic faith,195,196 zakat (almsgiv-
ing), alongside non-obligatory forms of charity, defines the nature of indi-
vidual philanthropy in Indonesia. Almost all Muslim Indonesians fulfill 
their zakat duties annually, and more than 90 percent of individual giving 
in Indonesia is accounted by religious giving.197,198 Amid this prevalence of 
Islamic philanthropy, institutionalized collection and administration of 
zakat funds came to the fore, both from the public sector and from the 
private sector. In 1949, the Ministry of Religious Affairs was founded; it 
later adopted the role of managing zakat funds, and private collecting 
agencies known as Lazis (Lembaga Amil Zakat) followed suit.199,200,201
Christianity also plays a role. Though less than ten percent of the popu-
lation practices Christianity, the religion’s commitment to delivering social 
services (including emergency disaster relief, education, and health care) 
make it a notable contributor. So does its follower base of wealthy and/or 
ethnic Chinese Indonesians.202,203
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The religious backdrop does not always promote a positive environ-
ment for social services. Under the authoritarian Suharto government, 
many religious impulses were steered toward containing communism and 
cracking down on dissident political voices.204,205 Also, giving donations to 
non-religious NGOs—even those for social services—is less common-
place, and donating to non-Islamic organizations is even shunned.206
Religious and nonreligious NGOs developed under Dutch colonial 
rule.207 The Dutch government intervened little in private matters related 
to zakat, unintentionally allowing for the emergence of Islamic associa-
tions.208,209,210,211 To the dismay of the Dutch empire, Indonesian civil soci-
ety grew toward social consciousness and a sector-wide goal of fighting for 
independence.212,213,214 With its clear division of public and private spheres, 
the Dutch colonial government enabled a freer Islamic philanthropic life 
that led to the establishment of community organizations.
The charitable sector faced a less tolerant government in the New 
Order era (1965–1998) under General Suharto. Suharto suppressed any 
dissent, halting the growth of NGOs and other civil society organizations 
in the country.215,216 He co-opted religious activities for his agenda, as 
noted above, and limited other functions.217,218 Hans Antlöv, Rustam 
Ibrahim, and Peter van Tuijl aptly summarize the position of civil society 
in the New Order era:
During more than three decades of authoritarian rule, civil society in 
Indonesia was seen as a part of the problem, not as the solution. Civil society 
was there to be controlled, not to be listened to or as a partner to work 
with.219
At best, alongside religious groups, only community development-focused 
NGOs—locally known as Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat, meaning “self- 
reliant community development institution”—were recognized by the 
government as in line with its development activities and policies.220 The 
legacy of this predatory food chain between the public sector and the 
social sector resonates across the country to this day, where some Suharto- 
era laws are still applicable and readily made available should the govern-
ment deem necessary in its intent to control civil society.221
In the final years of the Suharto regime, and following its fall in 1998, 
political democratization resulted in an increase in the number of NGOs 
from thousands to tens of thousands just by the end of 2003.222,223,224 
However, a wide array of current challenges and obstacles remains for the 
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charitable and philanthropic sector in Indonesia. Indonesia lacks any major 
incentive for this sector, in that tax exemptions for NGOs are not pro-
vided; nor are tax deductions for individual donors.225,226 Charitable orga-
nizations rely heavily on foreign funding, given a lack of vibrant domestic 
philanthropy.227 And in the wake of the politicized struggles under the 
Suharto regime, distrust remains high between the private, public, and 
nonprofit sectors.228,229 These areas can be improved with efforts by all 
relevant stakeholders in Indonesian society, tackling its challenges with the 
combined efforts of NGOs, the government, and the private sector.
MalaysIa
The Malaysian experience of philanthropy is history in the making. That 
is, with its semi-authoritarian regime and stiffly divided multiethnic popu-
lace, Malaysia did not see a vibrant third sector until recently.230, 231 Several 
factors inhibited the birth and growth of active charity, while recent 
changes bring a hint of hope for a slowly developing field.
Malaysia’s “semi-authoritarian” label reflects the mismatch between its 
official status as a democratic nation and its reality as a one-party state.232,233 
Based on repressive legislative measures, some would argue that Malaysia 
is simply authoritarian.234 Civil society has been particularly restrained by 
the 1960 Internal Security Act and the 1966 Societies Act, which permit 
detaining without trial and categorizes NGOs as “friendly” or “politi-
cal.”235,236 The government has also established its own social organiza-
tions, including the National Human Rights Commission and the 
Federation of Malaysian Consumer Organizations, to absorb the functions 
of social movements and NGOs.237
In sharp contrast to the Dutch Indonesian experience of separate pri-
vate and public spheres of Islam, Malaysia’s authoritarian reach influenced 
religious philanthropic life. The difference stems from a British colonial 
legacy, one that elevated the status of sultans at the expense of religious 
institutions.238 Such a co-optation of religious affairs continued to exist 
throughout the post-colonial period; even the administration and collec-
tion of zakat is singlehandedly managed by governmental religious coun-
cils.239 In such an unfavorable environment, it is surprising that some 
NGOs and civic activities exist at all.
An authoritarian state also complicated relationships among Malaysia’s 
multiethnic populace. Federal discrimination and ensuing ethnic tensions 
encouraged segregation of philanthropic beneficiary groups and a fractured 
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civil society.240,241 In particular, Elizabeth Cogswell finds in her survey of 
civil society that in Malaysia, Chinese help Chinese, Malays help Malays, 
and Indians help Indians. While charitable organizations might state in 
their charters that they serve without regard to ethnicity, in practice some 
focused on assisting their ethnic groups in response to the government’s 
discriminatory policies.242 Sometimes, a given ethnic group would even 
refuse help from another due to historical tensions.243 Chinese Malaysians, 
seeing the preferential treatment of Malays, often donated in China to their 
villages and communities of origin, rather than to other fellow Malaysians 
in need of assistance.244
Despite these challenges, recent affairs in Malaysia attest to potential. 
With increased exposure to uncensored social media and the Internet, 
Malaysians are demanding more in terms of political liberalization.245 Such 
desire burst forth when the dominant United Malays National Organization 
party suffered a heavy defeat in the 2008 elections, leading for the first time 
to a united electoral front within civil society against the government 
regardless of ethnicity.246 The transition might not come easily, given the 
lack of political experience among now-elected social leaders.247 Nonetheless, 
if these new members of the government promote productive reforms, 
charity and philanthropy in Malaysia may grow faster than ever before.
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CHAPTER 3




CAPS, Hong Kong SAR, China
Asia isn’t the only place to experience a trust deficit. Trust has fallen to 
discouraging levels around the world, according to the 2017 “Trust 
Barometer” by Edelman, a public relations firm. Titling its recent report 
“An Implosion of Trust,” Edelman writes that trust in NGOs in the 
United States, China, Japan, Germany, and the UK fell to less than 50 per-
cent, its lowest level since 2001, when the survey was first conducted. In 
Asia, trust for civil society has been low for many years, and it has recently 
fallen further in Japan, South Korea, Singapore, and Malaysia.
But there are bright spots. Trust levels have actually increased in India, 
China, and Hong Kong, for reasons that may be duplicated elsewhere. These 
economies have taken steps to clarify the murky landscape in which private 
social investment takes place, a problem detailed in Chapter 4. China, espe-
cially, has received media attention over new laws affecting international 
NGOs. Though China and India are at the forefront of changing the envi-
ronment for charitable action, other nations are also amending laws aimed at 
the giving and receiving of funds. Some changes reflect a desire on the part 
of governments to mitigate the trust deficit and allow for greater transpar-
ency and accountability. Some have to do with entirely different agendas.
Changes in the legal system affecting philanthropy broadly fall into 
three categories. The first is an effort by governments to discern between 
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advocacy and social delivery organizations, with the goal of permitting the 
latter while hindering the former, especially when such groups advocate 
for policies counter to the government’s agenda. Within those regulations 
lies a subordinate set aimed at curtailing foreign funding oriented toward 
changes in individual rights, freedom of speech, and political engagement. 
The governments in question find this outside involvement an infringe-
ment of authority, and they have little or no interest in permitting foreign 
organizations to meddle with official aims. The second category includes 
policies aimed at increasing local philanthropy, particularly when it is in 
line with the government’s agenda, and the third set is of laws endeavor-
ing to create more transparency and accountability. On this last count, 
many governments are aware that if the trust deficit can be mitigated, 
increased local giving could result. This chapter examines the policies gov-
erning civil society in each of these three categories.
The definition of civil society is difficult to pin down. In fact, in 2001, the 
BBC stated, “The paradox about civil society is that it covers a vast range of 
activities—yet it’s very hard to define.” In an attempt to address this diffi-
culty, the BBC produced a 12-part series called What Is Civil Society?1 Despite 
this noble effort, the definition still evades us, although we can all agree that 
facets, goals, and operating norms of civil society differ across cultural con-
texts. The details give context to the current legal changes in Asia.
Civil society is often thought of as the voice and actions of the people, 
instead of that of companies and of the government. In the Western con-
text, it is considered a basic tenet of a pluralistic society. While not neces-
sarily the case, the term is often used as a contrarian voice against the 
government and the private sector. Civil society tends to focus on human 
rights and social justice. Civic engagement is a different story. Civic 
engagement is the way in which ordinary people can participate in helping 
their communities and countries, and the term does not carry an antago-
nistic connotation. Although civic engagement can utilize both political 
and non-political processes, it is not about pluralism as an endgame but of 
the human tendency to help one another. But the distinction can become 
complex. Many efforts start off as engagement only to become advocacy, 
and vice-versa. It often becomes clear to those trying to solve a problem 
that systemic change must include the government, and sometimes that 
implies the government must also change. Over the past decade, we can 
see a trend in Asia to channel energy into civic engagement while trying, 
at times with great conviction, to curtail the growth of civil society. As 
Simon Andrew Avenell writes when talking about the creation of the NPO 
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(nonprofit organization) law in Japan, “Never did they [civil society 
 pioneers] imagine that their model would become an endorsement of the 
state’s mellifluous vision of civil society.”2
A good portion of recent regulatory change aims at tamping down orga-
nizations that promote a political agenda contrary to the government’s 
goals. Such regulations stem from the perception that many political agen-
das are funded by foreign actors; while it is difficult to determine precise 
figures, that might be partially true. Within Asian nations, donors might 
have little interest in challenging the system. In Chapter 4, we note that 
many Asian philanthropists have become wealthy under the status quo and 
therefore see no reward from agitating for social and political change (except 
in extreme cases such as the People Power revolution in the Philippines). In 
fact, the whole lobbying industry is almost absent in Asian nations as corpo-
rate leaders choose to either go along with the government or find ways to 
work around existing statutes. One cannot equate the government-friendly 
Keidanren in Japan or the Federation of Korean Industries in Korea with the 
Business Roundtable or the offices that line K Street in Washington D.C.
Asia is not unique in grappling with the intent of an organization and 
thus calibrating government support based on perceptions of the advocacy 
aims of an organization. The United States put tax policies in place in 
1913 to delineate between organizations with strictly social missions and 
those that include in their mandate lobbying for policy change. Despite 
these laws being on the books for more than a century, there are frequent 
examples of organizations crossing the line between social delivery and 
advocacy. In recent years, with the rise of social enterprises, a new gray 
area between profit and nonprofit has emerged that challenges historical 
thinking and practice about organizations delivering social good.
And as in other parts of the world, Asia sees friction at the intersection 
between nonprofit and religious organizations. In most every country 
where there are tax-exemption policies, religious organizations enjoy these 
benefits. Normally, their work—such as help for the needy—passes with-
out incident. Sometimes, however, the goals of the organization counter 
those of the government, as seen in Indonesia in July of 2017, when 
President Joko Widodo signed a decree making it easier to disband reli-
gious or civil society organizations. The decree was broadly seen as being 
aimed at Hizbut Tahrir, a conservative Islamic organization at odds with 
the national constitution and pluralist state ideology. Even as many under-
stood why the Jokowi administration would seek to quash Hizbut Tahrir’s 
efforts, human rights groups swiftly expressed concern that the law could 
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be used to disband any politically inconvenient civil society groups, regard-
less of their religious persuasion. “This threatens the legal rights of all 
NGOs in Indonesia,” said Usman Hamid, the Indonesia director of 
Amnesty International.3
Another religious organization, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh 
(RSS) has been disbanded three times in its history, while the Congress 
party ruled India. The RSS, considered to be the largest nonprofit in the 
world with an estimated 2.5 million members, is a Hindu nationalist orga-
nization with the motto of “Selfless Service to the Motherland.” Now in 
favor with the Modi government, the RSS has expanded efforts to obstruct 
the work of nonprofits aligned with other religions.
The primary tool of hindering religious and political voices has been a 
crackdown on organizations receiving funding from abroad. In the past 
few years, the two Asian countries that have been most active in endeavor-
ing to control foreign funding of NGOs are China and India. In 2010, 
India passed the Foreign Contributions Regulation Act (FCRA), prohibit-
ing the use of overseas funds for “activities detrimental to the national 
interest.” Though the law was initially seen as a bureaucratic burden, 
entailing significant financial reporting and documentation, the effects 
have recently become more severe. Under the Modi government, elected 
in 2014, FCRA requirements of filing annual returns have been used to 
cancel registrations of more than 10,000 organizations while denying 
renewals of an additional 1300 found to have filed incorrect information.4 
The reporting requirements imposed through FCRA are so onerous that 
many nonprofit organizations forego foreign contributions altogether.
Others closed their doors. The FCRA legislation shut down Colorado- 
based nonprofit Compassion International, which had been operating in 
India for 48 years to provide educational, health, and nutritional services 
for children. According to The New York Times, it has repeatedly ranked as 
India’s largest single foreign donor, transferring around $45  million a 
year.5 But FCRA regulations accused it of funding religious conversions, a 
charge it denies. FCRA rules were also instrumental in shuttering the 
India operations of the Open Society Foundation and of Greenpeace.
Among the most contentious moves has been the decision to cancel the 
license of PHFI (Public Health Foundation of India). PHFI has received 
a significant portion of its support from the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation to provide its health-related services. Some commentators 
have said that the decision was based on PHFI’s and the Gates Foundation’s 
anti-smoking programs, while others have cited the relationship between 
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the Gates Foundation, GAVI (the Vaccine Alliance), and various interna-
tional pharmaceutical firms. The PHFI has filed an appeal, and as of now 
is waiting to hear from the government about reinstatement of its license.
China’s new international NGO (INGO) law goes beyond funding. 
The goal of the law is to allow for greater management and control of 
foreign NGOs and foundations operating in China. The official language 
says, “This law is designed to standardize and guide all activities carried 
out by overseas NGOs within China, and protect their rights and interests, 
while promoting communication and cooperation.”6
In practice, the new system creates the need for dual registration for over-
seas NGOs (this includes nonprofit organizations; think tanks; and social 
organizations, including associations). They need to satisfy two criteria for 
legal status in China. First, they must have an appropriate government 
department act as a professional supervising unit, and second, they must 
register with public security authorities. The new law requires the NGOs to 
find a sponsor before registering, making this key to forming a legal entity.
The burden is placed on the sponsor to decide if the international NGO 
is engaged in appropriate activities and to oversee their activities. This 
poses a formidable hurdle, especially for those organizations relatively new 
to China or engaged in any activity a local partner might consider risky. 
Foreign organizations approved to date have had long-standing relation-
ships with local partners, with a somewhat even split of organizations 
involved with trade and the others focused on more humanitarian pur-
suits. In the first six months of the law, just 154 organizations had been 
approved: 71 were trade-elated, such as Cotton US and the France 
Chamber of Commerce, and many counted for several listings; World 
Vision, a humanitarian organization, was listed six times with approval 
from the provinces of Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Jiangxi, Tianjin, 
and Yunnan. The Ford Foundation and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, both organizations facing challenges in India, were approved 
in China during the first round.7
There has been a great deal of international media attention regarding 
China’s new INGO law. Finding a supervising unit might not be easy. 
There is very little upside, and potential significant downside, for the 
Chinese supervisor, though the burden may be eased when the work of 
a particular NGO aligns with the tasks of its governmental supervisory 
body. A further burden comes from the requirement that no INGO can 
be involved with political activities, a problem when the interpretation of 
what constitutes political activities can vary across time and disciplines. 
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For example, for many years, the number of Chinese with HIV/AIDS 
was listed as a state secret, making outreach in that area politically diffi-
cult. And if the NGO’s work is multidisciplinary in nature, and does not 
fall clearly into a subject area (environment, health, education), it may 
be difficult to find a supervisory unit from a sector-specific ministry. 
Lastly, the role of the Ministry of Public Security is central to the new 
law but it is not clear how or which relevant MPS officials will be trained 
to deal with these new responsibilities. As in the case with many of 
China’s laws, the specifics regarding implementation will be ironed out 
over time. In the meantime, with more than 7000 foreign NGOs in 
China, there are many NGO leaders who do not know if they will be able 
to continue with their work.
IncreasIng LocaL PhILanthroPy
This book is entitled Pragmatic Philanthropy. One of the clearest trends 
we witness across Asia is that of Asian donors providing philanthropic sup-
port in line with, and at times in partnership with, the government’s 
agenda for addressing social challenges. This is a common trend. For many 
years, as wealth increased, a number of governments did not seem to grasp 
why private money might be helpful. They grappled with the notion that 
by allowing funding for education, health care, or disaster relief, there 
might be a perception that government itself wasn’t doing its job by deal-
ing with these issues directly. In a number of meetings I’ve had with gov-
ernment officials, they questioned why philanthropy was necessary when 
it was the government’s role to provide education and health care. This 
was especially the case in China.
More recently, however, several governments in Asia, including China, 
have come to the realization that Asian philanthropists tend to want to 
support government initiatives and will make donations that are aligned 
with government goals. In our work, we see how this trend paves the way 
for governments to craft laws encouraging local giving.
Official support for the sector can be seen most clearly in the creation of 
tax subsidies for the giving and receiving of philanthropy. Here, Singapore is 
a dramatic outlier. In order to spur local giving, Singapore raised its tax sub-
sidy to 250 percent in 2011, and in some cases provides matching funds. In 
2015, the tax subsidy was increased to 300 percent until the end of 2018 to 
celebrate the island state’s jubilee year. The Singapore Straits Times quoted 
Finance Minister Tharman Shanmugaratnam who said: “On the occasion of 
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our jubilee year, we should take the opportunity to engage in giving to the 
causes that we feel matter to us as Singaporeans.”8
The very context of giving must be seen through an Asian lens. In their 
book Charitable Giving and Tax Policy, Gabrielle Fack and Camille 
Landais look at the relationship between philanthropy and tax policies in 
the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Denmark.9 They 
use tax policies as a way to answer three questions: why do people give, 
what constitutes a public good, and does enforcement of tax policies affect 
people’s behavior or is it enough to have the rules on the books? But these 
questions carry significant Western assumptions, as the authors note it is 
difficult to assign a monetary value to the “warm glow” generated by a 
philanthropic contribution. In Asia, while the altruistic aspect of providing 
a contribution does exist, so does the notion of the benefit of enhancing 
relationships with business partners and with government, motivations 
missing from the Fack and Landais calculation. The second question can 
be seen as tautological in the Asian context; a public good is what the 
government determines is a public good. This may be explicit, such as the 
verbiage and directions in China’s new charity law, or it can be implicit. 
When Narendra Modi championed the need for more toilets in India, 
there was a flurry of philanthropists building toilets throughout the coun-
try. Now some people say that there are not only enough toilets but that 
many of them are being used as storage facilities, as there was little if any 
concurrent sanitation education about the use, behavior, and benefits 
associated with toilets. Lastly, while the question of enforcement is rele-
vant in the Asian context, the signaling aspect of government policy is 
again very important. Governments use policies to signal what matters and 
what does not, or what is encouraged and what is discouraged. In coun-
tries with weak civil society and strong governments, private individuals 
and companies become adept at reading between the lines of the actual 
policy itself. Singapore provides another good example. Fiscal incentives 
can be helpful, but given Singapore’s low tax rate, subsidies do as much by 
providing a powerful message that the government encourages its citizens 
to give to local causes. These tax breaks are only available when a tax- 
paying Singaporean gives to certified nonprofit organizations doing work 
in Singapore, in activities approved by the government. Such a policy 
would be unthinkable in America, but not in China or the Philippines.
Of the 15 economies in the Centre for Asian Philanthropy and 
Society’s Doing Good Index survey, only Indonesia does not grant any 
tax benefit to individuals and all of them provide some sort of tax 
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 subsidies to corporations. In practice, fewer countries make full use of 
their policies, because a government can really only offer a tax break 
when it is effectively collecting taxes. As many countries in Asia struggle 
with tax collection, offering tax subsidies may sound good on paper but 
might not amount to much in real monetary value.
It is also true that although tax relief may literally be part of the law, it 
can be very difficult for either the donor or the tax-exempt organization 
to claim these benefits. The process by which one gets tax-exempt status 
in China is particularly onerous. The Harvard Kennedy School report 
states that as of 2015, only 157 organizations had been granted tax- 
exempt status.10 In our Doing Good Index, the time and expense of reg-
istering as a tax-exempt organization is part of our calculation of what 
enables or hinders a philanthropic ecosystem.
There are other ways to incent local giving, allowing a government to 
endorse citizens providing private support for local and national chal-
lenges. One of the most popular recent innovations is a national giving 
day, week, or month. In 2015, the Japanese government approved a con-
sortium endeavoring to increase local philanthropic giving through a 
“Giving December” program to “reflect on the importance and roles of 
donations, increase interest in donating, and create an opportunity for 
action.”
In China, the new charity law includes establishment of an official 
“charity week” and day. Many Internet companies, especially, have played 
up Charity Day. During its second annual Charity Day event last September, 
Internet giant Tencent raised US$44 million as 6.8 million users donated 
to an assortment of charities.11 South Korea hosts a Giving Big Festival, 
and Thailand promotes Volunteer Day. In 2017, Singapore, through its 
quasi-governmental partners the National Volunteer and Philanthropy 
Centre and the National Council of Social Service, has organized Singapore 
Cares, a multifaceted program designed to “support the goodwill of 
Singaporeans and guide them to better help those in need.”
India is trying a variety of policy and regulatory initiatives to change the 
local philanthropic landscape. In the most progressive policy along these 
lines, India has made corporate social responsibility mandatory, becoming 
the first country in the world to require such spending. From 2015 on, 
companies with annual revenues of INR10 billion (about US$150 mil-
lion) must give 2 percent after-tax or net profit to charity. The impact on 
the charitable sector is immense. Critics charge that, like the toilet 
 imperative, the policy was put into practice without the programmatic and 
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infrastructure programs necessary to deal with such a large influx of funds. 
While this is certainly true, there is also no doubt that the new law has 
elevated corporate social responsibility (CSR) beyond the periphery to the 
center of business decisions, placing it very much into the minds and activ-
ities of executives and directors. Two years into the new law, companies 
are still scrambling to gain expertise. The few with previous experience in 
CSR are in great demand. As with China’s new charity law, it will take 
years to see the real impact of such a sweeping policy or to gauge how 
much it moves the needle in addressing massive social inequities and 
challenges.
With the Indian CSR legislation as an outlier and while putting in place 
tax subsidies and establishing giving days demonstrate a government’s 
interest in promoting local giving, most probably the best way to increase 
philanthropy is by addressing the trust deficit. Regulations can help 
improve transparency and accountability in the sector. Regulatory change 
affecting both the supply and demand for philanthropy has been taking 
place in a number of Asian countries in recent years.
In our recent study, the Doing Good Index, we asked representatives 
from 15 Asian economies if there had been a front-page headline regard-
ing a scandal involving a nonprofit organization in the last two years. Ten 
of them answered that there had been and several of the remainder said 
that while a scandal had not taken place in the last two years, fundraising 
is still affected by scandals that took place prior to this date.
When such scandals take place, the government reacts. As noted in other 
chapters, a pivotal moment in China’s social sector was the Guo Meimei 
episode, when Ms. Guo, an employee of an organization affiliated with the 
Red Cross in China posted pictures of herself with two luxury cars. While 
the Chinese government had been formulating a charity law for some time, 
the policymaking process took on additional impetus during and after Ms. 
Guo’s post and the public outrage and dismay that ensued.
The Chinese government’s opinion about philanthropy and nonprofit 
organizations has changed dramatically since 2008, often referred to as 
the “first year of civil society in China.” In 2008, responding to reports on 
social media, individuals and organizations flocked to Sichuan province to 
help with relief efforts after a massive earthquake. When they arrived, gov-
ernment officials did not know how to engage with them and treated both 
local and foreign NGOs with wariness and suspicion, turning most of 
them away. By the time of the Ya’an earthquake five years later, the 
 government had changed its policy and its reactions significantly. 
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Government officials realized that private money could be channeled into 
causes and problems identified by the government. NGOs were welcomed 
to help as long as they registered with the local coordinating office.12 
According to Ze Tao of the China Foundation Center in Beijing, in the 
last five years 700 new foundations have been set up each year in China.13 
The new charity law in China is meant to accelerate this trend. A recent 
Harvard Kennedy School report notes, “The intention of the new legisla-
tion is to regulate better the sector and encourage more giving by the 
wealthy to sectors prioritized by the Chinese government, while restrict-
ing giving to non-priority issues.”14 The Chinese Community Party has 
realized that private money can help them achieve their goals and can also 
be channeled and controlled to a significant extent.
China’s new law is designed to manage domestic Chinese philanthropic 
and charitable activities, making both more transparent and accountable. 
The law covers two major areas: governmental oversight and nonprofit 
support and management. It does not include changes to the tax code 
regarding subsidies and tax-exempt status, but it is expected that new tax 
regulations will soon be issued. The charity law also categorizes different 
types of organizations into charitable organizations, foundations, private 
non-enterprise units, and social groups. Government oversight has several 
provisions to increase transparency, including government approval for 
online fundraising platforms and requirements that financial records and 
audited reports must be placed on government-designated platforms. The 
law also stipulates that overhead expenses cannot exceed 10 percent for 
organizations and foundations and 13 percent for social groups. Included 
in the law are descriptions of what types of expenses can be included in 
overhead costs.
The charity law also promises to increase government procurement of 
services from nonprofit and SDOs. For the most part, government pro-
curement is a useful and constructive process. Government contracts help 
SDOs by providing sustainable and reliable income streams. They are also 
important as they legitimize organizations and lend credibility to the sec-
tor. The Eden Social Welfare Foundation in Taiwan receives half of its 
total budget through government contracts to provide services and pro-
grams for the disabled. The critique of government procurement is that it 
can contribute to mission drift and the transition of an SDO from a 
mission- driven organization to merely being a government contractor. 
This is more likely to happen when the government does not understand 
or appreciate the specialty or expertise of an organization and asks it to do 
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reports and projects that keep it busy and funded but not necessarily in the 
areas it was created to serve.
India has also been endeavoring to increase transparency and account-
ability. Given the significant amount of additional funding available due to 
the CSR legislation, increased accountability is a national imperative. The 
FCRA requirements discussed earlier have had the dual goals of increasing 
accountability as well as blocking foreign support for causes deemed ques-
tionable by the Modi government.
It is not uncommon when a government makes policy in reaction to a 
scandal or widespread belief of correcting a wrong that the reaction can 
verge on zealousness. This seemed to be the case when the Indian govern-
ment announced the Lokpal Act amendment in July 2016. The original 
intent of the Lokpal Act in 2010–2011 had been to require public ser-
vants—that is, government officials—to declare their assets so as to make 
the accumulation of wealth, and thus of corrupt practices, more difficult. 
As the years went by and the various parliamentary committees got 
involved with the bill, an amendment was passed that defined a public 
servant as anyone sitting on a board of trustees or in the senior manage-
ment of a nonprofit organization that received foreign contributions 
exceeding 10 lakh rupees (about US$15,000) or receives one crore rupees 
(about US$160,000) from an Indian government agency or department 
in a calendar year. The July 2016 amendment required trustees and senior 
staff to provide a listing of all assets under his or her name and all family 
members to the government by the end of August 2016, whereupon the 
government would release this information to the public. Not surprisingly, 
this announcement caused widespread alarm verging on panic. It meant 
that someone who was doing the right thing by sitting on a nonprofit 
board would be subjected to having all his or her assets and that of his/her 
family made public. And it was retroactive three years! One nonprofit 
research institution I know about was supposed to have new board elec-
tions in mid-August. All of the proposed candidates withdrew from con-
sideration. After appeals to the government and to Prime Minister Modi 
himself, the deadline was extended to December 31, 2016, so that law-
suits could be filed. Numerous were. Fortunately, a decision was taken to 
delay the Lokpal Act indefinitely. While transparency and accountability 
are important, penalizing well-meaning board members would be quite 
unconstructive. It is very helpful to have trustees with company and  private 
sector experience on a nonprofit board. These trustees can help with bet-
ter financial forecasting, accounting, and strategic planning. There should 
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be mechanisms that incent them to spend free time on SDO boards, not 
penalize them for doing so.
It can also happen that to hold off an overeager government or to com-
pensate for governmental inertia, nonprofit organizations collaborate to 
create voluntary schemes. The latter situation was the case when a group 
of voluntary organizations proposed a giving day in Japan, which was then 
supported by the government and made official.
In the Philippines in 1998, the Department of Finance recommended 
that only donations to the government’s disaster relief program be made 
tax deductible as only these contributions could be validated as to how the 
funds were spent. Six of the largest NGO and foundation umbrella orga-
nizations reacted with a proposal to create a self-regulatory mechanism 
that would ensure the transparency and accountability of organizations 
that met a strict set of criteria. The Philippine Council for NGO 
Certification (PCNC) was created and received authorization from the 
government to certify eligible organizations. The PCNC has by far the 
most stringent criteria and vetting process in Asia and perhaps in the 
world. By 2017, more than 1300 nonprofit organizations and foundations 
have been certified, and the PCNC has been heralded as a model not only 
of nonprofit-government collaboration but also of a concerted effort to 
create a clean and accountable charitable sector.
concLusIon
In 2017, major events shaped the discourse on the governance of civil 
society in Asia. In China and India new sets of rules are set to influence 
greatly the evolution of how these two nations develop. The two new laws 
in China, taken together, show that the Chinese government is endeavor-
ing to increase local philanthropy and NGOs, while discouraging foreign 
involvement. While there are foreign organizations that have forged the 
appropriate connections within China who will not be too negatively 
affected, there is a climate of caution in place that is affecting all. India, as 
well, is looking inward when it comes to social investments.
In China, civil society is not the only recipient of this cultural ethnocen-
trism. In recent weeks, the availability of VPNs (virtual private networks), 
the primary way that one could access international websites, has been 
shut down. This is all part of Xi Xinping’s pushback against all things 
“Western.” In fact, when he came to power in 2013, a document known 
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popularly as Document #9 was widely circulated among Communist Party 
cadres. The document called for the end of seven taboo topics: Western 
constitutional democracy, universal values, civil society, neoliberalism, the 
Western concept of press freedom, historical nihilism, and questioning 
whether China’s system is truly socialist. Within this context, the rules 
regarding philanthropy and nonprofit organization could be viewed as a 
small sliver of a larger plan.
Whether that is true or not, the at times uneasy coexistence between the 
people, the government, and the private sector will continue to experience 
friction. The charitable sector is especially prone to such friction given the 
lack of clarity of mandate coupled with the often opaque and questionable 
motives of individuals and organizations operating within its parameters.
Again this year, two governments are struggling with scandals arising 
from questionable philanthropic contributions. Deposed Korean President 
Park Geun-hye is currently on trial for, among other things, soliciting 
donations to a friend’s foundation in return for political favors. Shinzo 
Abe in Japan is reeling from donations he and others made to a veterinar-
ian school. It would not be surprising that once these two situations are 
resolved, the governments in Japan and Korea call for new laws to govern 
the sector. As discussed at the beginning of the chapter, the Jokowi admin-
istration in Indonesia has done just that.
Asia is a continent of extremes. Home to the second, third, and fifth larg-
est economies—China, Japan, and India—Southeast Asia, taken as a whole, 
is the world’s sixth largest economy. There is incredible wealth in the region, 
the great preponderance of which has been created in the last 50 years or 
less. Asia is also a region with immense social challenges. India still struggles 
with a literacy rate hovering around 75  percent according to the World 
Bank. In 2017, the Sustainable Development Solutions Network lists only 
Japan and Korea in the top 50 countries whose aggregate scores show attain-
ment or progress in meeting all of the Sustainable Development Goals.15
Beyond these indicators, new challenges arising from the unequal dis-
tribution of wealth in a globalized world are creating unrest and volatility 
throughout the world, and Asia is no exception. Hong Kong, with the 
highest Gini coefficient in the world, is grappling with discontent about 
the stronger domination of China and the lack of economic as well as 
democratic opportunity this is perceived to cause.
Technology has had a multifaceted influence. Millions of eyes see the 
excess of an unequal world and the fraudulent behavior of corrupt 
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 individuals. But technology can also hurt trust in charitable organizations 
overall; when a Guo Meimei posts damning photos, they go viral within 
hours, if not minutes.
Given the confluence of greater wealth, stubborn inequity, and the 
growth of technology, there is no doubt that governments will continue 
to try to manage social organizations and philanthropy. Officials will enact 
policies and regulations in line with their long-term goals and in response 
to short-term crises. Some will help and many will give rise to unforeseen 
circumstances that, in turn, will provoke further response by governments 
and by civil society at large.
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CHAPTER 4
Philanthropists in Asia: What Do They Want? 
What Do They Get?
Ruth A. Shapiro
R.A. Shapiro
CAPS, Hong Kong SAR, China
Asia’s story of the past few years includes rising wealth and increased phil-
anthropic giving. In 2014, there were 128 charitable contributions of 
more than US$1 million from Hong Kong alone, a 185 percent rise from 
the year before (and including the US$1.18 billion that Jack Ma of Alibaba 
used to set up his own foundation).1 In its 2016 study on philanthropy, 
BNP Paribas says that 27 percent of high-net-worth Asians plan to leave at 
least a third of their fortune to charity.2 With much greater wealth, many 
more Asians are becoming philanthropic, and the number and amounts of 
donations are increasing, in many cases, dramatically.
In responding to the increased interest, magazines, articles, and confer-
ences on philanthropy and social investment have proliferated. In China 
alone, new magazines include Charitarian, China Philanthropist, and 
Philanthropy. Forbes magazine has been publishing a Heroes of Asian 
Philanthropy edition annually for the past nine years. These publications 
and related surveys offer a peek at the sources of donations as well as at the 
sectors receiving them. Overwhelmingly, education gets top billing as the 
focus of giving, followed by health. We wanted a further understanding of 
not only what Asian philanthropists fund but why and how they do it.
In the past few years, I have interviewed numerous ultra-high-net- 
worth individuals. Without exception, they expressed a willingness to 
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increase their philanthropy if they felt that they could trust the organiza-
tion or individual receiving their largesse. As discussed in Chapter 3, Asian 
charity functions within a system dealing with a profound lack of trust.
Before examining strategies philanthropists have developed to mitigate 
the trust deficit, it helps to understand why it even exists. There are five 
primary reasons. The first has to do with the importance of an enabling 
regulatory environment. Government plays a crucial role in incentivizing 
civic engagement.
To align incentives, improve transparency, and encourage more chari-
table engagement, it is important to encourage regulations, tax incentives, 
and the general societal predisposition toward the giving and receiving of 
donations. Donors are very much influenced by the regulatory and tax 
policies that govern philanthropy in a country. There are two reasons for 
this, economic and political. On the economic front, governments can 
encourage donors to be more philanthropic by putting in place regulatory 
and tax incentives to give more. The recent corporate social responsibility 
legislation in India is an example of the government orchestrating giving 
in a very large way: its impact is enormous, as we’ll discuss shortly in the 
section “Rely on Your Own Network.”
On the political front, governments can signal to donors that individual 
and corporate philanthropy is not only allowed but also welcomed. 
Singapore’s recent decision to increase the tax benefit of a philanthropic 
donation to 250 percent is a good example. In fact, through our case study 
work, we have shown the impact of confusing or murky regulations on 
diminishing philanthropists’ desire to provide donations commensurate 
with their financial resources and potential. As covered earlier, governments 
across Asia have been trying to address this situation by putting into place 
new laws, regulations, and programs meant to stimulate local giving.
For social delivery organizations (SDOs), the ability to register as a 
charity, to be tax-exempt, to receive tax-deductible contributions, and to 
seek government contracts with projects aligned with their mission are 
critical factors in determining success.
Just as there are best practices in management, there are best practices 
when it comes to government policies. Which work best? What are the 
results as well as the unintended consequences? If the government wants 
to encourage charitable giving, what policies can it put in place that best 
insure that outcome? Which policies do not? This is policy research that 
must be undertaken to help address the reality that donors, practitioners, 
and in most cases the government itself is not clear about the types and 
ramifications of policy decisions shaping the charitable sector.
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The second important factor in explaining the trust deficit is an extraor-
dinary lack of transparency and disclosure by SDOs, often as a result of an 
inability to explain and measure results. Most SDOs have been started by 
and are run by people who are trying to do the right thing. At the same 
time, many of these individuals lack the skills necessary to keep proper 
accounting, management, and human resource systems to explain in a 
transparent manner how they spend the funds they raise and what impact 
their work is having. In a popular essay on philanthropy, Bill Gates explains, 
“You can achieve incredible progress if you set a clear goal and find a mea-
sure that will drive progress toward that goal,” before he goes on to note, 
“it is amazing how often it is not done and how hard it is to get right.”
Lack of metrics is not always the fault of SDOs. Government again 
plays a role: most Asian economies do not require financial transparency 
by SDOs, or their requirements are confusing. In the Philippines and 
South Korea, different ministries working in different sectors require dif-
ferent types of reporting from the organizations they are charged with 
overseeing. In some countries, no regular financial reporting at all is 
required. As noted earlier, in an attempt to remedy this shortfall, China 
enacted a new charity law in April of this year outlining financial reporting 
requirements and the government agencies tasked with oversight.
Foundations as well do not always have to be transparent, contributing to 
the trust deficit. Even venerable organizations such as the Tzu Chi Foundation 
in Taiwan are at risk of public condemnation when their finances are com-
pletely opaque. Some people believe that Taiwan’s Tzu Chi Foundation is the 
wealthiest foundation in Asia, but it is a hard proposition to prove, or dis-
prove. What is clear is that Tzu Chi, founded in 1966 by a highly respected 
nun, Chen Yen, is the world’s largest Buddhist foundation. Tzu Chi, which 
means “compassionate relief,” has enormous reach. With staff and volunteers 
totaling over 1 million people, operating in more than 40 countries, Tzu Chi 
has grown to be a formidable player in disaster relief and health services. It is 
also almost completely opaque, as Taiwan does not require religious organiza-
tions to provide accounting information. While it is known that Tzu Chi owns 
more than US$3 billion worth of Taiwanese real estate, there is no public 
record of how much the foundation is worth and how much it spends on 
charity. Most people agree that as long as the foundation runs under Chen 
Yen, now 79, it will stay true to its mission to promote “sincerity, integrity, 
trust, and honesty.” Once she is gone, the test will be how it continues to 
operate in an environment without the need to be at all transparent.
Scandals are the third factor in explaining a widespread trust deficit. In 
systems where reporting and oversight is unclear, there can be  significant 
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and highly public scandals, most especially those that include fraud and the 
misuse of donated funds. In China, after the notorious incident of Guo 
Meimei, who had been caught apparently misspending donations to the 
Red Cross, philanthropic donations decreased by some estimates as much 
as 90 percent.3 In the Philippines, the Pork Barrel Scandal was among the 
most notorious. This unsavory story involved the funding of “ghost proj-
ects” that were financed using funds provided to lawmakers for develop-
ment projects. These projects were in turn “implemented” through fake 
foundations and non-governmental organizations set up by a firm with 
close ties to the government. Even in clean Singapore, there was an infa-
mous scandal involving the widely respected Kidney Foundation, which 
was found to have committed fraud and provided its chief executive with 
lavish benefits not allowed by his contract. There are numerous other 
examples. In fact, in our The Doing Good Index study, in ten of the 15 
economies studies reported front-page headline stories of scandals involv-
ing foundations and nonprofit organizations in the last two years.
The fourth powerful factor contributing to the trust deficit is confusion 
about the goals of the nonprofit organization itself. The term “NGO” 
itself makes no distinction between an advocacy organization and a social 
delivery organization. And many SDOs also advocate. Bainian Vocational 
Services in China advocates for increasing educational opportunities for 
migrant children. The World without Worries organization in South Korea 
advocates for an expanded view of what respectable tertiary education can 
look like. This type of advocacy is usually viewed by governments as benign 
or even constructive.
Problems occur when advocacy organizations agitate for changes in policy 
that are perceived to challenge the government’s agenda. Groups that work 
on human rights, legal rights, and labor rights find that governments in Asia 
frown on their activities, or worse. We seek to make no judgment about the 
proper role of SDOs, but rather to explain what happens in context.
In more authoritarian regimes like China and Vietnam, Western advo-
cacy organizations are simply not allowed to operate. In Korea, home-
grown advocacy organizations stemmed from a citizen response to the 
years of dictatorship. In almost all cases, well-heeled Asian donors do not 
support organizations that are strictly focused on policy or regime change. 
Asian donors tend to focus on organizations that deliver a clear and 
 unambiguous good to a needy population. Thus education and health care 
are the most popular causes supported by Asian donors: what government 
doesn’t want a healthy, better-educated populace?
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In the United States, such roles are more clearly defined. The tax code 
divides nonprofit organizations based on their goals and methodologies. 
Nonprofit organizations are 501(c)3s, the part of the tax code that enables 
both the organization to be tax exempt and the donor to receive a tax 
subsidy when making a contribution. 501(c)4s are civic organizations not 
organized for profit but with a mandate of pursuing a particular outcome 
often through lobbying or advocacy. Save the Children, the Red Cross, 
and the World Wildlife Fund are examples of American 501(c)3 organiza-
tions. Amnesty International, the Democratic National Committee, and 
Human Rights Watch are 501(c)4s. The system is not perfect, but it does 
help clarify distinctions.
No Asian country has this kind of legal separation, and the term NGO 
is often used across the spectrum. It is not a particularly useful term. 
Technically, NGO stands for “non-governmental organization,” a prob-
lematic term that does not clarify the organization’s goals to the donor or 
to the public at large. Even more confusing, many NGOs are, in fact, 
linked to government. A common acronym in the social sector in Asia 
is  a  GONGO, which is a government operated non-governmental 
 organization—a term that for many seems contradictory to Western ears 
but makes sense within the Asian context. In South Korea, NGO is more 
used for an advocacy organization and the term NPO (for nonprofit orga-
nization) is used when referring to SDOs. This is also problematic, as 
many NPOs are utilizing social enterprises or business to augment their 
income. They are not, strictly speaking, nonprofits. In Japan, NGO refers 
to organizations focusing on helping developing countries and NPO is 
used when referring to domestic organizations.
We at the Centre for Asian Philanthropy and Society use the term SDO, 
or social delivery organization, to refer to an organization aiming to 
deliver a social good. SDOs may or may not have governmental connec-
tions, and they may be using business tools or social enterprises to achieve 
their goals, but they are distinct from pure advocacy organizations aiming 
to change public policy. That sort of designation can be particularly help-
ful in Asia, where donors rarely wish to cross officials at odds with chal-
lenging advocacy.
The last factor that leads to a trust deficit is the historic tendency of the 
“best and the brightest” to go into wealth-making or government careers 
instead of into the charitable sector. While there are many exceptions to this, 
many of the most highly educated people in Asia have chosen more lucrative 
career paths. In the past—in a poorer Asia—these choices made a great 
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deal of sense. Now that many in the region are well off, or comfortably in 
the middle class, there are more opportunities for young people to take 
another route and spend time or their whole careers in the social sector. In 
2016, Teach for the Philippines was listed by a Swedish firm as one of the 
top ten sought-after employers, an unlikely result even ten years ago. 
Young adults have also been excited by the advent of social enterprises, 
companies that run as a business but address a social need. Social enter-
prises are arising all over the region. In Hong Kong, Synergy Venture 
Network has helped to start 20 portfolio social enterprises since 2007. In 
South Korea, the Law on the Promotion of Social Enterprises was enacted 
in 2007, certifying 36 social enterprises. The numbers have been growing 
since.4 Increased societal wealth and innovative business models bring new 
excitement into the social investment space. We expect to see more and 
more of the best and brightest choosing alternative careers in doing good.
Asia’s trust deficit is not a static condition. While each of the above fac-
tors has contributed to the problem, many are improving. Policymakers, 
donors, the public, and those engaged in delivering social good all recog-
nize that the need to fill this gap, to create mechanisms that engender 
trust. And in the meantime, philanthropists have developed a number of 
strategies designed to mitigate the existing trust deficit and the lack of 
institutional mechanisms for conducting due diligence.
But before talking about strategies, it is important to lay out motiva-
tion. What motivates someone with wealth to give it away in Asia? As 
shown in Chapter 2, there are long histories throughout the region show-
casing benevolence on the part of those empowered through position or 
wealth, or both. The motivations for giving in Asia are consistent with 
giving in other parts of the world.
The most important motivation is compassion and a sense of humanity. 
Despite the jokes that wealthy people do not have hearts, those with 
wealth do care about the world and are part of it. In Asia, as in other 
places, people are motivated to give in order to help, in order to ease suf-
fering, in order to find a cure, to educate a child, to help a mother. There 
are numerous examples of philanthropy in Asia going to the most basic 
human needs. Education, health care, and nutrition are at the top of those 
areas receiving support. This is especially true when there are natural disas-
ters. Following the numerous extreme typhoons in the Philippines in 
recent years, flooding in Bangkok, and earthquakes in Japan and China, 
and the tragic 2004 tsunami, people have demonstrated extraordinary 
humanity and willingness to provide assistance.
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Compassion also plays a role when determining the types of issues to 
support. David Wei of Shanghai built hospitals for Tibetan medicine in 
Tibet and Shanghai after witnessing the poor health-care infrastructure in 
Tibet. Laurel and George Tahija established a foundation focused on cul-
tivating all children’s learning potential in Indonesia, after finding these 
resources lacking when raising their own children.
There is also a strong paternalistic urge among Asians who have 
amassed wealth. It is not uncommon to hear those with wealth “helping 
the people” or “providing for the poor.” There is a cultural affinity with 
taking care of those less fortunate in very much a paternalistic manner. 
Those receiving this assistance also buy into the notion of being taken care 
of. In his book Blood and Silk, writer Michael Vatikiotis quotes Malaysian 
Prime Minister Mahathir’s daughter Marina Mahathir: “We are accus-
tomed to tolerating the extraordinary wealth of our leaders. That is 
because we consider they deserve riches in return for looking out for us.”5 
While this quote is referring to political leaders, it is also very much the 
case when it comes to business leaders. Communities expect those with 
wealth to provide for them. Those with wealth historically and still much 
in practice today feel it is their role to be the patriarch and take care of 
their extended family, relatives or not.
The cultivation and strengthening of relationships is another reason to 
give. People give when a friend or business associate asks for support of a 
cause or an organization that they have also been supporting. We will dis-
cuss this motivation in detail in the next section.
For many in business, a business imperative is reason to give. Many seek 
training and increased educational opportunities to raise the quality of 
employees. Others augment existing educational systems with their own 
training programs and courses.
And lastly, there is face, always a motivation in Asia. A philanthropist 
chooses to give so as to receive recognition for largesse. Of course, dis-
cerning cause and effect is a chicken-and-egg phenomenon. Does one give 
in order to get recognition or is recognition the reasonable and justifiable 
response to a generous act?
In any case, the social imperative for giving is growing in Asia. While 
some wealthy people resist the trend, most acknowledge the trend itself, 
one that affects not only the wealthy but also the middle class. Later on in 
this book, we will talk about the rise of crowdfunding throughout the 
region and its support among those with average incomes. Here we will 
address several key strategies employed by well-off philanthropists.
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The most important strategy rests on the importance of relationships. 
Throughout history, Asia has been a region that has relied on relationships 
to conduct a host of activities. Businesses ranging from the keiretsu system 
in Japan to those shaped by Chinese clans have relied on relationships. 
Relationships created the social glue and incentives to carry out complex 
transactions in areas where rule of law has not been the dominant organi-
zational principle.
It is not surprising that Nobel Laureate Muhammad Yunus based his 
microfinance model on the primacy of maintaining community and peer 
relationships. In Yunus’ innovative structure, originally established in 
Bangladesh and now widely replicated, collateral was replaced by peer 
groups where all the members would be accountable if one did not repay 
a loan. It is only in recent years with the advent of international finance 
that mechanisms such as securities and exchange commissions, stock 
exchanges, and international accounting standards have been created to 
allow participation in global markets.
Despite these mechanisms, interactions based on relationships rather 
than transactions remain supremely important. This is not to say that rela-
tionships do not matter outside of Asia. Of course, they do, but in Asia, it 
is hard to overstate how much they do matter. Relationships often trump 
price, subject matter expertise and even at times, one’s own interests. 
Much has been written about the importance of relationships in the pri-
vate sector, and how-to books geared to novice Western businesspeople 
emphasize nurturing the relationships necessary for success in Asia.
In an area without a clear bottom line like philanthropy and social 
investment, the importance of relationships becomes even more decisive. 
Through our work, we have identified patterns of how relationships 
inform or even determine philanthropic decision-making.
Rely on youR own netwoRk
The most prevalent strategy employed by philanthropists in Asia is to rely 
on their own networks or sets of relationships. This happens in several 
ways.
The most common is that someone in your network asks you to donate 
to a cause that he or she is championing. Of course, this also happens in 
other parts of the world, as a dedicated board member or donor recruits 
friends and colleagues to support a particular organization. While the 
donation may be in fact going to a good cause, the primary reason behind 
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the gift is to enhance the relationship of the donor with his or her friend 
or colleague. In fact, it is clear that the return on investment is calculated 
as the enhancement of the relationship first and perhaps the impact of the 
donation further down the list.
It is not uncommon to find a philanthropist whose total giving is reac-
tive, based on friends’ requests. While this is changing, there are still few 
philanthropists in Asia who decide on an issue or project first and then find 
the people and organizations to impact on that issue. In fact, as we will 
see, the great majority of philanthropic giving in Asia is reactive as com-
pared with proactive, with the goal of ameliorating a particular problem.
An example of this was a donor who was asked by a friend to support 
an organization working with slum children. In an interview, he said, 
“I was not planning on donating to this cause, but of course it is a good 
one. Who doesn’t care about slum children?” Then he quickly added, 
“Also, the person requesting was a business partner, so it was helpful all 
the way around.”
Many donors employ this “I’ll scratch your back if you scratch mine” 
strategy when it comes to philanthropy. Given the situation it is an elegant 
solution. The donor’s risk is mitigated by the previous history of his friend 
or colleague with a particular organization; by giving, the relationship 
with that person deepens.
This response-approach also occurs regularly at the behest of a govern-
ment official. In our work, we see two types of government requests to 
charitable causes. The first is when the government has a particular program 
or initiative for which they are looking to outsource much of the costs. This 
was what happened with our case study on the Squash Raquets Association 
of Malaysia (SRAM) in Malaysia. When the Malaysian government wanted 
to build up a national competency in the game of squash, it asked a promi-
nent business leader to underwrite the associated costs. He obliged for sev-
eral years and then passed the funding baton to another business leader who 
followed the same pattern. Another example is now taking place in India, 
where the government is not asking a company or donor to fund a specific 
project but has put in place incentives that amount to the same outcome. 
Since 2013, India has had an extraordinarily progressive CSR law requiring 
companies to spend 2 percent of after-tax profits for charitable causes. As 
we discussed in Chapter 3, it has generated a huge influx of cash going into 
social programs and projects. At the same time, Narendra Modi has been 
advocating for increased sanitation throughout the country. As a result, 
many businesses are building toilets. It is smart to do so: you are working 
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toward meeting your 2 percent obligation while supporting Mr. Modi’s 
agenda.
It is quite common in Asia for the government to ask local business 
leaders to pay for flagship projects that have societal value. In Korea, the 
large chaebols have all been asked to dedicate significant sums to pay for 
costs associated with the upcoming Olympic games. Once again, this is 
not idiosyncratic to Asia, but in Asia it is quite unthinkable for a company 
to say no.
Once again, it is not necessary for the government to ask overtly. On 
the homepage of the China Youth Development Foundation, a quasi- 
governmental organization dedicated to helping children in China, a ban-
ner headline reads, “Since 1989, donors like you have given ¥4.52 billion 
to our programs.” You can then click on the list of donors, which includes 
many of the nation’s top companies as well as a number of multinational 
companies. Giving to the China Youth Foundation is one degree removed 
from giving directly to the Chinese government.
In the examples above, the donor sees the triple benefits of providing 
support for a worthwhile cause while at the same time deepening rela-
tionships and mitigating the risks of making a donation into an unveri-
fied organization. In the case of the government, it may be in the donor’s 
interest to show through philanthropy support for the government’s 
goals.
There are costs to this approach, despite its efficiency in aligning incen-
tives for donors. Sometimes, gifts from donors to the government for 
charitable work may not appear as noble. Given the existing lack of trust, 
the public can easily suspect foul play when the disbursement of funds is 
not transparent. An example of this can be seen in South Korea: in order 
to escape jail terms, both Hyundai’s Chairman in 2006 and Samsung’s 
chairman in 2008 donated $1 billion for charity to the government. In 
both cases, no records exist as to how the funds were disbursed, so it is 
easy to see why the public would be skeptical about their just use.
Philanthropists also use networks to direct donations through a person 
they trust. This happens in two ways. In the first case, the donor trusts a 
particular person and asks that person to head up an organization or an 
initiative that he supports. This was the case when Ronnie Chan, the chair-
man of the Asia Society, asked his long-term protégé to head the Asia Society’s 
Hong Kong operations; he knew she could do an excellent job while also 
representing his interests. It was the case when Washington SyCip in the 
Philippines gave a large contribution to CARD, a microfinance  organization, 
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to put in a place a scholarship program. CARD was not an educational 
organization, but Wash SyCip trusted CARD’s founder and CEO Aris Alip 
to figure out how best to take on this new task. In fact, it is not uncommon 
in Asia to ask someone you trust to take on a role or carry out a task 
regardless of whether that person has had similar experiences. In the 
United States, it is more common to look for a candidate who has had a 
relevant track record and then get to trust him or her. In Asia, it is often 
the other way around. In the end, the outcome is similar but the order of 
the steps toward that outcome differs in important ways.
The other way trust in a particular person matters is when that person 
is heading up an effort and relies on his or her network to gather support. 
This has certainly been the case for me personally, with support for the 
Centre for Asian Philanthropy and Society (CAPS). I have gone to those 
with whom I have had long and trusting relationships when asking for 
support. As Ronnie Chan said in a recent meeting, “I invest in people who 
I know will accomplish great things,” and as Ratan Tata informed me, 
“I focus on those I trust.”
Beginning with a trusted contact makes particular sense in Asia. Since 
there are few mechanisms for conducting due diligence on a social invest-
ment, the norm in Asia is to seek your friends’ advice as to which organiza-
tion does good work, which can be trusted. This means that within one 
economy, oftentimes the same organizations receive the bulk of the local 
community’s support. The utility of relationships goes both ways. Donors 
use their relationships to decide who and what to give to; SDOs use theirs 
to solicit funds.
One of the ramifications of relying on one’s network is the rise of what 
we are calling “superstar NGOs.” In each economy there are a few non-
profit organizations that become well known and established among the 
elite. Giving to them becomes to a certain degree de rigueur. These orga-
nizations are headed by men and women who have either come from elite 
backgrounds themselves or have established themselves among the elite 
and gained their trust. Funding a superstar NGO is less risky. These orga-
nizations are well established and have a place of pride in the community. 
They have recognized names and lauded reputations. They often do excel-
lent work. The downside is that by focusing one’s giving on the most 
prominent organizations, the barrier to entry rises for new and potentially 
innovative organizations. It is very difficult to establish a new organization 
without a pre-existing set of enabling relationships. This difficulty is 
 exacerbated by the existence of a small group of blue-chip organizations 
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receiving the bulk of the philanthropic donations. In fact, in our study, in 
two of the economies, the Philippines and Malaysia, donors only wanted 
to fund case studies if it was with one particular organization. We con-
vinced them to look beyond the one superstar NGO, but the initial desire 
to go with the most successful and best known was strong.
Philanthropists use their relationships in a variety of ways when making 
decisions about donations. Relationships may be the source of the request, 
the means by which to vet a request, or ultimately, the beneficiary of a 
request—even when a given contact falls outside of the issue or problem 
that is ostensibly the reason for the gift.
Faith-based Funding
Asian donors also give to faith-based organizations. As with others around 
the world, much of this giving is driven by the belief that these organiza-
tions embody the values of compassion, kindness, and doing good for 
one’s fellow man. Faith-based giving often goes to SDOs that have been 
established by the clergy or lay practitioners closely associated with reli-
gious organizations. In our study, Haven of Hope in Hong Kong strives 
to maintain its Christian values while delivering secular health-care ser-
vices. Caritas Manila benefits greatly as the charitable arm of the Catholic 
Church in a country where 86 percent of the population is Roman 
Catholic. Donors feel that their funds are being more effectively spent by 
organizations affiliated with their own religion.
do it on youR own
Since many philanthropists do not trust existing nonprofit organizations 
and are more confident of their own management and strategic abilities, 
some decide to fund their own foundations or SDOs. Most have financial 
skills and are active in their respective fields: Asia has very little inherited 
wealth that goes back more than a couple of generations. That means most 
high-net-worth individuals are businessmen and women who are engaged 
with their operations on a day-to-day basis. Increasingly, this means that 
many of them want to employ the same business rigor and savvy to their 
philanthropic investments as they do for their profit-making activities.
In Asia, companies are still family owned or dominated, to a large 
degree. The company’s charitable contributions and those of its largest 
shareholder or owner are often indistinguishable. Zhang Xin and Pan Shiyi, 
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for example, are the primary owners of SOHO China, and since they sup-
port educational initiatives, so does SOHO. Currently they focus on the 
provision of scholarships for promising Chinese students matriculated into 
several elite American universities. From 2008–2012, SOHO went directly 
into schools with its Children’s Virtue Project and Bathroom Construction 
Campaigns. These two programs allow SOHO team members with rele-
vant expertise and skills to work directly with schools.6
In India, Mukesh Ambani is the dominant shareholder of Reliance, 
with 45 percent of its shares, and his wife, Nita Ambani, chairs the Reliance 
Foundation. The Reliance Foundation works in five areas throughout 
India: rural transformation, education, health, urban renewal, and in arts, 
culture, and heritage. The Reliance Foundation follows the model of a 
philanthropist with faith in his or her own management skills: it is an oper-
ating foundation, meaning that it designs and carries out the projects 
itself, rather than giving the funds to existing SDOs.
Globally, foundations taking active roles in how their funds are spent 
are on the rise. In Hong Kong, the Jockey Club Charities Trust, the larg-
est foundation in Hong Kong, has revamped its giving into strategic initia-
tives rather than supporting numerous and non-aligned organizations. 
The Azim Premji Foundation in India utilizes business strategies in 
addressing educational shortfalls in eight Indian states. It is extremely 
dynamic, forming one of the most strategic and ambitious foundations in 
the world and certainly in Asia.
Fund FoReign and Reputable oRganizations
Our own chairman, Ronnie Chan, made international headlines when he 
and his brother Gerald made a contribution to Harvard University that 
was, at the time, the largest in its history. The T.H. Chan School of Public 
Health has now a large endowment to carry out cutting-edge research on 
global health pandemics.
The Chans are not alone. More and more Asians are donating abroad, 
in accordance with the principles outlined above, of supporting valuable 
causes and relying on existing contacts. Universities make natural  recipients. 
According to The Wall Street Journal, Hong Kong donations make up 
17 percent of the world’s total donations to U.S. universities. Prior to the 
Chans’ gift to Harvard, Princeton University ranked first among recipi-
ents, with US$67.6  million from Hong Kong donations,  followed by 
Stanford University (US$39.3 million) and the University of California at 
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Berkeley (US$28.8 million).7 In 2014, SOHO China’s Pan Shiyi and 
Zhang Xin gave US$15 million to Harvard and US$10 million to Yale. In 
2010, Chinese financier Zhang Lei gave US$8,888,888 to his alma mater, 
Yale University (8 being a lucky number in China). In 2010, Harvard 
Business School received US$50  million from Tata Companies, the Sir 
Dorabji Tata Trust, and the Tata Education and Development Trust.8
Nor do all the donations go to the United States. In May 2013, Li 
Ka-Shing of Hong Kong pledged £20 million (US$26.4 million) to 
Oxford University.9 Dickson Poon of Hong Kong gave £10  million 
(US$13.2 million) the following year.10
Though these contributions caused some degree of backlash in their 
home economies, it is not unusual to donate to universities, especially an 
alma mater. Most of these donors gave large sums to universities in their 
home countries as well.
ConClusion
Philanthropy in Asia, like many other fields, is experiencing a cultural shift. 
With increased wealth, there is increased giving, resulting in many others 
moving up the learning curve of how and why to give.
For the man or woman on the street, the primary reason to give is the 
human tendency to be compassionate. For Lifeline Express, half of their 
donations in China and in Hong Kong come from small donations made 
without any type of quid pro quo. In Chapter 2, we saw how charity has a 
long and noble history in Asia. There continue to be many millions of dona-
tions made because the situation warrants it and people feel the very human 
desire to help. There is a reason that education is the largest beneficiary of 
philanthropic donations in Asia. Donors believe that education makes the 
most critical difference. All of the donors to our Centre have supported 
scholarships to one extent or another because of this heartfelt belief.
In addition, particularly for those making larger contributions, relation-
ships continue to be a strong driver of charitable giving. Relying on relation-
ships offers many advantages for donors. It is in fact a virtuous circle—you 
give, you enhance your relationships, which help you earn more, and thus 
you give more. In some ways, it is the most strategic thinking.
On the other hand, the desire to have impact, to make a difference, to 
solve a big problem, is also driving much philanthropic giving. Those who 
give to Western universities would argue that they are doing so to maxi-
mize the value. In the last few years, training programs and university 
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courses on philanthropy have become to proliferate. Just a few months 
ago, the China Philanthropy Research Institute received US$50 million 
from five donors to establish the Shenzhen International Philanthropy 
Academy to train newly minted philanthropists on how best to give away 
their money. They draw from an active, growing pool in China.
Philanthropy, individual and corporate, is proliferating in Asia. As this 
book points out, it will maintain different characteristics from giving in the 
West but there is no doubt that it will continue to grow.
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Relationships are two-way streets, connections between people, and 
donors know it—especially in Asia. As discussed in the chapter on philan-
thropists, donors use their relationships to engender trust and to guide 
decisions about funding. It’s no surprise that our studies show successful 
social delivery organizations (SDOs) in Asia are adept at cultivating their 
own sets of relationships. Here we detail their strategies of employing 
relationships to get things done.
The most straightforward way to engage a helpful network is to have one 
in place from the start. Many successful SDOs begin with a founder or 
board member already established as a leader. Our board members are 
excellent examples. Ronnie Chan has been involved with numerous non-
profit organizations for years, has led the Asia Society, and helped me to 
create first the Asia Business Council and now the Centre for Asian 
Philanthropy and Society. Lizzie Zobel is the co-founder of Sa Aklat Sisikat 
Foundation, a philanthropy devoted to increasing literacy, is the chair-
woman of Teach for the Philippines, and sits on the board of the Population 
Council. Daniel Tsai sits on the board of his alma mater, the University of 
Southern California, and oversees four charitable foundations in Taiwan. 
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Jamshyd Godrej has been on the boards of the World Resources Institute, 
the World Wildlife Fund of India, Shakti Sustainable Energy Foundation, 
the Council on Energy, Environment and Water, and the National Center 
for Performing Arts. This group of leaders has made exceptional contribu-
tions to the charitable sector. Clearly when a person like Lizzie Zobel  creates 
a new nonprofit organization, she not only legitimizes the effort but offers 
to it potential resources in ways that those without her network cannot.
In Asia, the involvement of the elite directly starting, running, and gov-
erning social delivery organizations is increasing with the rise in wealth. This 
“do it yourself” mentality—a spirit of philanthropic  entrepreneurialism—is 
evident in many thriving SDOs. Elites have stepped in where government or 
existing social institutions have left a social need unfilled. One example is 
Nellie Fong, a legislator and chartered accountant, who caught the atten-
tion of Chinese authorities with her expertise on international tax law in the 
1990s. She joined the transition team for the handover of Hong Kong from 
British to Chinese sovereignty and became aware of plans by China’s prov-
inces to send symbolic gifts for the occasion. Seeing an opportunity to 
respond in kind, she suggested a gift from the people of Hong Kong: a train 
that which could criss-cross mainland China, offering mobile health care to 
those who needed it. This idea was rooted in the very concept of guanxi, as 
a way for the people of Hong Kong to reciprocate the gifts received from 
the Mainland, and as a way of fostering goodwill.
With blessings from Hong Kong and Mainland officials, the Lifeline 
Express departed from Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, carrying eye doctors 
and equipment to perform cataract surgery in rural areas of China. Serving 
130,000 beneficiaries and reaching 27 provinces and 120 cities since then, 
Lifeline Express was made possible through the tenacity of an insider like 
Fong. Her clout on both sides of the border helped her to garner support 
for the Eye Train concept, earning approval from two state-level ministries 
alongside multiple provincial and local officials in China—a prerequisite for 
nonprofits to operate openly and effectively in the country. Fong recognized 
her unique role as a convener to the extent that she personally drew up ban-
quet seating arrangements when she brought people together in support of 
the cause. She used her personal guanxi to get the Eye Trains up-and-run-
ning and offered Lifeline Express as an opportunity for people to accrue it 
themselves: a seat on the board of the Lifeline Foundation would become an 
attractive platform for China’s most influential current and former officials.
In Singapore, the Lien Foundation began with another well-established 
leader. Banker and entrepreneur Lien Ying Chow started the foundation 
in 1980 as a means of giving back to society. When it added professional 
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staff in 2005–2006, its first hire was a former official and businessman, Lee 
Poh Wah. Brought on to lead Lien AID, an organization made “to cham-
pion the foundation’s interests in water and sanitation,” Lee encouraged 
its growth at a time when there was a paucity of SDOs focused on water- 
specific interventions.
Lien AID’s substantial support from the Lien Foundation (about US$12 
million by 2014, 80 percent of its operating income) enabled it to experi-
ment with new solutions for improving the quality and availability of drink-
ing water in the nearby countries of China, Vietnam, and Cambodia. With 
its financial security, Lien AID could experiment until discovering solutions 
that flourished in the local context. The organization’s first project in 
Cambodia, in 2007, was as Lee put it, “our most spectacular failure.” The 
hygiene complex constructed in an urban slum in the capital city of Phnom 
Penh became a target for resentment in the community and was eventually 
dismantled in 2012 to make way for property development in the fast-grow-
ing city. But Lien AID persisted in Cambodia with various water-related 
interventions, launching 43 successful community-based water social enter-
prises by May 2015. Today, Lee Poh Wah heads up the Lien Foundation as 
chief executive officer while Laurence Lien, grandson of Dr. Lien, serves as 
chairman of the board. Water and sanitation remains among its three areas of 
focus, and the foundation continues to be Lien AID’s most generous bene-
factor, providing 91 percent of its income in 2013–2014. Responding to a 
gap in the social delivery sector, Lien AID was established as a “start-up,” to 
bring about fresh ideas and to challenge existing norms. This was possible 
only with patient capital from its parent foundation, itself started by a leader 
in the community who could afford the risks associated with innovation.
Many donors move one step away from creating organizations them-
selves, looking to those who are already trusted members of their network. 
When Wash SyCip, Filipino business tycoon and founder of the Asian 
Institute of Management, got behind a project, there was one critical  factor 
that drove his decision to do so: “I only fund organizations where I know 
and trust the leader,” he said. He is not alone. Asian business has traditionally 
been conducted on the basis of good relations, as exemplified by the concept 
of guanxi in China. Translating roughly into English as “relationships,” the 
phenomenon of Chinese business underpinned by personalized networks of 
influence has been closely studied in modern management literature. In the 
Oxford Handbook of Asian Business Systems, INSEAD Professor Michael 
Witt argues that business groups based on relationships exist due to the lack 
of rule of law and its  formalized enforcement mechanisms.1 There is great 
mistrust, which propels business people to stick with those they know.
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Founders thus often establish a board of trustees where the relation-
ships among them help move the organization forward. Of course, this is 
also true in successful organizations around the world, but given the cul-
tural traditions and historical context of the region, it is particularly impor-
tant in Asia. Bainian Vocational School (BNVS), for instance, chooses its 
board of trustees strategically to meet its mission in job placement. BNVS 
board members are well positioned both to help financially and to provide 
access to future company employers.
The China Medical Foundation (CMF) takes an additional step in 
targeting successful business leaders for its board. Unlike many other 
organizations, it requires a financial commitment of at least US$10,000 
per  annum from each board member. Many nonprofit organizations 
encourage board giving, but CMF’s requirement is made explicit for 
every incoming board member. In addition to financial support, CMF’s 
board members are often in positions to help reach out to potential 
donors and government partners in China. With “skin in the game” 
through their financial investment, CMF’s board is highly committed 
and involved with its success in China.
Given the importance of relationships in Asia, it is natural for boards of 
trustees to further organizations’ causes. We also found that for those 
organizations that begin within the elite, the board offers productive social 
empowerment. Outside such circles, boards tend to have less reach, and 
are often comprised of friends and family, when such a board exists at all. 
Closing this gap of experience can help many SDOs in Asia, as they increase 
the capacity of their boards to help achieve their missions.
Well-connected: Pre-existing relationshiPs
Of the 30 Asian SDOs studied, there remain several started by practitio-
ners from outside of business and political circles. Dedicated and resource-
ful founders have established some of Asia’s most prolific nonprofits; but 
no such success is a solitary affair, as our studies show. Organizations 
begun by outsiders often receive the help of benefactors encountered on 
the way to development. Insiders in their respective fields have provided 
support ranging from financial, or in-kind, to something more akin to 
guanxi, as founders tap into the resources and trust of well-connected 
friends to bring their ideas to fruition.
Jaime Aristotle Alip did just this in the Philippines, after he founded 
CARD Mutually Reinforcing Institutions (MRI), a microfinance network, 
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in 1986. Alip was not a member of the elite himself—CARD was famously 
established with a 20-peso (US$1) bill and a mechanical typewriter for tap-
ping out proposals—but his pre-existing relationships were critical in getting 
the idea off the ground in the first place. As Alip described it; “Perhaps 
because of pity, my friend’s company accepted my proposal and provided 
US$10,000.”2 CARD’s first donors were acquired through contacts Alip 
had acquired from his time at the Philippine Business for Social Progress 
(PBSP), a social development foundation established by a Philippine busi-
ness consortium. With a little help from his friend—the Japanese foundation 
Asian Community Trust is a long-time international funder of the PBSP—
Alip was able to take the first steps towards fulfilling his vision for a bank 
owned and managed by landless poor women. Today it has 1 million loans 
on its ledger and protects 8 million people under its insurance schemes.
Alip didn’t stop there, nor did the productive use of his relationships. 
CARD became a trusted and respected organization, and Alip had become 
acquainted with Wash SyCip, a successful business leader who provided 
most of his philanthropy to improve the life chances of poor rural chil-
dren. Although CARD was a microfinance organization without experi-
ence in the education sector, SyCip provided P20 million (US$430,000) 
for a pilot CARD MRI educational loan program tested in two rural prov-
inces. It succeeded, and the program expanded nationwide. SyCip himself 
put in US$1 million and through his own network convinced several 
New York financiers to also offer substantial funding for the further devel-
opment of the program.
Support from India’s business and political elite was also a major driver 
behind the Council of Environment, Energy and Water (CEEW), an Indian 
policy think tank. Leaving an illustrious career in international develop-
ment, Arunabha Ghosh ghostwrote a proposal for a world-class environ-
mental think tank. He shared it with former minister Suresh Prabhu and 
business leader Jamshyd Godrej, chairman of Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing 
Company. They not only shared his vision but had been advocating for the 
establishment of such a research organization for some time. “I was assured 
that the individuals who would become our board members were seeing the 
gaps that were resonating with me,” said Ghosh. “If they were not there, 
I wouldn’t necessarily have come back to India and started something.”
CEEW began operations in August 2010 in a sparsely furnished room 
in Gurgaon, operating with two staff members and a donation from 
Godrej of INR 5000 (around US$100 at the time). It is now interna-
tionally recognized as one of India’s best think tanks and serves as an 
example of guanxi coming full circle, with a multiplying effect. CEEW 
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added to its board of prominent trustees, which now includes business 
leaders S.  Ramadorai, Deepak S.  Parekh, and Anil Kakodkar, former 
chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. All are active in promot-
ing the organization’s research and agenda for an evidence-based 
approach to sustainable development. In 2015, Prabhu, now minister 
for railways, released a CEEW policy briefing on the solar potential of 
Indian railways.
ByPassing the trust deficit
Like Wash SyCip, supporters of these SDOs put their faith in personal 
affiliations they perceived to be trustworthy, transparent and accountable. 
Such relationships provide a starting point for charity that differs from 
many places in the West, where donors may seek a particular organization 
more than a known individual. Relationships matter elsewhere, too, and a 
well-placed champion is an asset anywhere in the world, but in Asia, a 
personal connection becomes especially valuable in the absence of due dili-
gence mechanisms.
A trusted domestic broker has the capacity to boost an SDO’s credibil-
ity. In Thailand, with its complex interaction between business, the mili-
tary, and the state, the royal family brings unique credibility to public 
ventures. Revered by the Thai people, the royal family generally stays 
above the fray of political strife, and are perceived as trustworthy actors in 
public life. Organizations who receive the royal seal of approval, such as 
the Foundation for Slum Child Care (FSCC) are accredited with a level 
of confidence that is beyond reproach in the Thai context. Although the 
FSCC had already enjoyed an affiliation with the elite and international 
accolades, royal patronage changed the game for its co-founders, 
Nongyao Narumitrekakarn and Prateep Ungsontham. Narumitrekakarn, 
a respected socialite, became aware of the squalid conditions in Klongtoey 
Slum when her brother worked as an architect on a public project there. 
While visiting, she met activist Ungsontham who was raised in the slum 
and had established a “one-baht-a-day” school at her home for the many 
neighborhood children who did not have access to education. 
Ungsontham had already had local success. In 1972, she was photo-
graphed standing in front of a tractor that had been sent by the Bangkok 
Metropolitan Authority to demolish the school and reclaim the land. For 
her efforts to save the school, she was awarded the Ramon Magsaysay 
Award for Public Service in 1978 and the John D.  Rockefeller Youth 
Award for her “outstanding contribution to mankind” in 1981.
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That same year, the two women established FSCC to provide day care 
for slum children who were left to fend for themselves while their parents 
worked. Together, the duo caught the eye of HRH Princess Galyani 
Vadhana Krom Luang Naradhiwas Rajanagarindra, a prolific philanthro-
pist, who was intrigued by a profile in an English-language newspaper, 
Bangkok Post, on a “nursery for the poor.” Princess Galyani’s patronage of 
the FSCC was a turning point for the organization, bringing recognition 
and confidence along with the royal seal of approval. They went on to raise 
the funds needed to expand operations to other slum districts within 
Bangkok, and eventually establish a nationwide training network to offer 
official certification for child care providers.
When SDOs lack direct access to the elite, intermediaries play an impor-
tant role in connecting deserving organizations with potential benefactors 
and supporters. In India, where a 2013 Companies Act mandates that 
2 percent of after-tax income be directed to corporate social responsibility 
activities, a number of intermediary organizations have emerged to help 
businesses and individuals make sense of their giving. Among these are 
GiveIndia and Guidestar India, online portals that connects donors with 
screened nonprofits, and Dasra, providing bespoke research and manage-
ment services to donors while working to build the capacity of recipient 
organizations. More informal groups in India also act as trusted brokers, 
such as Caring Friends India, which businessman Ramesh Kacholia 
founded to “act as a bridge between outstanding NGOs and donors.” 
Over the years, it has identified 30 such NGOs across 10 states in India, 
one of which is Dilasa Sanstha, a grassroots organization aiming to allevi-
ate the suffering of farmers in drought-prone areas, by providing micro-
credit and the adaptation of indigenous irrigation systems.
Babu C.  Joseph, former chief executive officer of the Axis Bank 
Foundation, heard of Dilasa Sanstha through Caring Friends. He eventually 
supported it with a grant of around US$1.8  million, helping more than 
8000 farmers and extending credit to 43,000 beneficiaries. Caring Friends is 
not a registered NGO and has no bank account,3 but it has built an informal 
network of Kacholia’s friends and supporters who are bound together by a 
wish to do well. “The common cord that binds them is a genuine desire to 
reach out to those who need our care,” writes Joseph. “The beauty of the 
association is its simplicity and informality and this friendship has resulted in 
providing support to several organizations.”4 In this sense, intermediaries 
such as Caring Friends have successfully leveraged their own guanxi to help 
worthy organizations in India that are deficient in it.
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Organizations can also develop helpful relationships by first attracting 
international recognition. When Dutchman Willie Smits stumbled across 
Suara Alam, it was an Indonesian grassroots radio station with a mission to 
highlight local environmental injustices. Smits, an experienced philanthropist, 
provided it with funds to set up a TV station and get on the radar of interna-
tional organizations. The group rebranded as Telapak and went on to work 
directly with local communities to establish sustainable logging cooperatives, 
creating livelihood options for farmers as opposed to illegal poaching. For this 
work, it received awards in social entrepreneurship from the Schwab and Skoll 
foundations, and Telapak president Ambrosius Ruwindrijarto won the presti-
gious Ramon Magsaysay Award for Emergent Leadership in 2012.
Such accolades have a multiplying effect, attracting donor funding from 
foreign governments and foundations seeking to get behind a tested orga-
nization that meets their strategic objectives in Indonesia. Many of these 
organizations lacked visibility in Indonesia’s nonprofit sector, and Telapak 
became one of the few trusted names for many international funders in a 
notoriously opaque sector. This confidence eventually transferred to multi-
national companies, who turned to Telapak for advice. It now provides advi-
sory services to large corporations operating in the country on how to work 
with communities in a sustainable way, and in 2014 this income comprised 
25 percent of its total revenues. In a country such as Indonesia, which has 
historically been beset by corruption, international accolades such as those 
showered on Telapak amount to a form of due diligence where credible 
actors in the nonprofit sector are otherwise difficult to locate and verify.
Yang Lihe provides another example of how a founder’s long-time inter-
national connectivity can prove critical to the success of an SDO. Yang, a 
former village doctor, became a leading researcher on leprosy, working for 
the Chinese government’s main research center and as an advocate for patient 
rights. He also founded HANDA in 1996, a GONGO ( government-operated 
NGO) providing services treating leprosy in 12 of China’s 23 provinces. To 
support its mission, Yang leveraged the connections of his long career in 
public health, as a university researcher, and as a government official. While 
government support made the creation of HANDA possible, it is these addi-
tional relationships that have enabled its growth. HANDA’s first major donor 
was the corporate foundation of Novartis, the Swiss pharmaceutical com-
pany, and international sponsors remain its lifeblood today, providing 73 per-
cent of HANDA’s income in 2014.
In a broad sense, relationships offer Asians a way around lack of trust in 
the system. In nations where regulators do not require transparency or 
accountability, donors need other sorts of reassurance that their money will 
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be well spent. Traditionally, personal networks have filled that gap. Today, 
new means to conduct due diligence have entered the marketplace through 
the use of technology, and such technology is helping organizations take on 
roles of trusted advisors, allowing people to sustain communities where 
none had existed before.
Indonesia offers a prime example of technology empowering new 
relationships. They have been crucial to the success of the Academy of 
Sharing, Akademi Berbagi in the Bahasa, a national social movement for 
skill training with media personalities and business leaders offering free 
face-to-face classes for young people. It began with a tweet: when 
founder and PR consultant Ainun Chomsun went online in search of 
career information, she sent a public message over Twitter to Subiakto 
Priosoedarsono, founder of one of Indonesia’s top advertising firms, 
soliciting his advice.
“I want to learn to be a copywriter, Mr. Bi, tell me how?” she tweeted.
“I teach, you interested?” Subiakto tweeted back a few minutes later.
The exchange cumulated in him offering to teach a free class at his office 
to a small group, for which word spread quickly over social media. Dozens 
of aspiring copywriters attended. The movement for free-of- charge skills 
training grew, with teachers drawn from Indonesian business and media. 
Through social media, Akademi Berbagi had blossomed into a national 
public platform open to all for learning and sharing with experts, with classes 
coordinated online and conducted offline. Since that first copywriting class 
in 2010, 30,000 students have attended some 1000 classes, which were led 
by 200 teachers assisted by an equal number of volunteers. Twitter provided 
an open platform for the genesis of Akademi Berbagi, requiring the organi-
zation to be an open, transparent operation. Its success offers a new way for 
SDOs to think about how to leverage the public forum provided by social 
media to build trust in lieu of pre-existing guanxi.
Throughout Asia, there are more and more initiatives applying technol-
ogy to enhance transparency and gain trust. In Hong Kong, WiseGiving 
is an online platform allowing potential donors to look under the hood of 
Hong Kong-based SDOs to see how each  organization spends the funds 
it raises. In Singapore, the National Philanthropy and Volunteer Center is 
a government-backed agency aiming to improve efficacy and transparency 
of SDOs while aiding philanthropists to make informed decisions. They 
too have constructed an online platform to facilitate this process.
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Throughout Asia, the rise of social media has also empowered and 
enabled the citizen watchdog movement, curtailing those trying to exploit 
the system or engage in fraud. While these efforts are still in their early 
days, the trajectory of the trend is clear. Citizens are creating alternative 
mechanisms to fund and oversee social development initiatives with and 
without the inclusion of the traditional elite.
conclusions: strategies for Guanxi in the social 
delivery sector
Guanxi persists as a currency of trust in the social delivery sector, rooted 
in the context of community and family in Asia and bolstered by weak 
regulatory environments and a resulting dearth of trust. New organiza-
tions face barriers to financing and support, given wariness on the part of 
philanthropists and donors toward homegrown institutions. “Donations 
can be made only when these fundamentals [infrastructure, legal system 
and human resources] are all in place,” said Chinese philanthropist and 
founder of Alibaba, Jack Ma. “That’s why I think giving donations to 
charities is more difficult than earning money,” he said.5
In this context, founders from or close to the elite of society have 
been best positioned to achieve success across the 30 SDOs studied. 
Fong of Lifeline Express and Lien of Lien AID were able to leverage 
their considerable personal resources to move their own projects ahead. 
Meanwhile, Alip of CARD MRI and Ghosh of CEEW benefited from 
their insider status acquired from years of building relationships and 
providing advice as national experts in their respective fields. On the 
surface, these observations would be disheartening for less well-con-
nected, aspiring SDO founders with bright ideas. But SDOs within the 
study have deployed various other tactics to garner credibility and gain 
access to funding and resources.
Other methods of maximizing relationships include:
Seek alternative accreditation: Soliciting international recognition gave 
Telapak credibility to attract funding and raise its profile, especially 
among international funding agencies looking to expand their activities 
in Indonesia. Co-founder Ungsontham’s international profile as a slum 
activist similarly drew attention from international donors to FSCC, but 
it was royal patronage that ensured its domestic longevity. Getting on 
the radar of international organizations, including those highlighting 
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the work of high-performing SDOs, can serve as a fillip to future pros-
pects. But whether this strategy is viable for an SDO depends highly on 
their aspirations and the local context.
Cultivate relationships with intermediary organizations: In India, where 
nonprofits have to register under the Foreign Contribution Regulation 
Act to receive funds from overseas, aspiring to recognition among inter-
national supporters might not be a viable strategy. In such cases, inter-
mediary organizations can connect donors and nonprofits, and there are 
many in India as a result of the regulatory environment. Organizations 
such as Dasra, Guidestar India and GiveIndia offer a clearinghouse 
function by vetting charities and helping them develop positive relation-
ships with engaged donors.
Many such intermediaries actively help SDOs build confidence among 
donors by developing their internal skills in management, financials, and 
operations. They also have created optional accreditation systems to 
help SDOs improve their appeal to donors. The China Social 
Entrepreneur Foundation (You Change) is currently rolling out a sys-
tem assessing social entrepreneurs by a number of metrics to become 
certified by You Change. WiseGiving and NVPC have already estab-
lished platforms to aid worthy organizations.
Focus online: The case of Akademi Berbagi is an unusual one: few organi-
zations were born on the basis of a tweet. However, it does illustrate the 
extent to which the operating environment has changed for SDOs, 
offering new ways in which they can take advantage of changing dynam-
ics. SDOs can directly engage with debate and even shape the discussion 
of philanthropy through social media, using its platforms to build up 
credibility with the public. Already, organizations such as Give India are 
following in the footsteps of Guidestar in the United States and Europe, 
using an open-source database for organizational data, allowing donors 
to make their own assessments. Information availability and data is 
much patchier in Asia, with its inconsistent reporting requirements and 
varying attitudes toward transparency, but if the case of Akademi 
 Berbagi is anything to go by, those organizations able to harness the 
Internet improve their chances of thriving.
These strategies, alone or in combination, can help an SDO work around a 
shortfall of guanxi, a lack of access to elite resources and support. 
Leveraging relationships in some manner will be crucial for a new organi-
zation, as it has been for each of the SDOs studied across Asia. For many 
of them, pre-existing relationships played a critical role, either through 
founders who were well placed to draw upon trusted  relationships with 
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members of the elite or by those founded by a member of the elite them-
selves, investing their own resources and relationships to the benefit of 
the SDO. Others found their way to productive relationships through 
outside accolades or assistance, or through social media.
In none of those cases do relationships provide all that organizations need. 
They must still work at building transparency, accountability, and impact 
measurement, especially in Asia, where the trust deficit remains as a 
legacy of an unclear regulatory environment. Registration and report-
ing requirements vary, but in many places, these appear to be insuffi-
cient to gain the trust of donors and supporters without the credibility 
brought by guanxi.
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CAPS, Hong Kong SAR, China
When Yao Li sought to set up a free-of-charge vocational education school 
for the children of migrant workers in Beijing, she had the ideal back-
ground for the challenge. A prominent Chinese businesswoman, she 
tapped into her extensive network of contacts to garner support for 
Bainian Vocational School (BNVS). It now comprises nine branches in 
major Chinese cities plus an international branch in the capital of Angola, 
all under the direction of an illustrious board assembled by Yao Li, includ-
ing former housing adviser to the Hong Kong government Simon Li, and 
well-known media personality and former CCTV journalist Wang Jie.
But it was a fortuitous meeting with the China Youth Development 
Foundation (CYDF) that cemented the launch of BNVS and its eventual 
success. CYDF, one of the country’s oldest and largest national public 
foundations, has a particularly important network. With this partnership 
as a foundation, BNVS was able to succeed in spectacular fashion. Around 
2500 underprivileged young people from across China graduated from its 
programs from 2005 to 2015, trained as skilled workers.1
CYDF’s clout means that it plays an important role in setting the 
national youth development agenda, one amplifying the reach of its grad-
uates and personnel. Founded by the All China Youth Federation, it was 
the driving force behind Project Hope, a national initiative that had sup-
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ported 5 million students in rural areas to continue their education by 
2013. As a partner, CYDF could offer Yao Li not just experience but 
prominence and broad approval. Tu Meng, then vice chairperson and 
 secretary general of CYDF, knew Yao Li faced a challenging maze of laws 
and regulations to establish a nonprofit school if she pursued them alone. 
“What you are missing, we have it all,” he told her.
Reimagining the Social contRact
Tu and Yao Li soon reached an agreement whereby CYDF would subsi-
dize BNVS from its own Vocational Education Fund. And through this 
affiliation with CYDF, BNVS could now undertake public fundraising, 
which was to prove a crucial factor in its development and future growth.
Their partnership reflected currents in the country as a whole. Their 
initial discussions took place amid a long-term shift in how the Chinese 
government viewed the social sector’s developmental role. In the past, the 
majority of social services, and practically all education services, were pro-
vided by the state. That began to change in the 1990s, as China began a 
process of economic reform that included considering different approaches 
for public service delivery.
In China, the practice of procuring nonprofit contractors to deliver edu-
cation and health care services on behalf of the state is not as well established 
as in some other countries. As Beijing began collaborating with both the 
private sector and social organizations to explore new models of service 
delivery, CYDF was at the forefront of this movement in education. It would 
be a critical partner in piloting the BNVS model for vocational schooling.
This offered a pathway for migrant children unable to access the formal 
education system due to strict residency requirements while also respond-
ing to a growing demand in China’s labor market for more service- 
oriented, technically skilled workers. Perhaps drawing inspiration from the 
success of the BNVS, the government has since announced plans to 
increase the number of vocational education schools countrywide, with a 
target of providing universal free-of-charge training.
This shift in public-sector thinking is not limited to China. Governments 
across Asia have become increasingly open to new ways of financing and 
delivering on public expectations as the social contract forged with their 
citizens comes under increasing strain. In the wave of postwar indepen-
dence, new governments across the region had attempted to bring 
together fragmented and diverse societies through a unifying vision, as 
exemplified through Jawaharlal Nehru’s interconnected India, and 
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Sukarno’s harmonizing Pancasila principles in Indonesia. In other coun-
tries, the contract that was brokered was more transactional, with the 
promise of public services and prosperity in exchange for social stability. 
From Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore to Mahathir’s Malaysia to Deng Xiao 
Peng’s modern China, this deal helped to foster the stability required for 
East Asia’s economic ascent.
In the more developed economies of the region, traditional pathways 
to social mobility are becoming closed off. A new generation is no longer 
seeing sufficient returns on acquiescence and are demanding a greater 
voice in decision-making. The student-led Umbrella Movement of Hong 
Kong in 2014 demanded broader representation in selection of its leaders, 
and opposition parties in Singapore rose on the support of young people 
via social media channels. In the developing countries of Asia, many with 
large, young populations, governments are under pressure to raise living 
standards and provide jobs to quell discontent—for example, Indonesia’s 
youth unemployment rates remain worryingly high at 21 percent, accord-
ing to World Bank data. This is all taking place in the wake of the 2008 
global financial crisis and subsequent economic shocks, when fiscal pres-
sures on the public purse have never been greater.
FoR SeRvice DeliveRy
Amid this changing social dynamic in Asia, domestic social delivery organi-
zations (SDOs) are emerging to play a more prolific role in public service 
delivery. Multilateral development agencies encourage collaborative models 
of partnership between the government and non-traditional actors in the 
delivery of health care, education, poverty alleviation, and environmental 
services. It has not always been so: SDOs in Asia have not historically been 
so broadly interested in collaboration models. But now, partnership with 
government has become all but essential to achieving their aims. Across the 
30 nonprofits and social enterprises studied, there are few exceptions to this 
rule. A closer look at the high performers in their countries shows us various 
ways to partner with government across the region, collaboration taking 
place at different phases in the evolution of the SDO. Indeed, the arrange-
ments being struck are as diverse as the countries of Asia themselves.
The most straightforward means by which to work with government is 
to be contracted by government to carry out social delivery services. Of 
the 15 economies in our Doing Good Index study, all allow for the pro-
curement of services of SDOs to deliver social goods, although six go 
further and add incentives for SDOs to compete for government  contracts. 
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In fact, in Hong Kong, of the 450 SDOs listed with the Hong Kong 
Council of Social Services Wise Giving platform, 49 percent of their aggre-
gated budgets come from government contracts, the highest among the 
countries we studied. As noted in Chapter 2, there are historical reasons 
for this. In economies where colonialism played a formative role, the gov-
ernment simply did not have the desire or bandwidth to carry out social 
delivery functions. They contracted out these tasks to local groups. In the 
case of Hong Kong, this practice continues today through government 
procurement schemes.
Although the enthusiasm for working with government partners varies 
depending on domestic dynamics, direct engagement with government is 
broadly necessary at some stage for SDOs to thrive. As our case studies 
indicate, there comes a time when the founder or manager will likely 
reflect on how it will forge its relationship with relevant government enti-
ties. More often than not, it is not a case of considering why they should 
work with government but usually a matter of when and how.
aS Jv PaRtneRS
To achieve their objectives, some SDOs were established with an under-
standing that they would need to partner with government to even make 
it onto the playing field. Recognizing the value of this form of endorse-
ment, such “joint ventures” (JVs) are sought willingly by SDO founders.
The joint venture struck between Yao Li and Tu Meng was critical to 
the BNVS concept even getting off the ground. Right at the start, domes-
tic fundraising posed a major barrier to BNVS’ efforts, which required 
government authorization for nonprofit schools. Through its affiliation 
with CYDF, BNVS was able to fundraise within Mainland China, eventu-
ally coming to depend almost exclusively on domestic funding. By the 
2013–2014 school year, 86  percent of its income came from domestic 
sources, rising to 93 percent the next year. In addition, BNVS benefited 
from free-of-charge usage of CYDF premises—classrooms for the 
Zhengzhou school were provided by the Henan Communist Youth 
League, a CYDF member. The CYDF connection has also been helpful in 
recruiting for BNVS, a virtual unknown in its early days, enabling it to 
attract the teaching capacity required for its schools to run.
Through CYDF, the government has remained a controlling stake-
holder and interested observer of Yao Li’s experimental model. Tu Meng, 
also a BNVS board member, acted as an important conduit between 
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 government and BNVS while providing a lens for BNVS into the govern-
ment’s plans for the vocational sector and youth development. But most 
critical to Yao Li’s success has been the official seal of approval stamp 
BNVS received by its partnership with the government-affiliated CYDF, 
which Tu described as a “successful innovation.”
In Malaysia, we found a much more explicit arrangement struck between 
the government and the Sports Racquet Association of Malaysia (SRAM). 
Established in the 1972 by young Malays and expatriates who played the 
game at exclusive clubs in Kuala Lumpur, SRAM’s founding purpose was to 
popularize the game of squash in Malaysia. Its major benefactor today, the 
National Sports Council (NSC) of the Ministry of Youth and Sports, began 
supporting the association in the 1990s in the wake of Malaysia’s winning 
bid for the 1998 Commonwealth Games. The government threw its sup-
port behind SRAM and other sports groups in a bid to help the nation’s 
athletes win prestige for Malaysia, spending more than US$468 million on 
the games. SRAM worked primarily at the state level, building facilities, 
recruiting young athletes, and developing a world-class training program.
In addition to financial support, the government also intervened to 
connect SRAM to sources of corporate funding. In 1995, the Ministry of 
Youth and Sports introduced a program known as Rakan Sukan (sports 
partner) to encourage Malaysian corporations to adopt a sport and pro-
vide the requisite financial assistance and management training to help 
elevate it to international standards. Industry responded to the call, and 
SRAM was matched with YTL Corporation Berhad, a Malaysian infra-
structure conglomerate founded by business tycoon Francis Yeoh Tiong 
Lay. From 1996 to 2003, YTL contributed US$1.3  million, until the 
baton was subsequently taken up by Nazir Razak, squash player and chief 
executive officer of CIMB Bank, who remained a primary corporate spon-
sor for SRAM till 2015.
Through the NSC, the government continues to be the biggest spon-
sor of SRAM’s programs and its athletes, providing 56 percent of its total 
funds in 2014. As a direct investor, the government was in essence funding 
SRAM as an extension of the national sports program, an approach pos-
sible only given the perfect alignment of their objectives to elevate squash 
as a national sport. SRAM’s founding vision to democratize squash and 
develop world-class players aligned perfectly with that of the Malaysian 
government seeking to raise the country’s global sporting image. SRAM 
was perceived to be an effective vehicle with the expertise and networks to 
develop sporting talent at the grassroots level—where a Malaysian  superstar 
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was discovered. International sporting icon Nicol David, who has won the 
World Squash Open a record-breaking eight times, is a shining example of 
this joint venture’s success.
aS ventuRe FunDeRS
Public grants and subsidies now give Asia’s social sector access to funds long 
available for economic development. Historically, governments of the region 
have utilized subsidies to support the growth of strategic sectors, including 
the electronics industry in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. This concept is 
now trickling through the social sector, as governments redirect subsidies 
toward new growth areas, such as renewable energy and environmental ser-
vices. The social enterprises in our study have benefited from this pivot by 
capitalizing upon new procurement opportunities that have arisen from 
Asian governments eager to develop their green economies.
Building a social enterprise around tree planting was very much a blue- 
sky idea for Tree Planet co-founder Jeong Mincheol. But rather than join 
a nonprofit that specialized in reforestation, Jeong wanted to prove that it 
was possible to build a profitable business that could also have a real envi-
ronmental impact. Noting the Korean government’s Green Growth policy 
agenda and the support that was being made available to industry, Jeong 
and his co-founder Kim Hyungsoo went to the market with an idea for 
selling customized replanting projects to consumers.
With the demand for environmentally minded products and services 
being stimulated, Tree Planet was able to thrive as a profitable business, 
with revenues of close to US$1 million in 2015. Alongside the K-pop fans 
who pay Tree Planet to plant and personalize forestry projects dedicated 
to their idols, the Seoul Metropolitan Government has been a consistent 
client of the organization in urban replanting initiatives.
Green growth is also blooming in China. Since the Chinese govern-
ment prioritized the green economy within its 12th Five-Year Plan for 
2011–2015, government agencies right down to the municipal level have 
received significant financial support to put toward environmental spend-
ing. This has paid off for social enterprise Landwasher, the developer of an 
environmental toilet that can save an estimated 2.2  tons of water and 
around 7300 kilowatt hours of electricity a year compared to a traditional 
portable model. Now with assets of US$10  million, Landwasher has 
installed more than 10,000 of its toilets across the country, making it 
China’s top waterless toilet-solution provider.
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Deciding that the concept of a social enterprise was still confusing to 
the domestic Chinese market, Wu prefers to call his company an “environ-
mental enterprise,” as the term is less likely to be associated with sensitive 
nonprofit activities in the Chinese non-governmental sector. It also directly 
links his proposition to funding earmarked for “green” solutions, helping 
him open doors to government agencies such as the tourism bureaus and 
local development departments that remain Landwasher’s client base. Its 
core business is in installing mobile toilets in remote tourist areas and 
municipal areas off the grid from urban sanitation and sewer systems. Its 
big breakthrough came in 2008, when it was selected from more than 200 
bidders to supply water-free toilets for the Olympic Games in Beijing. 
From there on, it has been the supplier of choice for other premium large- 
scale events in China, such as the 60th Anniversary Celebration of the 
People’s Republic of China, for which it provided 350 movable toilets.
Government subsidies have also benefited Landwasher in less direct 
ways. Local government agencies have played an important role in sup-
porting Landwasher’s development. Its classification as a high-tech enter-
prise means that it is eligible for tax and financing benefits and other 
forms of enterprise support from the Langfang, Hebei Province authori-
ties. But primarily, Landwasher interacts with government agencies as a 
preferred vendor. Public-sector contracts remain the bread and butter of 
its business, to the extent that Wu categorizes his company as being in the 
“business-to- government” sector.
Getting buy-in from government actors was a similar factor in the success 
of the Center for Agriculture and Rural Development (CARD), a Filipino 
social enterprise. Established in 1986, CARD has developed a network of 
“Mutually Reinforcing Institutions” (MRI) to extend access to financial ser-
vices to the rural poor. The CARD MRI network reaches far and deep into 
several provinces in the Philippines, a nation of 100 million, of whom an 
estimated 25 percent are considered poor. CARD has been extremely suc-
cessful with more than one million loans and 8 million insurance customers.
Its engagement with government kicked in when the organization’s 
founder, Jaime Aristotle Alip, sought to take CARD to the next level in 
1995. CARD’s loan portfolio had already grown from 200 borrowers in 
1988 to 4240 through the implementation of a microfinance group lending 
model. But Alip wanted to do more; he had a vision of creating Philippines’ 
first microfinance bank to be managed and partly owned by up to 1 million 
poor members. Upon being granted a license by the Philippines Central 
Bank, CARD Bank was established in September 1997.
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In growing its network of MRIs, CARD increasingly worked with rel-
evant branches of the Philippines national government, including the 
Central Bank, the Insurance Commission, and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC), to facilitate conditions conducive to the proliferation 
of microfinance. With the SEC, it developed commercial notes, a short- 
term debt instrument for corporations, for microfinance clients. CARD 
MRI’s lobbying efforts led to changes in law that officially recognized 
microfinance as a legitimate form of banking in 2000. This has set the 
stage for the sector’s growth since then, and the implementation of 
microfinance- based models for a wide range of services and products.
CARD MRI’s reach now extends beyond financial services. In 2012, it 
hosted a summit on the link between poverty and health, which resulted in 
an agreement to push for national reform. CARD’s own business activities 
have contributed to a dramatic increase in the number of people covered by 
micro insurance services; by 2010, about 21 percent of insured Filipinos 
received insurance through one of its MRIs. To achieve CARD MRI’s ulti-
mate goal of making financial services widely available and affordable for the 
rural poor, they had to engage with government at the very highest levels, 
acquiring the necessary operating licenses and driving the policy changes 
necessary for the microfinance sector to take root and grow.
aS hybRiD
When working with nonprofits, Asian governments incline toward grant- 
giving. As noted, more than 50 percent of some SDOs’ budgets come 
from government contracts. This dependency poses a concern for some 
founders and managers, whose revenues are vulnerable to changes in 
administration or government spending priorities.
As will also be discussed in Chapter 8, alternative models are on the 
rise. In Taiwan, Eden Welfare Foundation (EWF), whose revenues 
amounted to around US$40  million in 2014, has shifted. Historically 
dependent on government funding and recognizing the need for a more 
sustainable income stream, the organization has recently focused on devel-
oping income from its social enterprise arm. It now contracts out trained 
 disabled workers to provide cleaning, baking and other services to private- 
sector and government clients.
In Hong Kong, the Haven of Hope Christian Service (HoH) also 
diversified. For years, HoH has received public funding to deliver essential 
health care services to the population under the Hospital Authority. With 
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a staff of over 2000, this faith-based nonprofit provides integrated medical 
and social services at 46 locations, serving some 100,000 people since it 
was founded in the 1950s by missionaries. In 2012–2013 it received 
51 percent of its US$55 million budget from the Hong Kong govern-
ment, with the rest from a combination of fundraising, donations, grants, 
and investment returns.
The challenge for the Haven of Hope is to strike a balance between 
serving the health care needs of the community while staying true to its 
founding mission and values. It has done so by directing its self-generated 
funds toward activities that align with its spiritual values that are not cov-
ered in its public remit. One such area is palliative care services, for which 
there is a dearth of facilities in Hong Kong, which lagged behind Taiwan, 
Singapore, Japan, and South Korea in the Quality of Death Index, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2015 assessment of end-of-life care. Seeking 
to fill this gap, Haven of Hope established the Sister Annie Skau Holistic 
Care Center in 2006 to care for the mind, body, and spirit of the termi-
nally ill, directing resources where the health care system was unable or 
unwilling. Today, the center runs itself on a social enterprise model, rely-
ing on donations for only 15 percent of its expenditure.
Hong Chi Association has also been a long-time beneficiary of Hong 
Kong government grants, which amounted to US$70  million for the 
2014–2015 financial year. It has embarked on a pilot project in which it 
hopes to forge a new sort of procurement relationship. Established in 
1965 to provide educational services to the mentally handicapped, Hong 
Chi Association sends people with intellectual disabilities to collect used 
glass bottles and process them for the production of eco-bricks. In the first 
of its kind project funded by the charitable arm of the Hong Kong Jockey 
Club, Hong Chi Association is working closely with the Environmental 
Protection Department in the hope that by 2018, it will be hired as a pre-
ferred vendor for the government’s glass recycling scheme.
FoR Policy change
As nearly all of our case studies indicate, government partnerships across 
the region follow a spirit of pragmatism. When it comes to social delivery, 
the organizations studied show signs that they are less inclined toward 
changing the status quo and more interested in solving a problem at hand; 
two-thirds focus entirely on creating a direct impact for their beneficiaries, 
with no agenda or inclination to participate in the policy discourse. For the 
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vast majority of Asian SDOs, maximizing the number of people whose 
lives have been improved is the self-purported goal.
When they do seek policy change in the interests of their beneficiaries—
be it to champion the rights of disabled people in Taiwan in the case of 
Eden Welfare Foundation, or to improve public benefits for the elderly in 
Japan as was the mission for Sawayaka Well-being Foundation—they tend 
to do so through a collaborative approach, as opposed to adversarial. This 
manifests itself in organizations that begin life in an advisory capacity. 
Founders are typically respected thinkers or practitioners with existing 
cache within the country, and often abroad. Whether they be from within 
the establishment or having worked with friendly international entities, 
they have come from a background where they have worked with or on 
behalf of government entities. They have created these new organizations 
not to challenge the status quo, but to provide expertise and the knowhow 
to help move it along.
aS national exPeRt
The founder of Coral Triangle Center (CTC), an Indonesian organization 
at the forefront of domestic efforts to drive sustainable use of marine 
resources, is one case in point. Rili Djohani worked for the World Wildlife 
Fund in developing its marine conservation portfolio and joined the 
Indonesian branch of The Nature Conservancy to help establish its coastal 
and marine programs, including one in Bali. From 2004 to 2008 she was 
TNC’s country director for Indonesia with responsibility for forest and 
coastal management.
However, international NGOs in Indonesia cannot raise money inside 
the country, which for Djohani limited their ability to be self-sufficient and 
truly responsive to domestic needs. With the support of prominent backers 
with a concern for the environment, the Coral Triangle Center headquar-
tered in Bali was established. Indonesian businessman George Tahija and 
diplomat and government veteran Hasyim Djalal were founding directors, 
alongside Made Subadia, a top Indonesian conservation official.
Djohani’s expertise and ability to represent domestic interests in inter-
national circles quickly raised CTC’s profile as the national authority on 
issues of marine conservation. CTC is the only domestic partner involved 
in the Coral Triangle Initiative, a formal pact by the six nations that flank 
the beautiful Coral Triangle waters—waters highly vulnerable to ecosys-
tem damage. The other seven conservation partners selected are from the 
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major international agencies that Djohani used to work for and with. CTC 
is also well placed to communicate directly with the government on such 
matters of ocean governance, with two board members who represent the 
Indonesian government on maritime and external affairs.
For Arunabha Ghosh, getting the ear of policymakers was initially a 
tricky task, but one that he believed was critical in the face of India’s loom-
ing environmental crisis. As a respected global thinker on climate gover-
nance, Ghosh had previously worked at the World Trade Organization, 
the United Nations Development Program, and as an author of the annual 
Human Development Report. He became increasingly concerned with 
the paucity of data and information available to Indian policymakers on 
issues of sustainable development. In 2010, this drove him to accept a 
challenge from business and policy leaders in India and build an indepen-
dent research organization, the Council for Environment, Energy and 
Water (CEEW).
Going against the grain of India’s traditionally noisy advocacy groups, 
CEEW seeks to affect policy change on the strength of its research and the 
evidence it generates. With the support of prominent Indian business 
leaders, and importantly, a board co-chairman in former Union-level min-
ister for environment and forests, fertilizers and power, and heavy industry 
and public enterprises Suresh Prabhu, Ghosh and his research team aspired 
to provide the data that policymakers required to make well-informed 
decisions on important issues of resource management and environmental 
governance.
Although it was conceived first and foremost to fill a vacuum for reli-
able empirical data on policy issues, engaging with government has been 
one of the more difficult aspects of CEEW’s mission. “It is hard to get 
access to government in Asia, and no one is going to compliment you or 
even acknowledge your work at times. It can be like selling yourself from 
scratch, every time,” said Ghosh. But CEEW has continued to parlay its 
expertise in government circles and developed a much deeper engagement 
over the years.
The appointment of Prabhu as minister of railways under the new 
National Democratic Alliance government in 2014 has now also provided 
CEEW with a direct line into the Indian government at the highest levels. 
With its growing caché and largely on the strength and relevance of its 
original data and research, CEEW has been invited to advise government 
on more than 140 occasions, both in India and abroad.
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In politically volatile Thailand, the Foundation for Slum Child Care’s 
(FSCC) was established in 1981 in part to fill what its founders viewed as a 
failure of the public welfare system. Public childcare for those under the age 
of two is not available in Thailand. The shortfalls of this were most evident 
in Bangkok’s slums in the 1980s, where a generation of babies and young 
children was born into miserable conditions while lacking adequate care and 
supervision. FSCC came under the royal patronage of the late HRH Princess 
Galyani Vadhana and become a reputable provider of childcare services and 
professional training, caring for 2133 young children in 2014.
Although its raison d’etre was to plug gaps in social service provision 
that the government was not inclined to fill, FSCC eventually would take 
a more strategic approach, like CARD-MRI, to circumvent what it saw as 
bad policy. The requirements for childcare providers to register with the 
Ministry of Social Development and Human Security were so onerous 
that the vast majority of centers were unable to meet them. This encour-
aged an unregulated grey sector for childcare, leaving large numbers of 
children vulnerable to mistreatment.
So FSCC brokered a deal with the government. Through its community 
networks, it would recruit unregistered community-level childcare centers, 
and provide proprietors with professional training under its Network for 
Childcare Services Co-development scheme. Those who passed the course 
received an FSCC certification, and with this they would be able to register 
formally with the ministry. FSCC’s royal pedigree and professional reputa-
tion made it a trusted partner in the eyes of both government actors and 
informal operators. And it came with a good proposal, approaching the gov-
ernment with a solution that precluded the need for policy reform—a chal-
lenging task at a time when Thailand’s political environment is so in flux. The 
government agreed. As of 2014, 81 childcare centers from 67 communities 
within Bangkok had been trained by the FSCC under this program.
aS bellwetheR
More than in other East Asian nations, civil society in South Korea has been 
a consistent channel for questioning and challenging political repression.
Against this backdrop, World Without Worries for Shadow Education 
(WWW), a group seeking to effect change in South Korea’s education pol-
icy, operates in a more confrontational fashion than either CTC or CEEW 
but with a comparable emphasis on research and data to inform their con-
versations with the government. Like protesting farmers, Song In-soo had 
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no qualms about deploying attention-grabbing tactics as part of his organi-
zation’s efforts to reform the education system. He saw that it was placing 
enormous pressure on Korean students desperate to beat their competitors 
for one of a handful of seats at its elite universities. This manifested in the 
form of a “shadow” industry of cram schools, which Korean parents were 
willing to invest in to ensure the success of their children, sometimes to the 
detriment of their mental health. In a worrying 2011 report, the National 
Teachers Labor Union reported that student suicidal impulses were primar-
ily the result of too much time in cram schools and a fear of poor marks.
Former educator Song established the Citizens’ Ministry of Education 
under WWW with a mission to address the worries of desperate parents 
who were concerned for the well-being of their children but also scared of 
them losing their edge in the fierce competition for university places. The 
Citizen’s Ministry compiled data and conducted research to inform its 
case for the reform of pre-university education, finding that the bar for 
English language ability for the high school admissions test had been set 
too high. This gave those who were able to pay for additional tutoring or 
cram school preparation an unfair advantage. In 2009, the Ministry of 
Education lowered English language proficiency levels of the tests, caus-
ing some cram schools to close—household spending on shadow educa-
tion dropped for the first time in 20 years.
The Citizen’s Ministry ramped up its efforts in 2012, when WWW 
members staged one-person protests over 100 days in a public open space 
known as Gwanghwamun in central Seoul, wearing signs urging passersby 
to support education reform. Recognizing a shift in public sentiment 
around this issue, political leaders had even sought to promote these 
reforms in collaboration with WWW. But wary of appearing too close to 
the fray, WWW maintained its independence with its efforts contributing 
to the passage of a national law regulating shadow education activities 
within the public school system. Unlike CTC in Indonesia or CEEW in 
India, WWW did not seek to co-opt government to effect change, but 
instead focused its efforts on changing public perceptions and building an 
evidence-based case for reform that it could take to legislators.
to Scale
Scale is a clear driver for such increased engagement. Many Asian govern-
ments have a governance infrastructure that runs right down to the town-
ship and village levels, where the local representative acts as the gateway to 
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serving local communities. This is particularly true in the larger democratic 
nations of India, Indonesia, and the Philippines, where responsibility for 
public service provision tends to be more decentralized and devolved to 
officials at the sub-national levels. In fact, even when avoiding national gov-
ernment, many of the SDOs in our study developed relationships with the 
local government to ease the path to operating in new areas even if their 
initial instinct is to give wide berth to bureaucracy. Some organizations 
spoke of conceding agility when it comes to entering into arrangements 
with governments, who can either be a hindrance or help on the ground.
This was certainly the case for Magic Bus, an Indian youth develop-
ment charity that began life as an informal club of adults teaching poor 
youngsters to play rugby. It grew into an organization that helps 300,000 
children and teens through a network of 8000 mentors. When founder 
Matthew Spacie wanted to scale up their efforts nationally, he knew he 
had to approach the government in order to do so. “The first conversa-
tions we had with the government were very difficult, because we learned 
very quickly that you can’t speak to the government unless you have 
some quantum of scale,” he said of his initial outreach to the govern-
ment. “We withdrew from conversations until we felt we had some fire-
power to have influence.”
Magic Bus was awarded a UNICEF grant of US$120,000 to expand 
coverage to 150,000 young people, up from the 4500 it was serving at the 
time. For the Indian government, the grant was a clear signal of Magic 
Bus’s credibility as a potential partner. As Spacie and his team were  devising 
their expansion plan in 2008, the central government launched its Village 
Youth Sport and Play Initiative. It was India’s first initiative by the Ministry 
of Youth Affairs and Sports to promote social and physical development of 
rural youth, through which the government provided funds for the devel-
opment and maintenance of sports grounds at the village level.
In 2010, the national government selected Magic Bus as a partner to 
implement centers for its new initiative in Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh 
states. This was an opportunity for Magic Bus to establish itself to public 
officials as an effective partner for scaling up the ambitious scheme, instill-
ing trust that it was a pair of safe hands for the job. To this end, when 
Magic Bus won the World Bank Development Marketplace Prize and 
received a US$70,000 grant, Spacie spent the money on the measurement 
and evaluation of existing programs. This evidence of its impact imparted 
Magic Bus with the confidence it would need to earn the trust of govern-
ment partners seeking the most effective organizations to work with.
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Some SDOs know from the start that they will need to engage with 
government at a certain point of development. Dr. Armida Fernandez 
made that choice quite deliberately for the Society for Nutrition, Education 
& Health Action (SNEHA), which she had established in 1999. Her prior 
experience of working in a hospital in Mumbai’s Dharavi slum showed her 
that it was not possible to drive significant change through delivery of 
health care services alone. Only arming Dharavi’s residents with the 
knowledge to help themselves would prevent them from returning to hos-
pital again and again, straining the public health system.
She set up SNEHA with the intention of changing attitudes among 
slum dwellers and literally bringing health care to the community. As of 
2015, it had made 4500 home visits to pregnant women and assisted more 
than 21,000 women with potential birth complications. It had also moni-
tored the growth of nearly 24,000 children under three years of age in 
Dharavi, brought health care education to more than 10,000 children and 
adolescents, and intervened in more than 5000 incidents of violence 
against women and children. But Dr. Fernandez and her team thought it 
could achieve an even more lasting impact, by helping to build the capac-
ity of the overstretched public health systems.
An opportunity to collaborate with government emerged from the City 
Initiative for Newborn Health (CINH), which was formed in partnership 
with the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai, the public authority 
responsible for the Mumbai metropolis and suburban areas. CINH was 
tasked to reduce maternal and neonatal mortality in eight Mumbai wards 
and to assist some 283,000 people by developing systems for coordination 
between different levels of administration at the hospitals and clinics—a 
daunting task in a city of that scale.
Cognizant of how difficult it could be for NGOs to navigate India’s 
bureaucracies and overcome inertia, the SNEHA leaders saw their role 
within this initiative as that of facilitator and moderator, helping to create 
an environment that was conducive to cooperation between the various 
stakeholders. At the first meeting of all those involved, Dr. Fernandez 
surprised many in the room by opening with praise of government health 
officials for their accomplishments. She acknowledged the difficulties gov-
ernment workers faced in their jobs, the constraints they faced, and their 
desire to make a positive difference to the communities they served.
This appreciative opening set the scene for CINH’s approach, and it 
became the country’s largest urban health initiative for maternal and new-
born health. SNEHA worked with government counterparts to  implement 
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standardized clinical protocols and benchmarks at every tier of Mumbai’s 
public health care system. Lines of communication were established 
between government hospitals, and standards were set for the transfer and 
tracking of patient cases between and within institutions. Data collection 
and analysis provided the government actors with rationales for action. 
When SNEHA examined government data to design the CINH program, 
it found mismatches between capacity and patient flows, leading to a re-
examination of staffing capacity across facilities.
By creating a congenial environment that fostered collaboration 
between government and non-government actors, SNEHA helped over-
come some of the friction associated with bureaucracy. Today, most of 
SNEHA’s programs involve some level of contact with local government 
agencies, either through delivery of services or in its advocacy efforts. As 
of 2015, it has trained more than 3000 public health care providers and 
2900 government outreach workers.
concluSion: StRategieS FoR goveRnment engagement
Successful SDOs collaborate with governments in a variety of ways across 
Asia. In China, BNVS saw that the endorsement by CYDF gave it legitimacy, 
making donors feel safe in following the support of Beijing. In Malaysia, 
SRAM’s objectives aligned so perfectly with those of the government that 
they came together in a marriage of convenience, where SRAM did the work 
of cultivating sporting talent from the ground up while the government 
channeled resources from top down. In India, CEEW shared its data with 
officials, improving their ability to make well-informed decisions.
Each of the social enterprises studied found government as a lucrative 
client, helping these firms to extend their reach and impact. This was par-
ticularly true for environmental-minded enterprises Landwasher and Tree 
Planet, which have benefited from government not only as consumers of 
their offerings, but also indirectly as recipients of resources officially chan-
neled to growing the green economy in China and South Asia.
For those nonprofits reliant on government grants, strained public 
finances have prompted new models of funding. Some have established 
income-producing social enterprise arms. Eden Welfare Foundation in 
Taiwan and Hong Chi in Hong Kong now provide training and jobs for 
the disadvantaged with the view toward improving self-sufficiency of ben-
eficiaries and the organizations themselves. This shift is consistent with the 
Wang Dao philosophy of philanthropy espoused by Taiwanese industrialist 
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Stan Shih, who writes of the societal benefits reaped from doing well by 
doing good.
Only a handful of the SDOs studied had overt aspirations to change the 
policy environment for their chosen field, and even so, they chose to work 
with government cooperatively to fill gaps in technical expertise. With 
accumulated expertise from many years working in established interna-
tional conservation groups, CTC’s Djohani can assist with Indonesia’s 
domestic priorities and provide direct advice to the government on how to 
better manage their ocean resources. Ghosh initially collaborated to gain 
access to policymakers, who now recognize the value of CEEW’s indepen-
dent, robust research in informing environmental policymaking. WWW’s 
less-accommodating stance to partnering with government was specific to 
South Korea’s noisy tradition of civil society process, but it still served as a 
useful bellwether for legislators to understand the shifting national mind-
set on education reform.
And as frustrating as it can be to engage with government bureaucracy, 
maturing SDOs recognize this as the only pathway to ramping up the 
impact of their efforts. Magic Bus gained the trust of government and has 
been able to expand its reach to 22 of India’s 29 states through the national 
rural sports program. SNEHA realized that strengthening of the public 
health care system was the only way to drive better outcomes at scale, and 
to do this Dr. Fernandez fostered collaborative relationships between 
stakeholders. Inspired by the growth of the microfinance  industry in 
Bangladesh, CARD hoped to establish the same in the Philippines by work-
ing with various stakeholders to create the policy environment, institutions, 
and products required. And in an environment where policy reform is a 
distant prospect, FSCC leveraged its royal seal of approval and grassroots 
appeal to broker a workaround that helped informal childcare providers to 
register with the Thai government, despite its onerous regulations.
Reasons for collaboration vary, as do the models employed and the 
degree of engagement in each case. But a partnership with government 
has been forged by nearly all of the 30 SDOs selected for this study. Across 
the board, these SDOs have deployed common strategies that have helped 
them to leverage their engagement with government relations to maxi-
mum effect.
For certain SDOs, government partnerships present few conflicts. The 
alignment of objectives between SRAM and the Malaysian government 
meant that their successes were mutual, making for an easy partnership. 
But this is a rarity in the social delivery sector, where agendas are often 
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complex and less than perfectly matched. The SDOs most successful in 
cutting through the red tape were those that embraced it. Knowing that 
government officials tended to be overworked and beleaguered, SNEHA 
created an appreciative atmosphere to encourage collaboration between 
all actors to strengthen the health system.
But partnering with government does not mean co-option. In fact, an 
independent streak not only helps successful SDOs to avoid mission creep, 
but also allows them to appear as credible and valuable partners in the eyes 
of government. Despite the allure of research grants earmarked for specific 
policy questions, CEEW’s prerogative to set its own research agenda is 
fiercely guarded by Ghosh. In this way, CEEW is able to remain clear- 
minded on what it sees to be priorities of the day and to play its role cast-
ing the spotlight on them.
Mindful of the vagaries of government spending priorities, SDOs such 
as Eden Welfare Foundation are generating new revenue streams in efforts 
to become more self-reliant. But even organizations heavily dependent on 
government grants to deliver services have carved out the space to pursue 
their own interests. Recognizing a dearth of government resources flow-
ing to palliative care in Hong Kong, HoH used alternative funds to set up 
an affordable hospice center. Such initiatives demonstrate the importance 
of maintaining the independence to identify gaps in public sector provi-
sion, and innovating to generate new solutions.
While CARD was ultimately dependent on government to facilitate the 
conditions for microfinance, it was very much the case of an SDO leading 
the government. Alip took the initiative in conducting research, generat-
ing funds, and planting the seeds for his grand vision to provide microfi-
nance services to the rural poor.
Arguably the greatest successes achieved were those in which the SDO 
showed governments a better model for service delivery. Of the 30 SDOs 
studied, SWF’s community model for elderly care, Magic Bus’s mentor-
ship system, New Homeland Foundation’s approach to rebuilding 
disaster- struck communities, and CARD’s delivery of microfinance ser-
vices through the “aunties” of the countryside have all been adapted by 
government as national models for service delivery.
Such success speaks to the importance of the lesson: SDOs in Asia must 
work with authorities at some level. The nature and timing of collabora-
tion varies with the country, the mission, and the organization, but the 
eventual relationship remains fundamental. For some SDOs, government 
partnerships are necessary even to begin operations, and for many more, 




1. In China, similar to several other Asian countries, there are GONGOs, 
which is an acronym for government operated non-governmental organiza-
tions. Seemingly oxymoronic in a Western context, it makes complete sense 
in Asia.
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Not Just Giving: How Do Companies Play?
Ruth A. Shapiro
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CAPS, Hong Kong SAR, China
In Asia, many companies have been quietly addressing local problems 
through a familiar model: that of family patronage. The deep cultural 
roots of family influence have taken Asian development along a different 
path than that taken in the United States and Europe, despite certain par-
allels in their economic growth.
Family influence matters greatly in Asian economies, though not every 
nation is identical. Some markets have developed within democratic sys-
tems and some under authoritarian regimes. Certain governments have 
erected barriers to foreign investment, while others have embraced inter-
national capital. Some countries have advanced economies, with the GDPs 
of Japan, South Korea, and Singapore among the highest in the world. 
Some remain poor, while others such as China, India, and Indonesia are 
an unusual mix, having created vast wealth and a rising middle class, yet 
retaining a significant populace living on less than $2 per day.
Despite this variation, there are important cultural characteristics shared 
across the region. One of the most important is the value of families in the 
overall economic systems.
The notion of a company itself as family forms an intrinsic part of Asian 
economic life. In this model, the owner/CEO treats workers as extended 
family, particularly in companies in which the family plays a dominant role. 
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Today, Asian companies typically have more professional employees, yet 
family remains an important driver of corporate decisions, including how 
a company relates to its surrounding community.
In fact, according to a 2013 KPMG study, a significant percentage of 
companies in many Asian countries with market capitalization of more 
than US$50  million remain family dominated. The chart below shows 









Japan, China, and to some degree Taiwan, are countries where family- 
dominant firms are not in the majority, but still even in these countries, 
there are family-controlled firms that are important mainstays.
For those not as familiar with this phenomenon, it can be difficult to 
convey how integrated families are in all aspects of business life. I recall 
once bringing a famous American business guru to meet with a group of 
Asian business leaders. His talk wasn’t going well, and I called for a coffee 
break to talk to him about changing gears and moving to a new topic. He 
said he knew exactly what to do and strode off confidently to restart the 
session. “Let me now address something that everyone cares deeply 
about,” he said. “Work-life balance…”—I cannot begin to explain what a 
dud that comment was! Work-life balance is not an issue in Asia the way it 
is in the West. Work is life and one’s friends are also one’s business part-
ners. Families are involved in business in their daily lives, affecting with 
whom they dine and, absolutely, whom they trust. This is true when mak-
ing business decisions, and it is very much the case when making philan-
thropic decisions. The borders between these different worlds, much 
more delineated in the West, are often blurred and overlapping in Asia.
Family control is important to understand when looking at a compa-
ny’s corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs and the focus of its 
philanthropy. It is quite common for a family to route its philanthropy 
through the company rather than create a separate personal foundation. 
I have had numerous conversations with ultra-high-net-worth individuals 
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who automatically consider their philanthropy through the company 
instead of setting up a separate family foundation. The company and the 
family remain tightly linked in many Asian economies.
A 2011 UBS/Insead report on Asian philanthropy says, “One has to be 
cognizant of the fact that in Asia it is hard to establish degrees of separa-
tion between family philanthropy and company philanthropy/CSR. Often 
what is seen as individual or family giving is “company giving” now prac-
ticed through the establishment of company foundations and trusts.”1
When a family is in charge, there tend to be certain common practices. 
First, the philanthropy is very much aligned with the personal interests 
and connections of the patriarch. This is slowly starting to change as the 
second and third generations go to foreign business schools and return 
home with new ideas about CSR, including the notion of impact investing 
and social enterprise support—topics we will explore in greater depth later 
in Chapter 8. A second typical practice is to run the company foundation 
under a member of the family, usually a wife, daughter, or niece. This per-
son represents the family and allows the chairman to have any final say. In 
Asia, despite divisions by sex in many business practices, it is culturally 
acceptable to have a female family member lead philanthropic efforts. 
There are many examples. In India, Nita Ambani, wife of multi-billionaire 
Mukesh Ambani, runs the Reliance Foundation, the philanthropic arm of 
the Reliance Corporation. In China, the Wahaha Charitable Foundation is 
run by Kelly Fuli Zong, daughter of founder and chairman Zong Qinghou. 
The Lopez Group Foundation in the Philippines is run by 11 family mem-
bers, with Mercedes Lopez Vargas as the president.
In a company dominated by a family, the patriarch often still plays the 
critical role. This dual persona of chief executive and father figure will 
likely remain in place in Asia because it adheres to norms that work within 
many Asian societies. The fuzzy distinction between family and company 
reflects the larger context of the fundamental use and appreciation of rela-
tionships. As Li and Redding write, “Across the board, Asian economies 
are rich in interpersonal trust, as expressed in extensive networks of recip-
rocal relationships between individuals both inside the firm and outside.” 
Asian societies do tend to build stronger interpersonal networks than their 
Western counterparts, both inside the family and with friends, leveraging 
them for business.2 It stands to reason that if personal relationships play a 
major role in business, they would be at least as important in situations in 
which there is no clear bottom line, like philanthropy.
Even in countries where the family/corporation lines have become 
clearer such as Japan and Taiwan, we can see a greater comfort level with the 
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company acting in a patriarchal fashion. In Asia, especially Japan, company 
towns are thriving. In a company town, the company provides many of the 
social services such as schools, elder care, sports, and recreational activities, 
and while the term has become anathema in the West, company towns are 
thriving in Asia. Positions in towns like Toyota City are eagerly sought. 
There is a comfort level with the company taking on the role of avuncular 
benefactor that does not have an equivalent in most Western societies.
Company towns are even increasing in Asia, while they decline in 
Europe and America. In January 2011, The Economist wrote, “What is 
dying in the West is surviving or being reborn in the emerging world. New 
company towns are being constructed from nothing … and old ones are 
being given a new lease of life.”3
One of the most notable company towns is Jamshedpur, the home of 
Tata Steel. Established in the early twentieth century, Tata Steel and its 
affiliate companies provide housing, health care, schools, utilities, and 
sporting fields and equipment. In an interview in 2016, Ratan Tata, for-
mer chairman of the Tata Group, explained how his appreciation for inter-
connectivity between the company and its employees was forged during 
his visits to Jamshedpur early in his tenure with the group.
Understanding the role of companies in Asian philanthropy requires 
seeing the pivotal role that families still play in Asian companies, the related 
acceptance of patriarchal tendencies, and also the degree to which inter-
personal relationships are cultivated and valued. The notions of family and 
community are integral to many companies in Asia.
Given the oligarchic nature of many Asian markets, it is easy to appreci-
ate the critical role that companies can play in delivering social goods to 
their communities. Within the last few years, virtually all companies have 
become expected to pursue philanthropic activities, and while some are 
slow to engage in a significant manner, many have embraced their roles as 
benefactors, with senior managers and family members devoting consider-
able time to their programs.
Companies employ different approaches when taking on a role in social 
delivery. This chapter describes eight:
 1. Corporate Philanthropy
 2. Volunteerism
 3. Shared Value
 4. Social Business
 5. DIY




 8. Longer-term Partnerships
Many companies in Asia use several of these strategies at the same time, 
but they are distinct and each worthy of explanation and illustration. They 
also have unique applications within Asia. While the strategies described 
are employed by firms around the world, those in the region have devel-
oped them in culturally appropriate ways.
 1. Corporate Philanthropy
The first and most prevalent technique is direct funding of local nonprofit 
organizations. Corporate philanthropy has been on the rise for a decade and 
continues to grow, despite some economic hard times. In 2012, 66 percent 
of all charitable giving in China came from corporations, according to the 
Conference Board. India also sees substantial corporate support for CSR, 
especially after new legislation requiring top companies to direct 2 percent 
of after-tax income to certified CSR activities. According to finance minister 
Arun Jaitley in a March 2016 Economic Times article, companies spent 
Rs8347 crore (more than US$1.2 billion) in the previous year.
Our case studies illustrate how much corporate philanthropy means to 
many SDOs in Asia. Bainian Vocational Services, which offers vocational 
training to migrant and rural teens, gets 51 percent of its budget from local 
Chinese and multinational corporations. Mercy Malaysia receives 45 per-
cent of its funding from companies. The Magic Bus in India receives 51 per-
cent of its funding from corporations. (In other chapters, we have discussed 
how most SDOs in Asia do not have the capacity to keep accurate records, 
maintain transparency and evaluate impact. In all 30 case studies, we asked 
for the percentage of overall donations that come from corporations; only 
five were able to answer the question specifically, although most acknowl-
edged the importance of corporate support to their overall budget.)
With traditional corporate philanthropy, a company supports nonprofit 
organizations in areas determined by management. In Asia, that is often 
education, the most popular area for funding across all countries. In any 
case, the company responds to a proposal or identifies SDOs with which it 
wants to work. Participation typically involves a simple transfer of funds. 
Relationships between the company and the SDO may go on for years when 
designed as a partnership, with the company providing financial resources 
and the SDO carrying out a program approved by the company.
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Western companies tend to work in this fashion as well. They identify a 
need they want to address and then find the SDO partner that has the 
capability and experience to deliver that good. For the SDO, corporate 
support can be a tremendous boon.
Oftentimes, however, the relationship between the two entities encoun-
ters difficulties. Companies and SDOs might have different approaches 
and necessarily have different aims. In a 1999 book Corporate-NGO 
Partnership in Asia-Pacific, editor Tadashi Yamamoto writes of the numer-
ous challenges that face ongoing corporate-NGO partnerships. During 
our work, we have found two innovative programs that seek to address 
these challenges and improve the relationships between companies and 
SDOs. CCPHI is an Indonesian nonprofit that promotes partnerships 
among companies, NGOs, and local governments to encourage sustain-
able communities. CCPHI acts as a sort of marriage counselor to the 
corporate-SDO partners. Every relationship needs a third party from time 
to time. CCPHI acts as that third party, offering training, counseling, and 
tools for effective and sustainable corporate–SDO partnerships.
Singapore Management University (SMU) has also developed a pro-
gram to address the disconnect that often occurs between companies, 
SDOs, and the government. In the new Master of Tri-Sector Collaboration 
degree program now offered, students learn skills to traverse the barriers 
between these three parts of society. Center Director Martin Tan says, “As 
societal issues in the world become more complex, we need to recognize 
that there isn’t a one-size-fits-all approach to solving these issues nor will 
there be one single entity that will have all the answers. Not the govern-
ment, businesses, or civil society on its own. However, we could if we 
collaborate across all sectors and leverage on each other’s strengths and 
expertise to address some of society's greatest challenges collectively.” 
This course, now in its second year, is the only one of its kind in the world.
Both SMU’s program and CCPHI offer innovative means to bring 
about more effective partnerships. Both recognize that the need to work 
together to solve complex problems, while still relatively untested in Asia, 
will be critical going forward.
 2. Volunteerism
Another tactic embraced by many Asian companies is volunteerism. 
A popular activity is arranging a specific day when employees are encouraged 
to clean a park, build a house, or teach a workshop. Many times, employ-
ees are encouraged to raise funds themselves, which are matched by the 
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company. While these activities do not bring about systemic change, they 
do solve a targeted problem and give the employees a sense of pride and 
shared values with their employer. Li & Fung, based in Hong Kong, pro-
vides a good example of such volunteerism, along with other kinds of 
philanthropy. The Li & Fung team in Pakistan has identified a girls’ school 
that receives financial support from both Li & Fung employees and man-
agement. The employees have offered workshops there on hygiene and 
public speaking to help the girls feel more empowered.
 3. Shared Value
Companies also engage with the community through shared value ini-
tiatives. Shared value, a term coined by Michael Porter and Mark Kramer 
in 2011, refers to a strategy whereby companies bring economic value to 
themselves while addressing a social need. In their seminal article intro-
ducing this concept, they wrote, “Not all profit is equal…. Profits involv-
ing a social purpose represent a higher form of capitalism, one that creates 
a positive cycle of company and community prosperity.”
While there has been much talk and excitement about shared value in Asia, 
there are few examples of Asian companies successfully carrying it out. One of 
the more notable cases of this work is Manila Water in the Philippines. Manila 
Water figured out how to decrease siphoning and protect the pipeline so that 
clean, cheaper water reached those in the poorest districts of Manila. This suc-
cessful project improved water access for the poor while at the same time 
increasing Manila Water’s bottom line. Jaime Zobel de Ayala, chairman and 
CEO of the Ayala Group, the holding company that includes Manila Water, 
has said, “Meeting social needs should be embedded in our business models 
and should be undertaken using the same disciplines as those of business.”
Another example of shared value is Kirin Beverage Company’s Hyoketsu 
Wanashi pear juice. Kirin developed the product using pears from the 
Fukushima region as a way to support local farmers after the earthquake 
and tsunami that devastated that region. In addition to supporting the 
community, Hyoketsu Wanashi has been a great commercial success.
Not surprisingly, shared value is an appealing concept. Shared value 
does not entail corporate philanthropy but can solve a social problem and 
generate profit at the same time, aligning incentives and buttressing pro-
grammatic sustainability. When the company and the community prosper, 
the initiatives are more sustainable over time. At this stage, shared value 
initiatives are new globally and very new in Asia. We can expect to see 
much more innovation from work of this kind in the years to come.
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 4. Social Business
In some ways, the opposite approach to shared value is the notion of 
“social businesses.” This term, coined by Nobel Laureate Muhammad 
Yunus in his 2010 seminal book Building Social Business, designates com-
panies choosing to forego profits in order to conduct a business that brings 
significant social benefits. Yunus has created several of these in Bangladesh, 
including one with clothing maker Uniqlo. In this social business, Grameen 
Uniqlo has established manufacturing plants employing local workers, to 
create a less-expensive line of clothing sold locally, at cost. In collaboration 
with Yunus and the Grameen Foundation, several companies have created 
social businesses in Bangladesh, including Veolia Water, Danone, and 
Intel.
Though these are wonderful initiatives, it is not clear that large compa-
nies would choose to forego profits if not for the involvement of an 
acclaimed Nobel prize winner. Partnering with Mohammad Yunus entails 
additional benefits for multinational companies as they garner high-profile 
approval from the public. Some companies in Asia have taken a different 
approach by creating social enterprises that, unlike social businesses, are 
independent of the larger firm. These will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter 8.
 5. DIY
The fourth strategy for community engagement is direct delivery of a 
social good, when companies arrange to do the work on their own. Those 
that do this believe, often with some justification, that they have the skills 
to deliver a social good more efficiently than by working through an 
NGO.
SM Holdings in the Philippines did just this with its BDO Foundation 
for building clinics and schools in the typhoon–ravaged areas of Leyte and 
Samar. The Federation of Filipino Chinese Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry Inc. followed a similar route, building 6000 schools throughout 
the Philippines. The Reliance Foundation also develops its own interven-
tion strategies and carries out work through its own initiatives in rural 
development, health, and education.
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In China, Lenovo has put in place the Lenovo Youth Public Entrepreneurship 
program, a company effort to transfer skills from Lenovo employees to start-
up social entrepreneurs. Lenovo employees help provide training, venture 
capital, and instruction in public speaking and other skills so that young col-
lege students interested in careers in public entrepreneurship can have a 
greater chance of success.
 6. Funding a Corporate Need
A fifth, related strategy is to offer services that companies themselves 
need. This is primarily done in education and training. Many companies 
find that they cannot find the talent they require, so they have created 
training programs to promote the necessary skills in current and future 
employees.
Skill training is not limited to Asian companies, of course. It takes place 
globally, and in emerging economies around the world, it is often a funda-
mental part of employment. It can be helpful to the employee and the 
company, but it does not address the larger societal problems of poor 
schools and an unprepared workforce. In interviews, a number of execu-
tives expressed interest in developing more comprehensive schemes to cre-
ate win-win-win outcomes: employee, company, and society at large.
 7. Alliances
In some cases, corporations and corporate leaders find it useful to 
develop an alliance or consortium to bring about change. Recognizing 
that the Philippines needed coordinated responses to typhoons, Jaime 
Zobel de Ayala of the Ayala Group and Manny Pangilinan of PLDT cre-
ated the Philippine Disaster Recovery Foundation, which is building a 
disaster operations center to manage private sector efforts for relief. In 
China, corporate leaders have come together to create the SEE Foundation 
to address environmental issues and the Ai You Foundation to provide 
medical aid to children. In Malaysia, under the leadership of Yayasan 
Hasanah, the philanthropic arm of the nation’s sovereign wealth fund, the 
Yayasan Amir program finds corporate sponsors for schools that have 
adopted the Yayasan Hasanah curriculum. Alliances like these can leverage 
and coordinate resources and donations in ways that do-it-alone strategies 
cannot.
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 8. Longer-term Partnerships
The last way to engage is the one that we believe has the greatest poten-
tial in Asia, a hybrid of the outreach strategies described earlier. Many 
companies blend a variety of skills with a longer term, venture capital 
approach. They place the skills that make companies successful alongside 
financial resources to build the capacity of SDO partners to bring about 
sustainable change.
SDOs may be nonprofits, but they need to think more like businesses. 
To maximize their impact, they should be concerned with transparent 
accounting, financial forecasting, strategic planning, organizational man-
agement and development, and a whole host of other skills that have tra-
ditionally been labeled as business skills. These skills are in ample supply 
within the private sector.
While illustrative examples of this type of partnership are not yet in 
great supply, there are some pointing the way forward. Here are three 
examples in India, Malaysia, and Thailand.
Dilasa Sanstha has been working with farming communities in India for 
20  years, with the goal of increasing production and stabilizing liveli-
hoods. Several years ago, Dilasa entered into a strategic partnership with 
the Axis Bank Foundation. ABF helped Dilasa set up funding to expand 
rural credit. It also assisted Dilasa with its internal budgeting and account-
ing system, and it supported the creation of a monitoring and evaluation 
system. With ABF’s help, for the first time, Dilasa could collect critical 
impact data on beneficiary income, household assets, migration level, edu-
cation levels, diet, investment plans, and insurance policies. The partner-
ship with ABF enabled Dilasa to operate at a much larger scale and to help 
a great many more farmers and rural communities.
Another example of this kind comes from Malaysia. Mercy Malaysia 
began with a small group of doctors who wanted to provide relief from 
natural disasters. But they found it difficult to create the systems necessary 
for nimble and effective response to unforeseen events, so they partnered 
with Khazanah Berhad, the sovereign wealth fund. Khazanah helped 
Mercy develop management systems to efficiently deploy people and 
resources to a disaster zone. The partnership has helped Mercy become a 
serious and internationally acclaimed provider of disaster assistance around 
the world. Dato Sri Azman Mokhtar, CEO of Khazanah, said that its work 
R.A. SHAPIRO
 143
will help broaden Mercy Malaysia’s impact by strengthening its service 
delivery, governance, and financial sustainability.
In Thailand, Siam Commercial Bank has partnered with the Songkhla 
Forum, a nonprofit organization based in the southern Songkhla prov-
ince. In 2012, Siam Commercial Bank revamped its CSR program and 
decided to focus its attention on youth-related services. It also decided 
that rather than just providing financial support, it would enter into a 
longer-term partnership with a youth-related SDO to help it became more 
strategic, better managed, and better governed. Songkhla Forum, with its 
services for at-risk youth, was a natural match. In addition to management 
support and financial assistance, the bank has provided help with finance 
and accounting, HR management, data management, and strategic 
development.
In all of these three cases, the companies provided financial resources 
and technical resources. They committed to the SDOs for the longer 
term, developing the trust and the relationships necessary to make the 
partnerships really work. These models point the way to an exciting new 
trend, of the deployment of business skills for social good.
Although the strategies may differ, the change in corporate attitude is 
clear. Moved by consistent public expectations for doing good, companies 
realize they must engage with their communities; the only question is 
how. Throughout the region, Asian firms are on the front lines of creating 
innovative community engagement strategies, to be long-term stakehold-
ers in the region’s continued growth. Companies designed on the long-
standing family model often find this a natural transition.
Asian companies are not the only ones testing the boundaries of com-
pany involvement; exciting new trends and innovation are taking place 
around the world. What is true in Asia, however, is that much of the inno-
vation stems from long-held values and practices. Families remain impor-
tant, and the role of the family in company decision-making is critical. As 
we saw in the do-it-yourself strategies of Reliance and SM Holdings, in Li 
& Fung’s community outreach, and with the Wahaha company founda-
tion in China, family-led CSR programs are not only the norm but exem-
plify company-community engagement. Families desire to be around for 
the long term. They have the control to look beyond quarterly reporting 
and to take a longer-term view that creates value for them and the 
communities in which they operate.
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For most of the twentieth century, nonprofit organizations relied on a 
static funding model: foundations supplied grants to charities that deliv-
ered services otherwise not available for a variety of reasons, including 
budgetary constraints (for example, health care for the poor) or because of 
the innovative but still unproven nature of the work (for example, new 
models of helping at-risk youth).
Beginning in the early 1980s, nonprofit organizations evolved and diver-
sified, taking on new characteristics throughout the 1990s that would 
change the way philanthropists and nonprofit organizations now think 
about and act on their work. Many of these changes result from an increased 
understanding and application of the tenets of social entrepreneurship.
In 1981, Bill Drayton introduced the concept of a social entrepreneur 
when he created Ashoka, now a global leader in incubating talent and 
ideas in the social sector. Drayton put forward the idea that a social entre-
preneur is someone who takes the passion and rigor of an entrepreneur 
and applies it to a social problem. This was a new idea in two important 
ways. First, most philanthropy up until that point focused on the organi-
zation rather than on its leadership and talent. Second, it introduced the 
notion that nonprofits should still follow basic business tenets, including 
sound management, transparent accounting, and strategic planning.
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Since that time, these ideas have led to a host of changes and innova-
tions that have changed the sector in important ways.
The first major change has been the blurring of the previously sacro-
sanct demarcation between profit and nonprofit. What started off as the 
adoption of corporate rigor has evolved into the implementation of numer-
ous business tools, such as the use of profit as a motive or the notion that 
key performance indicators (KPIs) are applicable in nonprofit management 
as well. This has shaken out with organizations sitting at various points on 
the profit–nonprofit continuum, offering an array of options for funders.
One of the most powerful social investment trends to emerge from this 
new thinking is the creation of social enterprises on the organizational side 
and impact investing on the funding side. The term social enterprise is used 
often to refer to a host of initiatives and models. A social enterprise must 
perform the delicate balancing act of meeting its financial obligations 
while staying true to its social imperatives.
Impact InvestIng and asIa
On the funding side, charitable application of the profit motive is called 
“impact investing.” The Global Impact Investing Network (GIIN) defines 
impact investments as “investments made into companies, organizations, 
and funds with the intention to generate social and environmental impact 
alongside financial returns.” Once again, there is variation, but mostly in 
terms of expectations of what kinds of financial returns the investor is 
looking to receive. The Acumen Fund, a pioneer impact investment fund, 
uses the term patient capital to indicate a time lag before seeing returns 
for the companies in its portfolio, perhaps at below-market rates. In Asia, 
Acumen has invested $31.9 million spread over 26 companies in India, 
and in Pakistan, $15 million in 16 companies. Their funds promote afford-
able housing, solar power, and private education, among other things.
Private equity giant TPG’s new social development fund, Rise, sits on the 
side of the return spectrum offering market returns for its investors. In addi-
tion to big names such as Bono and Jeff Skoll, Rise has attracted several pen-
sion and sovereign wealth funds. The New York Times reports that three such 
funds have invested nine-figure sums. In the same article, Rise managing part-
ner Bill McGlashan says, “The reality is that no matter which side of the aisle 
you’re on, and no matter where your framework is, if I can build a great busi-
ness that’s profitable and successful and, oh, by the way, here’s the impact and 
the multiple of impact that’s created through that business’s successes, I think 
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that’s good for everybody.”1 Rise targets businesses that are building infra-
structure, telecom, energy, and for-profit education.2
Even the Ford Foundation has joined in. In March 2017, Darren 
Walker, the foundation’s president, announced that it would commit 
$1 billion to investments that “earn not only attractive financial returns 
but concrete social returns as well.”3
While the Acumen Fund and TPG are on different sides of the profit-
ability spectrum, they are both committed to finding meaningful measure-
ments of impact, specifically how much these companies contribute to 
solving a problem in addition to bringing in financial returns. In 2016, 
GIIN released its sixth Annual Impact Investor Survey. It reports that of 
the 158 respondents to the survey, 60  percent principally target risk- 
adjusted, market-rate returns, while 25 percent target “below market-rate 
returns: closer to market rate” and 16 percent target “below market-rate 
returns: closer to capital preservation.”4
But Asia remains far from the center of the impact-investing sector. 
According to this survey, which includes most of the established fund 
managers in the field, only 5 percent of assets under management are in 
East and Southeast Asia and 8 percent in South Asia. Very little of that 
investment occurs in Asia, especially outside of India and Pakistan, a find-
ing consistent with our research. While some of Asia shares in the growing 
interest and buzz around impact investing, it sees little such activity taking 
place on the ground. There are several reasons for this.
First is the availability of deals—or more accurately the lack thereof. 
Though there is desire on the part of social entrepreneurs and investors, 
there aren’t as many social enterprises offering viable business plans. In 
fact, LGT Venture Philanthropy, one of the larger and most active funds, 
selected only 25 companies to pursue, of the 5000 considered.5 Six are 
now active in the LGT venture portfolio.
On the funding side, investors in Asia have not embraced impact invest-
ing to the extent that is taking place on other continents. In a recent South 
China Morning Post article, Stephen Tong, an investment consultant at 
global professional services firm Willis Towers Watson, said, “In Asia, 
many asset managers still see sustainable investment only as a risk-control 
tool to exclude certain sectors such as tobacco, rather than adopting a 
proactive and broader approach to build a portfolio with their own sus-
tainable criteria.”6 In the same article, Annie Chen, who might be the 
most informed impact investor in Asia, said that despite Hong Kong’s role 
as a global financial center, the city lagged in the development of  sustainable 
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investment, lacking both demand and supply of such expertise compared 
to other global financial cities.7
Asia’s lack of deals and interest in impact investing are changing, how-
ever. There is a great deal of enthusiasm around the subject. One indicator 
of this interest has been the increase in the number of conferences in Asia 
devoted to social enterprises and impact investing. These have included 
the International Symposium of Social Entrepreneurship (ISSE) 2016 
(Singapore), Asian Venture Philanthropy Network (Hong Kong), Dasra 
Philanthropy Forum (India), Social Enterprise Summit (Hong Kong), 
and the Korea Impact Investing Network (South Korea), among others.
Another important trend in Asia is the increase in the number of local 
funds that provide financial and management assistance to start-up social 
enterprises. A partial list is shown in Table 8.1.
governments JoIn In
In addition to nonprofit initiatives, many governments in Asia are getting 
into the game. Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, South Korea, India, 
Malaysia, Taiwan, and Indonesia have each established funds to support 
the creation of social enterprises. The tricky part here is the definition of a 
Table 8.1 Partial List of Impact Investing Funds in Asia




SOW Asia, Social Ventures Hong Kong, The Good Lab, Synergy Social 
Ventures
India Dasra, Start Up!, UnLtd India, Deshpande Fund, Villgro, Khosla Labs
Indonesia UnLtd Indonesia, Platform Usaha Sosial
Japan Japan Venture Philanthropy Fund, Entrepreneurial Training for Innovative 
Communities (ETIC)
Malaysia Social Enterprise Malaysia, My Harapan, Yayasan Hasanah
Philippines ChooseSocial.PH, Philippine Social Enterprise Network, Institute for Social 
Entrepreneurship in Asia, PRESENT Coalition




Innov8social, Social Enterprise Leaders Forum (SELF), Work Together 
Foundation, SK Happiness Foundation
Taiwan Social Enterprise Insights, Social Enterprise Development Association
Thailand ChangeFusion, C asean
Source: Compiled by the Centre for Asian Philanthropy and Society (CAPS) 2016–2017
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social enterprise and the role the government can provide in supporting 
their creation and viability. There is great variability across countries.
The India Fund highlights the goal of supporting world-class enter-
prises that focus on the problems of the poor, a broad category. South 
Korea identifies such an organization as “a company that performs busi-
ness activities while putting priority on the pursuit of social purposes.” 
This definition stresses the primacy of the social bottom line. A social 
enterprise has to meet its financial obligations while also remaining com-
mitted to its social imperatives.
The challenge of this balancing act was made terribly clear by the case 
of SKS Financial, in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. Unable to pursue 
both goals simultaneously, SKS veered toward profit first, resulting in the 
state government closing it down after numerous suicides by overlever-
aged borrowers.
And it is not alone. Mohammed Yunus of Grameen Bank warned at the 
time of its IPO that by going public, there would be incredible market 
pressure to focus on financial returns. In response to such concerns, the 
Benefit Corporation or B Corp accreditation system was created in the 
United States and is now operating globally. Once accredited as a B 
Corporation, a company must maintain strict compliance with the profit-
ability/purpose goals of the company. The first Indian company to become 
a certified B Corporation is eKutir, which listed in June, 2016. In China 
and Japan, three social enterprises are now listed. South Korea has the 
most, with ten social enterprises listed. It is fair to say this statistic shows 
that enthusiasm for social enterprises runs high in South Korea.
The most important component of government schemes is the avail-
ability of capital, especially in the start-up phase of the effort. Again, there 
is great variability. Singapore has put US$6  million into two funds for 
social enterprises; one for grants and the other for impact investment. 
South Korea has put US$28.3 million in its social enterprise support fund, 
and Thailand provides $1.2 million in financial resources to social enter-
prises. For India, according to the Business Standard at the time of the 
announcement, the India Fund was seeded with Rs500  crore (about 
US$77.5 million)8 and expects to expand to Rs5000 crore once launched.
All of these funds also offer ancillary types of support such as help with 
networking, mentoring, incubation hubs, and registration assistance. 
The key question here is who is doing the mentoring? Generally, govern-
ment bureaucrats and officials do not necessary know what makes a busi-
ness plan viable. It is important that people with on-the-ground business 
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 experience come into the mix and apply their experience to the projects. 
In Hong Kong, the Social Enterprise Partnership Programme does so by 
serving as matchmaker between start-up social enterprises and private 
sector mentors who work with the teams as they develop their ideas and 
launch them as businesses.
socIal enterprIses
During our project, we included two types of social enterprises among our 
case studies—those that are businesses with a dual bottom line; and those 
that are hybrids, organizations that include profitable and not-for-profit 
components.
There were three social enterprises in our study that adhered to the 
South Korean definition; namely, businesses primarily promoting a social 
bottom line. Tree Planet is one such South Korean company and a regis-
tered B Corporation. Tree Planet leverages online entertainment to carry 
out conservation projects in two ways. It began by incorporating payment 
for tree planting into mobile gaming applications and web games. In these 
games, a player can choose to nurture a tree by paying a small fee, which 
is then used by the Tree Planet team to plant trees in South Korea and in 
ten other countries.
After working with the gaming app for some time, the Tree Planet 
managers realized that there was another way to encourage young people 
to support tree planting. They conceived of the idea of “star forests.” Star 
forests capitalize on the extraordinary popularity throughout Asia of 
“K-Pop” or Korean music and drama stars. Fans pay for the planting of 
trees associated with their favorite star. In both the gaming and star forest 
initiatives, the government provides the land at no cost to Tree Planet. 
According to Tree Planet’s website, it has planted 509,568 trees since its 
inception.
Landwasher, based in China, makes similar use of government partner-
ship, but it did not begin that way. In 1999, Hao Wu left his job with a 
securities firm to address the need for sanitation in a country facing severe 
water shortages. He developed a waterless toilet with the intent of making 
it available throughout China but most especially in arid, rural areas. 
Landwasher was making some progress in building its business in rural 
China, but growth was somewhat slow due to the rather steep price tag of 
$5000 to $8000 for a 4-unit toilet system. Then in 2008 it received a 
huge deal from the Beijing municipal government to supply all the toilets 
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set up during the Beijing summer Olympics. According to Landwasher, it 
saved an estimated 1000 metric tons of water during the two weeks of the 
Olympic Games.9 Since that time, Landwasher has been the “go-to” 
source of sanitation systems for large, government-organized events in 
China. Now that Landwasher has become a successful business, it is turn-
ing back to its original purpose of providing sanitation systems to poor, 
rural areas. It is working on developing a lower-priced model. According 
to founder Wu, this is the most important challenge it faces today.10
Indonesia’s Telapak, the third social enterprise included in our study, 
also began with modest roots. Its two founders, Ambrosius Ruwindrijarto 
and Silverius Oscar Unggul, started off as investigative journalists. They 
began working together on Telapak when they founded a radio station 
that informed local citizens about illegal logging taking place in their 
communities.
Since then, Telapak has branched into sustainable community logging, 
and it also advises companies on sustainability and CSR activities in 
Indonesia. It has become an association of multiple stakeholders commit-
ted to environmental conservation and protection. They work together to 
provide assistance to farmers, nonprofit groups working on environmental 
issues, businesses, and the government. Telapak has created a unique sys-
tem that allows it to call upon relevant skill sets of those within the associa-
tion to address a particular challenge, responding to numerous requests 
from companies and aid agencies in the past several years. It has proved a 
winning model, earning the organization and its leadership the prestigious 
Ramon Magsaysay Foundation Award, the Skoll Social Entrepreneur 
Award, and an Ashoka Fellowship.
All three of these case studies share several important elements. First, of 
course, they were founded by passionate and driven social entrepreneurs 
committed to a cleaner, more sustainable community and world. Second, 
they evolved in ways that used different strategies than originally planned, 
while maintaining the essential mission of the work. When harnessing 
market forces to succeed, a business must follow the market drivers. In the 
cases cited above, the path took the companies in new directions. Tree 
Planet realized that building star forests leveraged the almost cult status 
enjoyed by Korean K-Pop celebrities. Landwasher and Telapak became 
much more commercial. By selling sanitation systems to the Chinese gov-
ernment, Landwasher provided a much-needed public good, albeit not in 
the countryside where Hao Wu first made his decision to create an innova-
tive social enterprise. Telapak must grapple with the balance of assisting 
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local and multinational corporations as a consultant, while also criticizing 
them for activities causing environmental degradation.
Each of the organizations also tackles the challenge of assessment. 
Balancing profit and mission is always a challenge for social enterprises. 
Ideally, most can tackle this challenge when first designing their business 
plans. Once beyond that, however, the balancing act continues. All three 
of these social enterprises, like many others in the field, must also contend 
with the twin challenges of measurement versus mission.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, businesses that try to “do 
good and do well” create a laudable but challenging goal for themselves. 
It does take discipline and commitment to maintain that delicate balance, 
a task that can be made easier when progress toward each goal can be 
measured. With that in mind, the Western world has put serious effort 
into finding measurement systems that capture the impact of an enterprise 
in addition to its sustainability. Rise, the TPG fund, has partnered with 
Bridgespan to create a “rigorous set of metrics with which to measure 
performance.”11 In announcing the Ford Foundation’s commitment to 
provide US$1  billion to mission-related investments over the next ten 
years, the foundation stated that impact assessments have evolved suffi-
ciently to warrant this type of investment.12
Asian organizations followed. The models from the West aren’t ideal; 
they see mixed success, as it is difficult to develop frameworks on intangi-
ble benefits that can accrue. But some social enterprises’ goods and ser-
vices lend themselves more readily to impact assessment. Landwasher 
measures its success on how many toilets were set up and the tonnage of 
water that was saved by using its systems. Tree Planet measures how many 
trees and how many forests were planted as a result of its work. Educate 
Girls, a social enterprise offering fee-based educational opportunities for 
girls in Rajasthan, India, can measure the number of girls who received an 
education through its programs. All of these offer a product or service that 
had not been available previously. Their work, by definition, represents a 
net gain of services to the community.
Measurement becomes trickier when there are confounding variables. 
For example, while Telapak can say that during the time it has been 
involved in a community, illegal logging decreased, it cannot claim clear 
causality. Telapak itself does not feel comfortable taking this credit. “We 
don’t want to be arrogant by telling people how much impact we have 
created to the community,” said Khusnul Zaini, Telapak’s president.13
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In such cases, some organizations employ impact analyses that adhere 
to local situations. For example, to buttress arguments in favor of microfi-
nance, the Grameen Foundation created the Progress out of Poverty 
Index (PPI). Aris Alip of the Center for Agriculture and Rural Development 
(CARD) says of PPI, “Now we have objective poverty data on our clients 
thanks to the Progress out of Poverty Index and Grameen Foundation’s 
guidance on analysis; the results challenge us to do better.”14 The chal-
lenge with the PPI is that it measures changes in poverty, but cannot show 
causality with the loans that the borrowers received.
Another similarity between the social enterprises in our study is the 
extraordinary degree of international acclaim and attention they have gar-
nered. Telapak’s awards are listed above. Tree Planet has received the 
Reddot Design Award, Google Innovation Award, and the iF design 
award, among others. Landwasher was picked by Fast Company as one of 
the 50 most innovative companies in 2013.
That isn’t by accident. We wanted to study successful social delivery 
organizations (SDOs), and since international acclaim is one indicator of 
success, it’s only natural that our case studies found firms garnering acco-
lades. But there is more to it than that. Because there are few successful 
social enterprises in Asia, those that do succeed reap a great deal of atten-
tion and kudos. These high-performing organizations ride the wave of 
interest in impact investing amid a scarcity of alternatives, especially in 
East and Southeast Asia.
Lastly, all three social enterprises in our study benefit from a larger phe-
nomenon of excitement about social enterprises, especially among young 
people. The Royal Bank of Scotland conducted a study that showed that 
people between the ages of 18–30 were more likely than the general popu-
lation to want to start up a social enterprise (27 percent, compared to 20 
percent), and more likely to consider supporting social causes that they are 
passionate about (70 percent, compared to 63 percent of the general pop-
ulation).15 Although no one tracks the actual ages of those running social 
enterprises in Asia, there is a great deal of anecdotal evidence favoring the 
young. Nini Daing, CEO of MyHarapan, a youth-focused organization in 
Malaysia, puts it best: “The challenges we face today require the naivety of 
our youth, our rebels with a cause, who are redefining success in their 
pursuit of a more meaningful life. The good news is that young people 
today are doing just this by rising up to take on these complex challenges 
to an unprecedented degree.”16
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HybrId proJects
There is one other type of social enterprise that is becoming more com-
mon in Asia: a hybrid organization. Here, that means a nonprofit organi-
zation that pursues social good while also supporting a business model 
that may work with its mandate, thereby creating sustainable income 
streams. In our case studies, there are three examples of this: Eden Social 
Welfare Foundation in Taiwan, CARD in the Philippines, and BAIF 
Development Research Foundation in India.
Eden Social Welfare Foundation was founded by Liu Hsia, herself dis-
abled, to train other disabled people in Taiwan with skills that help them 
to be productive members of society. This helps them gain self-confidence 
from their ability to earn an income and contribute to their families’ well- 
being. In the past 30 years, Eden has grown from a staff of two, including 
Liu Hsia, to an organization that employs 2800 full-time staff across 85 
offices in 21 counties and cities. Its budget/funding is now US$49.5 mil-
lion per annum.17
The growth has been extraordinary. Originally focusing on job skills, its 
services have expanded to include psychological counseling, sheltered 
workshops, employment referral, talent and skill training, cultural and rec-
reational activities, and gospel delivery. As Eden grew and trained more 
and more people, they outstripped the jobs available to them, so it began 
to create its own businesses to employ those it had trained. It started with 
a small factory employing six people making good quality local handi-
crafts. Then it expanded into restaurants and bakeries, and then computer 
training and coding. Now, alongside skill and job training, Eden works 
with its clients to help with interpersonal and communication training, 
counseling, and career advice. The businesses that Eden runs are an inte-
gral part of its core mission to help disabled people, but they also provide 
a very real benefit to Eden itself. Last year, 14.4 percent of the total bud-
get came from the businesses it has created. Eden has truly created a win- 
win situation by building social enterprises alongside its nonprofit 
programs.
CARD in the Philippines is another great success story. In 1986, Aris 
Alip and 14 other social entrepreneurs set up a microfinance organization 
with the goal of providing credit to rural poor involved primarily with 
agribusiness efforts. Unfortunately, the early results were not promising. 
Many borrowers did not pay back the loans. So Alip and his colleagues 
searched for alternative models. One such model was Grameen Bank in 
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Bangladesh. CARD adapted for the Philippines the women-focused 
group-lending model that Grameen had pioneered. It included the notion 
that CARD’s customers should also become part of the management of 
the organization. This way, the reasoning went, CARD would always be 
customer-focused.
The changes that it put in place made all the difference. CARD now has 30 
affiliated organizations and businesses. It owns banks to cater to those cus-
tomers who have moved beyond micro-credit and need more capital. It offers 
insurance and education. It has training affiliates for its customers as well as for 
its own employees. It offers customers and employees low- cost medications. 
CARD has become a holding company, with some of its portfolio organiza-
tions maintaining their nonprofit status while others are social enterprises. 
They work together, complementing each other and providing a range of 
services to their customers, many of whom are involved with some aspect of 
the management of the organization. Through experimentation, a willingness 
to take risks, staying very close to the needs of rural women, and through the 
novel combination of nonprofit and social enterprise models, CARD has 
grown into one of the Philippines’ most important SDOs.
A third example of a hybrid organization in our study is BAIF, which 
works with farmers in India to help them use technology and advanced 
agribusiness methods to improve their productivity and increase their 
incomes. Established in 1967, it has helped 5,892,045 families with 
improved animal husbandry techniques and 201,144 rural families in 
planting “wadi” orchards, allowing farmers to rear fruit trees, flowers, and 
vegetables more efficiently.
Inspired by Mahatma Gandhi’s call for Indian self-sufficiency, BAIF’s 
founder Manibhai Desai committed himself to improving rural liveli-
hoods. His first important breakthrough was the realization that the milk 
yields of native Indian Gir cattle went up dramatically when the cows were 
interbred with Dutch Holstein-Friesian and British Jersey cows. He devel-
oped a system for widespread application of artificial insemination that is 
now being used in 16 Indian states. From the very beginning, BAIF both 
worked across and brought together its mission-driven ethos with govern-
ment support, business acumen, and financial reward into a package that 
creates win-win-win impact. In its multifaceted agribusiness programs, 
BAIF does seek government and aid agency support, but it also provides 
numerous jobs to BAIF agricultural technicians and charges farmers for 
their services. These charges add a crucial income stream to BAIF’s bottom 
line and align commitment between all stakeholders.
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In the cases of BAIF, CARD, and Eden, the profitable and the non-
profit, the mission and the enterprise are mutually reinforcing. The busi-
ness imperative was created as a means to accomplish the humanitarian 
goals of the organization. In all three cases, the business initiatives grew 
organically from the needs and opportunities created by the organizations 
while following their missions. The benefit of this model is that the busi-
ness angle did not come first, only to be later structured to support the 
mission. There is less concern with the delicate balance described earlier 
for social enterprises created as businesses. Of course, not all nonprofit 
organizations and agendas lend themselves to the creation of social enter-
prises like BAIF, CARD, and Eden have done, but it is a compelling model 
and one worth emulating when the circumstances are right.
conclusIon
Enthusiasm for applying business tools and entrepreneurial rigor to social 
challenges is high, and in many respects getting higher. This trend brings 
much benefit, along with at least one potential pitfall. On the positive side, 
there is great energy, talent, and excitement in this space. Forbes magazine 
puts out an annual “Social Entrepreneurs under 30” issue.
If there is any downside to bringing business acumen to the nonprofit 
world, it may be in excessive expectations. The tag line to that Forbes 
article is “Leveraging business tools to save the world.” In the text, Forbes 
says that these young social entrepreneurs are solving the world’s toughest 
problems. This type of language, while extolling the virtues of these 
endeavors and helping to expand the buzz and excitement around this 
type of work, also showcases one of the misnomers of the field. Do social 
enterprises really solve some of the world’s greatest challenges?
Taking a look at the three cases in our study, it is difficult to make the 
argument that any of these social enterprises will solve problems at their 
root. While Tree Planet does in fact plant trees, it is not solving the wide-
spread problem of deforestation. While Landwasher provides toilets, it is 
not addressing the need for sanitation systems in arid communities; and 
while Telapak can advise businesses on how to source commodities in the 
most sustainable ways possible, it cannot change the way globalization and 
resource extraction are taking place throughout the world today. Social 
enterprises do make a positive difference, but we need to be clear that they 
cannot, in and of themselves, “solve” the biggest challenges. Many of 
these problems are complex and multifaceted, requiring complex and 
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multifaceted solutions. To really solve these challenges at their most fun-
damental levels, we need to bring together business and government and 
civil society in an unprecedented manner.
In Asia, it is critical for donors and policymakers to understand that 
while promoting social entrepreneurship is great, these efforts cannot be 
in lieu of other interventions. Rather, they shine as part of a set of initia-
tives that can work together to address seemingly intractable problems.
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CHAPTER 9
A New Social Contract
Ruth A. Shapiro
R.A. Shapiro
CAPS, Hong Kong SAR, China
For those of us working and living in Asia, we have witnessed breathtaking 
change over the past 30 years. New York City has developed since 1987, too, 
but nothing compared to the dramatic change in Shanghai or Singapore dur-
ing the same time period. Easiest to see are the new roads, airports, trains and 
the buildings, especially the buildings. In 1996, according to the mayor, one 
in five active construction cranes in the world were in Shanghai. But people 
are also changing. Asians are part of a global marketplace and cultural com-
munity like never before, particularly those in big cities. Connectivity has leapt 
forward at a blazing pace. From 2015 to 2016 alone, the number of active 
Internet users jumped 12 percent, and the figure for those with smart phones 
went up by 21 percent in Asia.1 There are also extraordinary improvements in 
education, life expectancy, and other quality of life indicators.
The news, however, is not all good. The Gini coefficient, a measure of 
the gap between the rich and the poor, is growing around the world. In 
Asia, this is happening at an accelerated pace. In many respects China is 
the first superpower to still be a developing country. While one can marvel 
at the modernity of Asia’s cities, there remains great poverty in both urban 
and rural areas. The dichotomy—between rich and poor, urban and rural, 
those plugged into the global economy and those very much left out—is 
glaringly obvious when travelling around many parts of Asia. Some coun-
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tries have moved into first-world status, including South Korea, Japan, 
Taiwan, and Singapore, but for the others, the need to deal with a 
bifurcated set of needs remains a significant challenge.
We have explored in these pages how governments, philanthropists, 
and nonprofit leaders endeavor to cope with rapid change. The chapter on 
legal and regulatory reform showcases the various attempts by govern-
ments throughout the region to react to new challenges. In fact, much of 
the legal reform is reactive and thus will undoubtedly bring new and 
unforeseen problems in the attempts to deal with current problems. The 
state of regulatory flux will continue as policies are drawn up and tested.
While the economic development of Asia has sped along, many aspects 
of work and play retain traditional qualities. Throughout this book, we 
have emphasized the importance of relationships in philanthropic decision- 
making, social delivery organization (SDO) success, and in the partner-
ships that often form to address a challenge. However much we hear that 
relationships matter in Asia, it is a deep truth in the field of charitable work, 
as the book aims to illustrate. Those who truly succeed in Asia—whether 
they are in government, in business, or running an SDO—have created, 
nurtured, and utilized networks and a whole web of relationships.
In our chapter on relationships, we detail the importance they play in 
the trajectory of an SDO. Relationships bring credibility to CARD in the 
Philippines. They bring the potential to raise funds for the China Medical 
Foundation in Hong Kong. They bring expertise to Mercy Malaysia, and 
they bring the second and third circles of networks for many organizations. 
Though this is also the case elsewhere in the world, relationships take on 
much greater significance in environments where skills are in short supply.
For philanthropists, relationships are often the only means by which 
one can conduct due diligence. The existence of the trust deficit in Asia 
means that organizations may be viewed with suspicion until proven oth-
erwise, and the involvement of a friend or business partner in an organiza-
tion provides assurance of credibility and reliability.
Projects championed by government officials gain further currency for 
donors interested in enhancing guanxi, or beneficial relationships. In fact, 
when I mention that the return on investment for philanthropy is increased 
guanxi to donors, their reaction is most often confirmation. This is not 
always the case when making philanthropic decisions, but it is certainly 
prevalent.
As noted in Chapter 2, there is a long history of charitable giving in 
Asia, but for the most part, the systems that come from organized philan-
thropy are nascent. In that context, relationships are how one gets some-
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thing done. It means enlisting the support of someone who can help to 
accomplish a particular task for a project. We found an example in the 
mere collection of data for our recent study on enabling environments 
for philanthropy. Personal networks were essential in getting people to fill 
out our surveys. Our contacts reached out to theirs and developed guanxi 
as result, strengthening their ties with us and with those they contacted. 
Both sides appreciated their input, and their roles as interlocutors rein-
forced the value of their relationships.
While relationships have long been useful, technology is providing new 
ways of getting things done. Asia has embraced technology along with 
development. Nine of the top 20 most connected countries in the world 
are in Asia.2 Technology has a profound impact on many aspects of social 
and economic development in the region. In the charitable sector, it 
changes approaches to business in four important ways: through fundrais-
ing, transparency, accountability, and impact.
Crowdfunding is a phenomenon around the world, and in a region as 
connected as Asia it is becoming a powerful tool. One of the most cited 
examples is the story of Deng Fei in China and the free lunch program he 
started. Concerned about hungry kids, Deng Fei asked for support online 
in 2011 to provide school lunches to kids in poor areas. Within a month, 
his posting on Weibo (China’s Twitter equivalent) generated more than 
RMB1 million (US$150,000) in small amounts from numerous donors. 
By the end of 2016, 80,000 children received lunch daily and the govern-
ment picked up the program to expand it in five provinces.
Technology also enables greater transparency and accountability in two 
important ways. First, in many Asian countries, online listings include orga-
nizations adhering to stricter reporting standards. The Hong Kong Council 
for Social Services’ WiseGiving platform, for example, allows potential donors 
to find out a great deal of information about the 450 SDOs on their site. The 
Philippine Council for NGO Certification lists all those certified on its web-
site. There are other such sites in India, Japan, South Korea and China.
The second way that technology makes a difference is as an important 
watchdog tool. While governments might not have the wherewithal to 
patrol the sector, millions of eyes look at nonprofit projects every day. The 
Guo Meimei/Red Cross incident became a scandal when her post of lavish 
spending went viral. So did a video of a rat at the buffet table of one of 
Malaysia’s largest public hospitals. Needless to say, the kitchens there are 
much better maintained now! Everyone with a smart phone becomes an 
investigative journalist and whistleblower. This powerful trend can bring 
about better governance and oversight.
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Technology even helps with impact. Many organizations use technol-
ogy as an integral part of their offerings. In this book, we saw organiza-
tions as diverse as Akademi Berbagi in Indonesia and Tree Planet in South 
Korea use the Internet to communicate and as their distribution system. 
They also illustrate the circular aspect of using technology well. When an 
organization fundraises successfully online, it can then scale up its projects 
and report the increased impact, which assists in further fundraising and so 
on. We picked the 30 organizations in our studies because they were par-
ticularly successful. All of them spent time and resources developing their 
Internet presences, without which it would be more difficult to be suc-
cessful today.
Another important recent trend in Asia drawing on relationships and 
technology is the wave of young people who see addressing social chal-
lenges as a viable career option. This is new. In the chapter on philanthro-
pists, we cited the historical tendency for the best and the brightest to go 
into lucrative careers, a phenomenon contributing to the trust deficit hur-
dle of charitable organizations. Such narrow career choices made sense 
when Asia was just coming out of widespread poverty. Now, more and 
more young people want to work with SDOs, with philanthropic founda-
tions, in social enterprises and impact investing. There is energy and 
enthusiasm for using business to achieve social good, and while these 
social enterprises have not made significant difference to date, it is still 
early days and many are moving into this sector. No doubt, scalable social 
innovations will proliferate and present us with solutions that haven’t been 
available before.
Certain innovations skip past steps followed in the West. We can see 
how cell phone coverage, for example, arrived in Asia before the full dis-
tribution of land lines. With an incomplete network of telephone lines, 
mobile technologies were able to “leap-frog” to massive scale quite 
quickly. The dearth of landline infrastructure was not just about the hard-
ware but the environment as well. While it is true that there were fewer 
phone lines in place, there were also fewer stakeholders with their own 
agendas to deal with. In the United States, the pre-existing phone compa-
nies put up road blocks to cell phones as they were slow to realize how 
critically important this technology was going to be. Similarly, in China, 
banks leapt past the use of paper checks. Once people became wealthy 
enough to substantially increase their regular purchases, transactions went 
digital to a degree surpassing the West. In 2016, mobile payments in 
China were 50 times those in America.
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In the charitable sector, we find similar factors in place. Throughout Asia, 
human and organizational infrastructures are sparser and newer. This means 
that if we find better models, best practices, enabling regulations, and poli-
cies, they can be put in place now, allowing Asia to maximize the way that 
private social investment is made, and to apply it in ways that leverage it 
much more effectively. It is also true that without established agendas, we 
have an opportunity to really start with fresh ideas and innovative models.
To see what is possible in the charitable sector, we can look to the 
“green revolution,” the widespread adoption of new seeds and agricul-
tural processes in the 1960s that dramatically increased production world-
wide, especially in developing countries, allowing millions to receive better 
food and nutrition. The green revolution succeeded through five comple-
mentary factors: application of new technology, an enabling environment 
(especially through improved fertilizer and irrigation), the training of an 
energized cohort of young people in new techniques, sufficient funding, 
and solid relationships with governments.
All these factors apply now to the charitable sector. In this case, the “tech-
nology” consists of the application of better models and best practices as well 
as the use of the Internet and mobile applications. The enabling environment 
comes through the popularity of engagement and “giving back” now becom-
ing increasingly popular in Asia. This is important as it is much more organic, 
more natural. And although there was one unfortunate outcome of the green 
revolution with the deleterious environmental impact of the same fertilizers 
that dramatically and somewhat unnaturally increased yield, there is no doubt 
that much more good took place. The training of young people is also hap-
pening apace, at the university level through classes on nonprofit manage-
ment, philanthropy, corporate social responsibility, and through incubators 
and hubs for social enterprises. Governments have set up funds for the cre-
ation of social enterprises and for other types of social projects, including 
trainings, workshops, and mentoring of those who receive the funds. On the 
funding side, while the numbers are difficult to pin down exactly, there is 
ample evidence of a fast-growing philanthropic movement in Asia.
Which brings us to the last factor: solid relationships with government. 
As we have discussed throughout this book, this is an area where Asia dif-
fers dramatically from the West. There is a social contract in place in Asia. 
Donors tend to fund projects, programs, and social needs that are aligned 
with the government’s goals in their country, and many successful SDOs 
do the same. This is true throughout the region. Sometimes this  cooperation 
is explicit. For example, in China, where the new charity law limits the 
work of SDOs to poverty relief, care for the elderly and orphans, disaster 
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relief, education, science, culture, and sports—all issues the government 
has prioritized for itself as well. In most cases, the understanding is implicit. 
There is some degree of self-policing in which donors choose to fund pro-
grams that comply with government priorities without being told to do so.
There are ramifications in having this social contract. One important 
one is that when government is involved with an effort to address a social 
challenge, the idea or innovation can be picked up by the government and 
scaled in a way that would have been impossible if only the SDO were 
administering it. Scale is a term that receives much fanfare in the social 
investment community today. Scale and systemic change are not the same 
thing. Scale means significantly increasing the number of products or ser-
vices. Systemic change refers to addressing the causes of the problem and 
changing the system so that it does not occur again or at least with the 
same frequency. To achieve great scale and carry out systemic change, you 
need the government to be involved. The good news in Asia is that in 
most cases, the government is already involved. What does not happen 
often enough is that the government is nimble or honest enough to see a 
solution and then change direction to accommodate it. It is for this reason 
that some philanthropists, such as the Azim Premji Foundation and Tata 
Trusts in India, and Wash SyCip and the Jon Ramon Aboitiz Foundation 
in the Philippines, have begun to train government officials on how to be 
better at their jobs so that they can more readily put in place viable 
solutions.
Another benefit of the social contract is the degree to which it brings 
about societal harmony within a country. Harmony is a prized value and 
outcome in the region. It is integral to the “Asian way” prescribed by 
Prime Ministers Mahathir and Lee Kuan Yew. It is also a way to mitigate 
critique and maintain social cohesion. The new laws in India, China, and 
Indonesia seem to push in this direction. In a much-cited article, Harvard 
University professors Roberto Foa and Yascha Mounk argue that based on 
public opinion polling, young people, especially those in developed coun-
tries, are not satisfied with their governments and are open to alternatives, 
including benevolent authoritarian regimes.3
In Asia, most have not known any other kind of governance. We are at 
a pivotal juncture. It is possible that with more government curbs on non-
profits engaging in advocacy—combined with the trend labeled in this 
book as “DIY philanthropy,” when companies take on addressing social 
challenges on their own and do not work with and through nonprofit 
organizations—those organizations will starve. We could witness the 
withering away of those parts of civil society acting as contrarian voices, 
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while at the same time improving the social indicators and certain aspects 
of the quality of life for many.
On the other hand, with other new trends—including use of the 
Internet and social media, and the outpouring of support to address social 
challenges from the region’s youth—we could see an activation of civil 
engagement unparalleled in Asian history.
Throughout Asia, the seesaw dynamism between old and new influences 
societal evolution in new and interesting ways. There is considerable varia-
tion across the region, but the presumption that every country would take 
on the attributes of the developed Western world has been debunked. Asia 
is evolving with unique characteristics that differentiate it from the West.
In Chapter 1, we proposed to answer the following questions:
• Is there an “Asian” way of doing good? If there is, why so, and what 
are the implications?
• What is the Asian philanthropy and social delivery ecosystem, and 
how has it evolved?
• What are the characteristics and strategies of successful Asian SDOs?
• Why is it important to distinguish between SDOs and other types of 
nonprofit organizations?
• What are trends of Asian philanthropists and why?
• What are shared challenges for the region?
• What can donors, SDO policymakers, and the public at large do to 
enable the social sector to thrive and contribute to improving the 
lives of people throughout the region?
Only the last has not been sufficiently answered. In order to do so, we 
must ask ourselves fundamental questions about the world we want to live 
in and what values are important to us. Many say that we are living in the 
Asian century. Time will tell what the implications of that truly are.
Asia has grown into the most dynamic economic region in the world 
today. Change is happening with great dispatch. Until recently, there has 
not been much infrastructure around the charitable sector, a condition 
improving rapidly along with the expanding reach of philanthropic efforts. 
These charitable aims grow through long-standing traditions, including 
the importance of relationships and an interest in family, as well as through 
newer developments, like the leveraging of technology and governmental 
partnerships. While the region retains its challenges, many will be met 
through the increased means and desire for doing good.
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